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The whole life order was introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as the most severe 
penalty available to the judiciary in England and Wales.  It is imposed on very few offenders: 
only those convicted of crimes of ‘exceptionally high seriousness’.  Uniquely, on the grounds of 
retribution and deterrence alone, those sentenced face life-long incarceration, with no review 
and therefore no possibility of release. 
 
In the study, written sources, primary and secondary, are complemented by interviews with 
key elite respondents.  The sentence’s genesis and the challenges it poses both to those 
serving it and to prison authorities are explored.  The context, mainly the 1980s and 1990s, 
reflects a changing landscape in criminal justice: increasing stress on crime control, public 
safety, victims’ rights and on the interaction of the media, the public and politicians.  The 
period also witnesses continuing judicial-executive tension and the growing reliance on the 
ECHR by defence counsel.  
 
The study examines the many challenges to the whole life order’s legitimacy, culminating in 
the most serious: Vinter, Bamber and Moore at the ECtHR.  The sentence’s survival is at risk 
and the issues involved in the potential broadening of the penological justifications to take into 
account proportionality, public safety or rehabilitation are considered.   Any of which, it is 
argued, would require a review mechanism.  The legal and political constraints the government 
would face in identifying any necessary replacement are examined. 
 
Hope emerges as a significant issue, both in court appeals and to many respondents.  Indeed, 
the whole life order is a sentence apart in removing not only liberty but also hope from those 
serving it.  Despite the sentence being the country’s ‘ultimate’ legal punishment, there is 
surprisingly limited evidence of academic or political scrutiny of public understanding of its 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1.1   Introduction 
 
One could expect a developed system to embody a law of murder clear 
enough to yield an unequivocal result on a given set of facts, a result 
which conforms with apparent justice and has a sound intellectual base. 
This is not so in the law of England, where the law of homicide is 
permeated by anomaly, fiction, misnomer and obsolete reasoning1    
 
Since Lord Mustill’s much quoted statement, the law on homicide has been variously 
described as ‘piecemeal’,2 having boundaries ‘frozen in tradition’, 3 and having ‘little claim to 
a sound and rational base.’ 4  In 2006, the Law Commission, reporting on murder, 
manslaughter and infanticide, added its criticism.   The Commission claimed that the law 
governing homicide in England and Wales was ‘a rickety structure set upon shaky 
foundations.’ 5  It claimed that some of the rules had remained unaltered since the 
seventeenth century, even though it had long been acknowledged that they were in dire need 
of reform and that other rules were of uncertain content, often because they had been 
constantly changed to the point that they could no longer be stated with any certainty or 
clarity.  
 
The next year Lord Phillips, the then Lord Chief Justice, expressed his opinions on why the 
law of murder posed so many problems: ‘Murder remains a common law offence, although 
Parliament has been nibbling at the edges.  And because murder is such a serious offence it 
has been the subject of frequent sorties to the House of Lords, where their Lordships have 
not hesitated to attempt to improve the law – and more often than not succeeded in making 
confusion more confounded.’ 6 
 
It is not surprising that Lord Phillips, in the same speech, described the law of murder as ‘a 
political hot potato’, appearing to hold members of both parliament and the judiciary 
responsible for the problems.7    Part of the problem, as identified by many who have 
criticised the law, is the scope of the offence.   Almost sixty years ago, the Gowers 
                                                     
1 Lord Mustill in [1997] UKHL 31 
2 Ashworth and Mitchell (2000):2 
3 Ashworth (2003):257 
4 Blom-Cooper and Morris (2004):12 
5 Law Commission (2006): at 1.8. 
6 Phillips (2007b)  
7  ibid 
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Commission drew attention to how vast this scope was.8   Thirty years later the same point 
was being made in Howe when Lord Hailsham commented:  
 
Murder, as every practitioner of the law knows, though often described as 
one of the utmost heinousness, is not in fact necessarily so, but consists of 
a whole bundle of offences of vastly differing degrees of culpability, ranging 
from brutal, cynical and repeated offences like the so-called Moors 
murders to the almost venial, if objectively immoral, “mercy killing” of a 
beloved partner. 9   
 
The Gowers Commission describing its attempt to classify the offence, concluded with regret 
that ‘the object of our quest is chimerical and that it must be abandoned’. 10  Nevertheless, 
the subsequent Homicide Act of 1957 did attempt classification, identifying five capital 
crimes, but it enjoyed only a brief existence.11  The attempt at classification was returned to 
in the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003.  A range of ‘starting points’ was identified, culminating 
in whole life, together with examples of the types of murder for which judges should consider 
a whole life order.   Such crimes may be few in number but rarely is there debate over where 
they belong in any scale of proportionality.  
 
Van Zyl Smit has argued that unlike the death penalty, which is always hugely controversial, 
life imprisonment only occasionally surfaces as a headline-making issue of criminal policy.  A 
primary reason is that not only in the public mind, but also in the specialist understanding of 
penologists, there is often considerable ambiguity about what life imprisonment means. 12    
Despite van Zyl Smit’s assertion, there is no ambiguity over one particular life sentence:  the 
whole life order.  It is an extreme sentence for an extreme crime, yet one which has attracted 
surprisingly little academic interest.  True, it is, perhaps reassuringly, a sentence that is not 
frequently required.  Before 2003, offenders could be retained in prison for the remainder of 
their natural life by means of a whole life tariff.  The use of this was in the hands of a member 
of the executive - the Home Secretary - and was imposed in circumstances that lacked 
openness and transparency, even to those receiving the penalty.  It took until the Freedom of 
Information Act 2005, for example, for names and details of those serving this sentence to be 
available to the public and, even after this, lists are disputable. 13   Since the CJA 2003, the 
penalty has been judicially imposed. 
 
It can be argued that this is a critical time for the whole life order and therefore an appropriate 
time for an in-depth study on the sentence.    Since its introduction in 2003, it has faced regular 
legal challenges.14  In January 2012 the fundamental legitimacy of the sentence survived its 
                                                     
8 para 534 
9 [1987] 2 WLR 568:581 
10 para 534 
11 The Act will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4.  
12 van Zyl Smit  (2006):405  
13 The questions of the lack of openness before 2003 and the disputed figures of offenders 
serving a whole life tariff/order are discussed in Chapter 5.  
14 The various legal challenges will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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most serious challenge to date.  An application 15 to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) alleging breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was 
dismissed.  The ruling was, however, a majority ruling of 4 to 3 and an appeal to the Grand 
Chamber of the Court has been heard.  This appeal follows others to the ECtHR 16 on the 
question of the legality of irreducible life sentences.  The time is, therefore, particularly 
apposite to look not only at the genesis and application of the whole life order but also on what 
grounds the latest appeal might be successful, what the legal consequences could be of the 
sentence not being available to the judiciary, and what options would be available to the 
government if the Strasbourg court ruled against the order.    
 
Before 1965, the most heinous of offences could have attracted the death penalty, a sentence 
that increasingly was the focus of controversy and criticism.  It has been suggested that a 
significant flaw in many abolitionist campaigns was the lack of attention given to what would 
replace the death penalty. 17  In English law the replacement was the mandatory life sentence, 
which in turn has been subject to much debate.  Having a mandatory life sentence that has the 
potential to be just that  - a sentence which means an offender is imprisoned for the rest of his 
natural life  - might well be expected to attract some debate.  Bedau, as well as opposing the 
death penalty, has stated his opposition to any replacement which results in life-long 
imprisonment, calling such a penalty ‘itself a morally unacceptable deprivation of freedom.’ 18  
Certainly it poses practical challenges to the prison service and these challenges are another 
pertinent aspect of this current study.    
 
Two comments perhaps exemplify the approach taken.  Lacey and Wells have written, when 
discussing violence, that  ‘legal definitions do not capture neatly the areas over which the net 
of legal enforcement is cast.  Social and cultural forces exercise as strong and pervasive an 
influence.’ 19   Ashworth has stated that ‘reform of the criminal law is unavoidably political and 
reform of homicide law is essentially political.’20    It was indeed impossible to explain the 
origins and application of the whole life order without examining its political, social and 
constitutional background.  One important element was the role of the Home Secretary, which 
was an on-going focus of tension between the executive and the judiciary. 
 
Downes and Morgan contest that  ‘at the beginning of the twenty first century we think of law 
and order as emotive, fundamentally political issues: we have got used to the fact that they 
arouse passionate political debate’.  They add that this was a relatively recent development 
and that, until the 1960s, law and order was almost absent from contentious party political 
                                                     
15 Vinter, Bamber & Moore v the United Kingdom  [2012] ECHR 61  
16 Principally Kafkaris [2008] ECHR 143 
17 Hodginson, Gyllensten & Peel  (2010):20   
18 Bedau (1997):87  
19 Lacey and Wells (1998):601  
20 Ashworth (2007):342   
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discourse. 21.  As will be seen, the issues surrounding the CJA 2003 undoubtedly reflect the 
increasing politicisation of law and order and its increasing interweaving with public and media 
opinion.    
 
 
1.2    Research questions and research design 
 
It was reassuring to read that Noakes and Wincup believe, for the qualitative researcher, the 
process of designing a project to pursue specific research questions, and then managing and 
analysing emerging data, is not a static or inflexible process and that best practice 
incorporates a willingness to adapt and adjust accordingly. 22  This study on the whole life 
order involved more than one occasion when adjustment and adaptation were required.  It is a 
qualitative research project that reflects an inductive approach, owing much to the grounded 
theory of Glaser and Strauss.23  Although the topic arose from an existing interest, it was 
approached with an openness that allowed a degree of flexibility to respond receptively to 
emerging data.  Initial ongoing analysis of data encouraged re-examination of the research 
questions and helped direct future, and at times revised, avenues of data collection.  The 
process was iterative in nature with ongoing interaction between data collection, analysis and 
the research questions.   
 
The original research questions, which were later to be refined rather than greatly altered, 
were: 
 
1. Why, within the Criminal Justice Act 2003 , was a judicially imposed whole life order 
introduced as the most severe penalty in English law? 
2. In its application, in what ways does this sentence pose practical challenges to those 
serving the sentence and to those charged with their care and security? 
3. In its application, does the sentence itself face deontological challenges?    
 
Bryman suggests various stimuli which lead to the choice of research area: personal interest; 
desire to test a particular theory; solving a puzzle; examination of a new development; the 
impact of a particular social problem. 24   The current study first appealed because the 
researcher, aware of the introduction of a new ‘ultimate’ penalty, wanted to know both why it 
had been introduced and also why its introduction seemed to be of such little interest to 
academic researchers and, indeed also, to the world outside academia.  Such an extreme 
sentence surely posed challenges to those serving it, to the authorities required to imprison 
such offenders and also, perhaps, to those charged with imposing it.   Similarly, such an 
                                                     
21 Downes & Morgan (2006):201   
22 Noakes and Wincup (2004):122  
23 Glaser and Strauss  (1967)   Glaser (1992) 
24 Bryman (2012):88 
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extreme sentence surely would attract deontological challenges, most typically in the form of 
legal appeals.   Dey argues that the researcher requires an open mind but not necessarily an 
empty mind.25   Prior knowledge is not a disadvantage as long as the researcher remains 
sensitive to the data and does not come with predetermined ideas.  The researcher of this 
study came with an open, if questioning mind, and welcomed the flexibility of an approach that 
allowed the development of theory whilst grounding the account in the emerging data. 
 
The research design was straightforward.  Data would be collected from scrutinising 
documentary sources, insights gained from secondary sources, and from interviewing key elite 
individuals with experience and knowledge of politics, the law and prisons.  Ongoing data 
analysis would identify relevant themes that would direct the next stage of the study to allow 
research questions to be answered.  Throughout the process there would be awareness of the 
need for rigour and for ensuring validity and reliability of data.  The basic research design 
outlined was followed, although flexibility was required as the journey became much more 
wide-ranging than anticipated and, on encountering potential dead ends, there was indeed a 
need to be able ‘to adapt and adjust’.   A boring journey it never was. 
 
 
1.3      The research journey 
 
1.3.1     Initial stages: historical research 
 
The central focus of study is Sections 269 and 270 and Schedules 21 and 22 of the CJA 2003, 
and an obvious place to start was an examination of what these comprised and both the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ they came into being.  The first two - the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ were relatively 
straightforward.  The ‘why’ was anything but straightforward as it encompassed the analysis of 
many different interwoven themes and issues.      
 
Many of the initial primary sources examined related to statutes and executive decision-
making. These included White Papers, public consultation documents, Bills, Acts, ministerial 
statements, Hansard reports from both Houses and from parliamentary committees, and 
selected Cabinet minutes.  These were complemented by reports from non-governmental 
bodies relating to law and order issues, party political statements, media coverage and 
statements by public figures.   
 
Scrutiny of the sources identified themes which were to be revisited and reassessed 
throughout the research process.  These included:    
 
 
                                                     
25 Dey (1993):63  
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• the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, 
including how far parliament should legislate on sentencing matters; 
• the limits of judicial discretion in sentencing, especially in relation to the mandatory life 
sentence for murder; 
• the provision of an appropriate sentence for crimes considered the most heinous and 
most serious; 
• the change from secrecy to transparency in the ‘sentencing’ of offenders to 
imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life; 
• the varying emphasis on different sentencing purposes in different decades, and even 
within decades;  
• the increasing influence of human rights, especially in the form of the ECHR and the 
ECtHR, in the sentencing of offenders and the treatment of prisoners;  
• political debate on issues of law and order and the growing influence of public opinion 
and the media on that debate. 
 
It became obvious very early that any analysis of the 2003 Act could only be completed when 
previous relevant legal and political data had been examined in order to consider its genesis.   
The immediate reasons for the introduction of the whole life order were rulings in appeal 
cases, both domestic and European, which required a suppression of the Home Secretary’s 
powers to decide on the length of time offenders serving sentences for murder could be 
detained, including the decision that for some this would mean imprisonment for the remainder 
of their natural life.   Such decision-making had been performed within the Home Office, far 
from the public’s gaze.  Recognition of the importance of the appeals which had necessitated 
the change, led the researcher to realise that analysis of judicial rulings would be a major 
element of the study.   This resulted in extensive study of court cases, mostly appeals, both 
prior to the CJA 2003 and since, a period in which the whole life order faced increasingly 
serious challenges.    
 
When examining the court cases for the period before 2003, a historical approach, which 
identified the successive steps in the restriction of the Home Secretary’s powers, was thought 
the best means of making the developments clear.   Much more consideration was needed on 
how to present the significant points of cases post-2003.  Structuring by means of a thematic 
approach had a strong claim to being the logical means of proceeding.  For instance, to 
classify cases where Schedule 22 applied (ie where a tariff needed to be set or reset for 
crimes committed before the Act took effect)  and where Schedule 21 applied (ie for crimes 
committed after the Act took effect), and then considering sub-themes within each of these.    
However, this logical way of proceeding came up against the reality of the cases.  It might 
have been supposed that Schedule 22 ‘transitional’ cases would be clustered in the period 
immediately following the Act.  This proved not to be the case.  For example, the hearing 
that finally determined the whole life order for Peter Coonan/Sutcliffe did not take place until 
 15 
2010.   This means that Schedule 21 and 22 cases were interwoven over the period, and 
precedents were set which applied not only to cases relating to one, but also to the other.    
Moreover, another disadvantage of a thematic approach was that many of the cases involved 
more than one theme. 26  The final concern was how to allow sufficient focus on the Vinter, 
Bamber and Moore cases 27 and to explore why they felt it necessary to apply to the ECtHR.   
The cases involving these appellants are of central importance to this study because of the 
strength of their appeal against the whole life order and the possibility that the ruling in the 
Grand Chamber will either confirm the legitimacy of the whole life order or require changes, 
which would mean legislation.   It was, therefore, decided to follow a historical ordering when 
analysing cases rather than discussing them on a thematic basis.   
 
Much of the early research including the case analysis was, therefore, historical in nature.  It 
has been suggested that for some researchers, historical research has a contemporary 
significance in providing an important baseline for the measurement of both continuity and 
change with regard to criminal justice matters; while for others, the precursors to our current 
criminal justice process are worthy of study for their own sake. 28   Both approaches proved 
true for this study.  The extensive historical research was indeed interesting in its own right, 
but it was also crucial in understanding why the whole life order emerged when, why and how 
it did.  Every state in every period has had to find ways to punish those who have committed 
what are deemed the most serious and heinous crimes.  To understand why the current most 
severe penalty took the form that it did, it was necessary to examine what it replaced and the 
reasons why its replacement was necessary.   The need for verification of the authenticity and 
veracity of historical documentary sources was borne in mind.   Most of the sources were 
primary, sourced from official origins.  Within these sources a particular slant or bias may be 
expressed by individuals, but the sources themselves are objective and credible and their 
analysis was carefully handled to avoid any researcher bias. 
 
However, emerging themes deemed legitimate did necessitate an ever-widening range of 
sources to be identified and analysed.  The growing importance of public opinion led to the 
scrutiny of valuable related surveys, opinion polls and statements by pressure groups as well 
as an examination of media coverage.  The recognition of the interweaving of the views of the 
media, the public and politicians and the media’s disproportionate and sometimes skewed 
focus on violent crime,  led to a limited examination of this interweaving.   The changing 
emphasis on law and order as a central focus for debate in English politics led to scrutiny of 
party political approaches and to the subject of party manifestos and speeches.  Tension 
between the judiciary and the executive over roles played in ‘sentencing’ led to the search for 
                                                     
26 Perhaps the best example of this is the little known Sawoniuk [2001] ECHR 895.  This case looked, 
among other grounds,  at whether a mandatory life sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate;  whether 
imprisonment in old age or poor health would breach Article 3;  whether a long period between 
committing the crime and trial could be unjust.  
27 These cases are dealt with in Chapter 7.  
28 Noakes & Wincup  (2004):110 
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judicial statements on the subject, sometimes found in speeches made by members of the 
judiciary, sometimes in their personal writing and sometimes in judgments.  The increasing 
importance of human rights and of the influence of the ECHR and the ECtHR necessitated the 
study of the Human Rights Act  (HRA) and the scope of the ECHR and the decisions of the 
ECtHR.   
 
Most of the gathering and examination of data at this stage was unproblematic.  One particular 
element of data gathering proved more difficult.  Until very recently the Home Office, and later 
the Department of Justice, ensured that information about numbers and placements of 
offenders serving a whole life order was not publicly available. 29  Prisons, their staff and 
inmates are protected from the public knowing where high profile murderers are serving their 
sentence.   Information is often published in the media but, even since the Freedom of 
Information Act, this is inconsistent and sometimes wrong.  More accurate information was 
sought from examination of the answers to the occasional written questions in parliament – 
although even these answers are guarded and limited - and from the examination of the 
judgments in appeal cases, especially those relating to the transition arrangements in 
Schedule 22 of the CJA 2003.  Two government ministers and the Attorney General in 
interview for the study were also asked for accurate information.   
 
All the initial data collecting was complemented by literature searches for academic debate on 
the core themes, in books and legal journals, research findings and in reports of lectures and 
conferences.   Academic debate was sought on historic ‘ultimate’ state penalties particularly 
relating to the death penalty and its abolition and to the mandatory life sentence.   
Disappointingly little was identified on the whole life order, although much has been published 
on the related penalty in the USA of life without parole.  Valuable academic debate was 
identified on the philosophy and purposes of punishment, on sentencing laws and the 
philosophical principles behind them and the challenges to criminal justice in the last decades 
of the 20th century with the increasing stress on crime control.   
 
Finding and assessing historical data has often been likened to an exercise in detective work, 
and this proved apposite as the process encompassed picking up clues in the data collected 
which led to searching for further sources of information.  The lengthy ‘starting process’ at 
times seemed confusing and lacking in focus.  Glaser writes of a researcher initially feeling lost 
and seeing the data as sometimes recalcitrant.  He argues that the grounded theory 
researcher bypasses this problem by simply studying, with no preconception of what should be 
studied in advance of its emergence. 30   Adopting such an approach permitted unforeseen but 
valuable information and themes to emerge.   
                                                     
29 Since early 2012 the total numbers of prisoners serving a whole life have been included in quarterly 
figures published by the Ministry of Justice, but no further details apart from total numbers are given. This 
is considered in Chapter 5. 
30 Glaser (1992):25-26 
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1.3.2     The necessity to ‘adapt’ and ‘adjust’ 
 
When the initial period of data collection was well established, the next step was to study the 
working of the whole life order.  In particular, to explore what challenges it posed and what 
challenges it faced.  
 
It was decided to concentrate first on any practical problems the whole life order posed.  The 
most obvious challenges identified were those facing offenders serving the sentence.  With no 
review available, these prisoners are aware they will be incarcerated for the remainder of their 
natural life.  The immediate responsibility of dealing with this group belongs to the prison 
authorities: from day-to-day supervision at prison level to the overall national responsibility 
held by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS).  It was decided that this study 
would benefit from fieldwork in the prison sector, comprising interviews with relevant prisoners, 
and staff members both from within prisons and within NOMS.  The aim was to discover how 
the authorities identified and met the needs of those serving a full life in prison and how the 
prisoners themselves viewed their punishment.    It was always going to be a sensitive area.   
 
An initial enquiry to NOMS made it clear that no research in prison would be considered 
without clearance first from the King’s College Ethics Committee.   Being aware of the 
sensitivity of interviewing prisoners serving a whole life order, who potentially could be both 
vulnerable and dangerous, a great deal of thought was given to preparing questions and 
information sheets for participants,  all with extensive safeguards and reassurances in relation 
to confidentiality and anonymity, including how any information would be stored, accessed and 
used.  Similar care was taken with information sheets and potential questions for prison 
officials.  After a very lengthy process and many revisions and refinements, the Ethics 
Committee granted permission.   NOMS then provided request forms for seeking research 
access.  The process was frustrating at many levels.  Having completed and submitted the 
forms, it was discovered a new system had been introduced and different forms were now 
required.  This meant a missed ‘window’ available for submission and further delay ensued.  
When the decision was conveyed, it was disappointing.  NOMS refused access to prisoners 
serving a whole life order on the grounds the research would be dealing with vulnerable 
prisoners.   Reluctantly accepting the decision, a follow up approach was made requesting 
access to prison governors and key staff working with these prisoners.  Detailed explanation  
was provided, including how the research could be of benefit to the prison service.  This  
access was again refused on the grounds that refusal of any research application meant a 
total blanket refusal and no further consideration of separate parts could be given. 
 
Perhaps it was naïve to assume that fieldwork would be allowed.  More than thirty years ago,  
Cohen and Taylor commented on the difficulties of gaining access for research in prisons, 
saying that such requests are  ‘trapped in a complex web of social and political restrictions’ 
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and complained of the authorities exercising a high degree of control over such research.31  
This appears to be an on-going problem, as almost twenty years later Lee asserted that such 
research could be surrounded by political and moral controversy in that it ‘illuminates the dark 
corners of society’. 32   More recently, Hughes supported this and maintained ‘not least among 
our society’s ‘dark corners’ are the institutions of the criminal justice system itself’. 33   
Radzinowitz had asserted that the Home Office set a customer-contractor relationship for 
deciding an agenda for research, with the agenda being set in relation to the administrator’s 
(and ultimately the minister’s) conception of what knowledge was needed. 34   Although the 
researcher was aware of these comments, it was hoped that with the advent of NOMS these 
difficulties belonged to the past.  Sadly, in the case of this study, this was not so.  
 
As exploring the challenges posed by the sentence was so crucial to the research, different 
strategies were explored and adopted.  Although the methodology had to be changed, 
ironically the alternative sources of data proved extremely enlightening and the enforced 
change arguably gave more depth as well as breadth of response.  Instead of interviewing 
prisoners and prison staff, it was decided to extend the range of respondents and also to 
explore a similarly wide range of pertinent written sources.  Much has been written in praise of 
different forms of triangulation and methodological pluralism, and in this current study using 
more than one method and more than one main source of data encouraged and facilitated 
both increased depth and accuracy.  
 
The choice of respondents was not one of random sampling.  It was a strategic and purposive 
selection of respondents, chosen after a refocusing of the research questions had identified 
key areas requiring elucidation and key people capable of doing this.  Gaining access to the 
respondents relied upon some personal networking, some limited snowballing and some more 
traditional ‘cold’ approaches.   
 
To gain data on life inside a prison and the challenges a whole life order poses, Dame Anne 
Owers, recently retired Chief Inspector of Prisons was interviewed, as was Phil Wheatley, 
former Director General of NOMS and former Director General of HM Prison Service. Two 
representatives of the Prison Governors Association (PGA) were also interviewed, as was 
Frances Crook, the Chief Executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform.  Contact was 
made with a Home Office official who worked in the field of prisons and prisoners and who 
provided interesting information about prison life for some of those serving sentences for the 
most heinous of crimes.  Because of her position, she did not wish to be identified.   
 
 
                                                     
31 Cohen and Taylor (1977):77 
32 Lee (1993):2 
33 Hughes (2000):238  
34 Radzinowitz (1994):101 
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Interviews in prison had been refused by NOMS, but a former life prisoner, released after 
serving a sentence of more than 30 years, was interviewed.  An offender serving a whole life 
order, Jeremy Bamber, was contacted by mail and a long-standing regular written 
correspondence ensued.  This proved particularly valuable, partly because of his willingness to 
discuss his prison life and partly because his appeal case is pivotal in the legal challenge 
facing the sentence.  He very generously gave access, among other things, to his legal team’s 
submissions. 35  
 
As part of the triangulation approach, in addition to these contacts, data about life in prison for 
those serving either long life sentences or, in the USA, sentences of life without parole was 
gained by reading first-person accounts of prison life published in book form.  Another former 
lifer, Erwin James had written, both while in prison and after release, a book and also a regular 
column in a newspaper and this also added to the width of data examined.  The monthly 
newspaper for prisoners, Inside Time, also provided valuable articles.   Also illuminative were 
the extensive writings of a notable former HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Lord Ramsbotham, 
as well as his contributions to debates in the House of Lords. 
 
Another form of pluralistic approach when collecting data was extensive reading of academic 
comment on prisons and prison life and conditions.  Relevant material was found on issues 
arising from conditions of maximum security; the problems of ageing and dying in prison; 
facilities specifically for long term prisoners; safeguards for fellow offenders and staff when 
faced with dangerous inmates; and therapeutic approaches within prisons.  As mentioned, 
very little was identified specifically on the whole life order.  
 
All the interviews and written data analysis were used to seek information on the particular 
range of challenges and issues facing those prisoners who have to face a future of life with no 
possibility of review or release.   The data was used to identify the parallel challenges faced by 




1.3.3      Interviewing throughout the research process 
 
The respondents with knowledge of prison life, mentioned in the previous section, were only 
one group interviewed for the study.  Another group comprised members of parliament.  Within 
this group, two sub-groups were identified.  Firstly, it was important to ask politicians involved 
in the passing of the CJA 2003, or in the period leading to it, of their memories and views on 
                                                     
35 As he is currently involved in appeals both in domestic and European courts, he asked that some of 
his information should be used by the researcher as background information to gain understanding but 
should not be included in the study as appeals are on-going.    
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the principles of the Act.   Secondly, it was deemed important to ask key, current politicians 
about their attitude to the whole life order, whether they thought it would survive the challenges 
it faces in European courts and what, in their opinion, would happen if it was compromised as 
a legitimate sentence.   
 
Of the MPs involved in the passing of the CJA 2003, three key individuals were identified and 
an interview with each was achieved.   David Blunkett, the Home Secretary who introduced the 
Bill, was interviewed, as was Dominic Grieve, who was the Opposition main spokesman in the 
debates, and Simon Hughes, who was the main Liberal Democrat spokesman.  It was thought 
of interest to interview John Bercow, because of his contribution to the debates on the 
proposed whole life order as he was one of the very few wanting to discuss the principle of the 
sentence.  When approached, his office responded that because of his current position of 
Speaker of the House of Commons, he could not participate.     
 
By happy chance, Dominic Grieve when interviewed was by then the current Attorney General 
and he generously answered questions relating both to 2003 and to current appeals 
concerning the whole life order.  However, he explained that his current post precluded his 
commenting openly on any legal matter so all his views, for example, on the possible outcome 
and consequences of the Vinter, Bamber and Moore appeal, would be strictly off the record 
and could be used only as a way of helping the researcher understand principles and practice 
and could not be quoted in the study.   A previous Home Secretary, Michael Howard, who 
played an important part in the genesis of the whole life order and its predecessor the whole 
life tariff, could not give an interview but provided written answers to questions.  The current 
Home Secretary, Theresa May, was also interviewed.  The then Justice Secretary declined an 
interview but a member of the Justice Department, Lord McNally, agreed to be interviewed and 
answered questions both as a government minister and as a spokesman for his Liberal 
Democrat party.  A former Justice Minister in the Scottish Parliament, Lord Wallace, was 
approached and agreed to an interview and, when a suitable date could not be arranged, 
submitted a very detailed and useful response to questions based on Scotland’s statutory 
position in relation to the penalty for the most heinous of crimes.  The current Justice Minister 
of the Scottish Parliament was approached but after an initial favourable response, the 
promised contribution was not forthcoming. 
 
Those who participated were extremely generous both in their time and in the openness of 
their responses.  The major disappointment was the current Labour Party front bench, who 
would not supply anyone to be interviewed.  The Shadow Justice Secretary was approached 
by letter and by email three times but no response at all was received.  The Deputy Leader of 
the Party, Harriet Harman, was then approached, not only as Deputy but also in her role as 
spokesperson for Human Rights, but her secretary responded saying she did not have time for 
an interview.   
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A selection of lawyers and judges with experience of trials or appeals which involved whole life 
orders – or involved particularly serious crimes which did not result in the sentence -  was 
interviewed in respect of legal and ethical issues surrounding potential whole life orders and 
their attitude to them.  Direct contact was made and an interview given by Lord Phillips, in light 
not only of his experience as former Lord Chief Justice (LCJ) and as former President of the 
Supreme Court but, in particular, of his determination in Bieber 36 and Jones. 37   A personal 
friend provided an introduction to a barrister who was also a part time judge, who had been the 
prosecutor in a trial that resulted in a whole life order being imposed.   The friend also provided 
an introduction to a member of a set of successful chambers that led to further introductions to 
two experienced criminal law barristers, one of whom facilitated access to a Lord Justice.   He, 
as well as giving very generously of his time for two interviews, enabled attendance of the 
researcher at the Court of Appeal when it considered in detail crimes ‘of exceptionally high 
seriousness’ in a key appeal case. 38  He also provided an introduction to a fellow Lord Justice 
who also agreed to an interview.   The senior judges interviewed were liberal with their time 
and their views but asked for their contributions to be non-identifiable because of their 
positions.  In the study they are identified simply as ‘a senior judge’ and referred to as ‘he’ to 
avoid speculation over gender.  Networking also provided an introduction to Edward Fitzgerald  
QC, considered of particular importance for his role as defence counsel in appeals against 
whole life orders.  To balance this legal perspective, Lord Pannick was interviewed in his role 
as QC for the government, in many cases opposing Mr Fitzgerald.    Although not in interview 
form, further data on the judiciary’s views was gathered by reading numerous speeches given 
by senior judges.  A book written by Lord Bingham, the former LCJ, also added insight. 
 
The Probation Service was not approached because those serving a whole life order would 
never be considered for probation but it was felt of interest to interview members of the police 
who had been involved in cases of high seriousness.  Their views would be sought on their 
perceptions of the whole life order and the justification for it and also of relevant attitudes of the 
public with whom they were in contact.  A personal contact provided an introduction to Janet 
Williams, Metropolitan Police Deputy Assistant Commissioner, who in turn provided an 
introduction to her colleague, Commander Simon Foy.  Both had areas of responsibility that 
involved serious violent crime, including murder.  They gave long, full and valuable interviews.  
A retired senior detective officer, Russell Allen, volunteered to facilitate the circulation of a 
questionnaire to a number of his retired colleagues, which included questions relevant to this 
study.  Although only individual interviews had been planned, the offer of a greater breadth of 
responses was welcomed.  Fifty former detectives completed the questionnaire.  
 
 
                                                     
36 Bieber  [2008] EWCA  Crim 1601     
37 Jones   [2005] EWCA  Crim 3115 
38 Oakes  [2012] EWCA  Crim 2435 
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As withdrawing from prisoners any hope of release raises difficult moral and ethical questions, 
it was decided that faith groups would be approached.  Their views on the sentence and its 
justification were sought, as were their views on punishment and long term imprisonment.  The 
Church of England Bishop for Prisons, the head of the Catholic Church in England, the Chief 
Rabbi and the leader of the Hindu Forum were contacted by letter and asked their views on 
the role of punishment and whether imprisoning offenders for the remainder of their lives could 
be justified.  The Humanist Society was also invited to participate.  All these groups responded 
generously.  The Muslim League was contacted, but wanted oversight of not only what was 
being written about the Muslim faith but also the research as a whole.  This was courteously 
declined. 
 
All interviews and questionnaires were used to explore key themes that had emerged from 
analysing the documentary sources.   On looking at the list of people interviewed, the selection 
could arguably fit the methodological process of elite interviewing, where people who are 
influential, prominent and well informed are selected.  This form of interviewing has been 
recommended by Tansey as being able to shed light on the hidden elements of action that are 
not necessarily clear from analysis of political or legal outcomes or from primary sources.  This 
allows the interviewer to seek information at first-hand from participants of the processes 
under investigation, obtaining accounts from direct witnesses to the events in question.39  
Certainly, every interview for this study provided such insights and undoubtedly supplied 
details of underlying contexts that were of pertinent interest and could not have been gained in 
other ways.  The information was used partly as background for the researcher to allow a 
deeper understanding of the subject and partly to illustrate elements of the study itself.  The 
researcher was always aware that respondents could deliberately or instinctively slant their 
accounts because of their personal involvement or their political views, but close scrutiny of 
the recorded interviews produced no evidence of this.  On occasions, politicians differentiated 
between what was party policy and what were their own views, but there never appeared to be 
any attempt to be anything but straightforward and honest in response.  The quality of the 
knowledge and experience demonstrated and the willingness to answer everything asked – 
even if some comments were ‘off the record’ - was a particularly striking aspect of the 
interviewing process.   
 
The face-to-face interviews with respondents were semi-structured and, with their permission, 
all were recorded.  The average length was 40 minutes, with the shortest being 30 minutes 
and the longest 90 minutes.  The recordings were not fully transcribed but extensive notes 
were taken from each recording to allow for identification and highlighting of key topics and key 
responses.  Questions varied for each respondent because their experience differed and the 
particular area of focus to be probed varied.  The semi-structured approach was planned 
round a series of pre-selected, open-ended questions that allowed follow-up questions and the 
                                                     
39 Tansey (2007):24 
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expansion of points raised.  Open-ended flexible questioning ensured the researcher was 
actively engaged in listening and probing more deeply where needed.  Glaser writes of the 
importance of an interviewer not preconceiving the emergence of data but maximising the 
acquisition of non-forced data. 40   Beardsworth and Keill recommend open-ended discursive 
questions to permit an iterative process of refinement so that a line of thought identified by 
earlier respondents can be taken up and presented for further comment.41   Both aspects 
proved effective in the interviews for this study.  The experience of interviewing was 
exceptionally worthwhile, vastly surpassing any expectation held, with the respondents 
providing in virtually every case intelligent, thoughtful, pertinent and original views on the 
subjects broached.   
 
 
1.3.4    The research questions revisited 
 
Having analysed how the whole life order posed challenges, researching whether the sentence 
itself faced any challenges proved more straightforward.  Most challenges were court based.  
Appeals against the sentence, or the transitional arrangements in Schedule 22, were identified 
and transcripts of court determinations were studied.  For approximately five years after its 
introduction, most appeals were used by the judiciary to clarify the sentence and its 
application.  Increasingly, however, the appeals in both domestic and European courts 
reflected a more serious challenge to the very legitimacy of the sentence itself.  
 
The emphasis in the original research question as to whether the sentence faced challenges 
had changed to whether the sentence could survive such challenges in its current form.   
Subsidiary questions then arose relating to what changes the ECtHR could demand and what 
the likely response would be to any such reform.  By reflecting on the data collected, both 
documentary and oral, it became clear that any changes in the sentencing of those convicted 
of the most heinous, and invariably high-profile murders, would lead to politicians, the public 
and the media expressing strong views.   
 
Public and political acceptance is required for reform of the law of homicide to succeed, and 
social and cultural forces exercise a strong influence on the subject.   Hudson, writing on 
research methodology, also suggests that as crime and punishment are both intensely political 
and moral issues, an awareness is needed of the political and moral stances taken on crime 
and punishment by particular societies at particular times.42  Although attention had been paid 
earlier in the research to the public and the media’s attitudes to crime, especially murder, and 
to how these attitudes interweave with politicians’ stances, more investigation was carried out 
on this area with fuller examination of recent surveys of public attitudes on the subject.  
                                                     
40 Glaser (1992):25 
41 Beardsworth and Keil (1992):261-2 cited in Bryman (2012):472 
42 Hudson (2000):175 
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With even a possibility of the ECtHR ruling now or in the future that the whole life order as it 
stands could not be sustained, research attention was paid to the possibility of those serving 
the sentence being awarded a review mechanism and how this might be provided.  Any review 
could bring into play the concept of risk and dangerousness, currently irrelevant as the whole 
life order is imposed purely on a retributive and deterrence basis.  The theory and academic 
views of risk and dangerousness were, therefore, examined.   
 
Sometimes serendipity plays a part in research, and it did so in this study.  The completion of 
the thesis was delayed for professional reasons and, during the delay, a domestic appeal 43 of 
core importance to the study was heard.  The researcher was able to attend to hear the 
arguments put forward and subsequently to analyse the judgment.   This ruling, given by no 
fewer than five Lord/Lady Justices, reinforced the judicial view that the whole life order was a 
valid and legitimate sentence.  The delay allowed this important judgment to be integrated into 
this current study. 
 
Another case, however, has not been able to be included.   Six months before the deadline for 
submission, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR heard a case that could have major 
implications for the whole life order.   It was announced that the ruling would be published any 
time between three and nine months from the hearing.   Because of the determination’s 
potential importance, the announcement has been awaited with impatience to see if it could be 
included in this study.  Senior lawyers with experience of the ECtHR suggested to the 
researcher that because of the sensitivity of the appeal, the Court might well take longer than 
nine months to give the ruling, citing other cases which had taken up to two years for a 
determination to be given.    Despite initial disappointment, it is apparent on reflection that 
even if the ruling had been given in time for inclusion, no immediate action could have or 
would have been taken by the government in response.  One has only to look at the 
government’s pattern of response to some ECtHR rulings to appreciate that any response 
takes time.   In light of the ruling not having been available, Chapter Seven looks at how the 
rulings may be received and examines potential responses.    
   
 
1.4    The study outline  
 
In order to understand the genesis of the whole life order, Chapter Two examines past 
penalties for the most serious crimes.   The history of the death penalty in Britain is analysed, 
concentrating on the parliamentary debates that chart the slow process of the restriction in its 
use and its abolition.  Thereafter the study concentrates on the legal position in England and 
Wales.  The introduction of the mandatory life sentence and the on-going controversy 
surrounding it is discussed.   The period following the abolition of the death penalty up until the 
                                                     
43 Oakes [2012]  EWCA Crim 2435 
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New Labour Government being elected in 1997 is examined, concentrating in particular on:  
the role of the Home Secretary in tariff setting and the attempts to restrict his powers; and the 
1991 Criminal Justice Act with its focus on ‘just deserts’ in sentencing and the subsequent 
retreat from it.   Particular appeals which affected the powers of the Home Secretary are 
scrutinised and themes which begin to emerge as central to this study are noted.  
 
Chapter Three is concerned with the period 1997 to 2003, which saw the Home Secretary 
losing his power to set tariffs.  A succession of court cases was followed, not by legislation, but 
by ministerial statements giving his response to each restriction of his powers.  The increasing 
importance of public opinion and media attitudes to law and order, and the influence they have 
on political views, provides a rolling background.    
 
Chapter Four discusses the passage of the CJA through parliament.  The societal and 
political background was discussed in the previous chapter and now the academic penological 
context and debate is examined.  The Act reshaped the sentencing framework established by 
CJA 1991.  The late introduction of the Sections related to the whole life order, and the lack of 
controversy over these, is considered, as is the reaction to the Act.   
 
Having looked in these early chapters at how those found guilty of the most heinous of crimes 
are dealt with in England and Wales, Chapter Five first considers how these crimes are 
punished in other jurisdictions.  The whole life order poses challenges to those offenders who 
are given the sentence, as well as to the prison authorities that have to keep them secure. This 
chapter reflects mainly on prisoners and prisons in this context.  It looks at the numbers of 
lifers involved and the nature of the crimes for which their whole life sentence has been 
awarded.    The development of maximum security prisons is noted and the implications of 
rising prison costs and numbers considered.   The treatment of those serving whole life 
sentences is examined as are issues that particularly affect them, such as challenges related 
to the elderly and the dying in prison.  
 
Following on from the challenges the whole life order poses, the study in Chapter Six looks at 
the challenges it has faced.  After discussing relevant constitutional and political developments 
in the period after the introduction of the whole life order, in particular the tensions between the 
judiciary and the executive, the chapter concentrates on court cases which featured appeals 
against the whole life sentence and scrutinises the determinations made by the judiciary to 
clarify the sentence.    
 
Chapter Seven examines in depth the most serious challenge faced by the whole life order to 
date.   The possible future of the sentence is discussed, using the information and analysis of 
pertinent issues from the earlier chapters.  These include:  the attitude of the media and public  
to the sentencing of murder; the influence of these on political views; attitudes in Britain to  
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decisions of the ECtHR; the potential need to introduce a review system for those sentenced 
to whole life; the issues surrounding the need to assess future risk and dangerousness.    
 
Chapter Eight presents conclusions, which are drawn from the study, with an emphasis on 
the importance of hope and how far the whole life order is a sentence apart.   
 
 
 1.5      Conclusion 
 
It has been said that research is ‘the art of the feasible’ and to a large extent what was desired 
for this research proved to be feasible.  There were disappointments and enforced diversions, 
largely the refusal of access to prisons by NOMS and the lack of co-operation by the current 
Labour Front Bench.  The latter had to be accepted as regrettable. The former could be 
accommodated by adopting a pluralistic methodological approach.  The alternative methods 
adopted to gather data ironically turned out to be extremely rewarding for the study.   
 
The research questions were adapted as part of a legitimate process of ongoing analysis of 
the emerging data.  Indeed the work not originally planned added value by allowing additional 
depth to the work.   
 
At the beginning of the research journey, the whole life order had been thought of as an 
important topic to investigate because of its role as the state’s ultimate penalty.  Those 
sentenced were often high profile offenders but the sentence itself had not attracted academic 
attention.    The researcher felt it of value to undertake a study, which for the first time 
gathered together the wide range of elements of the subject, most notably:  the circumstances 
which necessitated the whole life order’s introduction and the debate surrounding that reform;  
the application and clarification of the sentence by the judiciary, through the identification and 
examination of appeals; the practical implications of the sentence for those serving it and on 
those responsible for them during their sentence;  consideration of the possible future of the 
sentence and possible enforced alternatives;  the implication and influence of political and 










Schedule 21 of the CJA  2003 introduced into English law the judicially imposed whole life 
order: 44 
 
 If        (a)     the court considers that the seriousness of the offence … is  
                                exceptionally high  
            and  
      (b)     the offender was aged 21 or over when he committed the offence, 
                                the appropriate starting point is a whole life order.  45 
 
This was the first time a hierarchy of sentences for different murders was laid down by statute.  
The crimes for which the sentence of whole life would be imposed are those at the apex of the 
hierarchy.  While the variety of sentencing purposes in the Act have been criticised for being 
wide ranging and potentially in conflict with one another in individual cases, 46 the whole life 
order unambiguously aims to achieve retribution and deterrence.  Preventative sentencing, 
which gives rise to risk assessment and the protection of the public from future 
dangerousness, plays no part in the judicial reasoning and, in consequence, there are no 
review mechanisms available to those serving the whole life sentence.  
 
During the 2002 Commons debate on the Criminal Justice Bill, the Home Secretary David 
Blunkett was asked about his justification for the whole life sentence. 47  He replied:    
 
I am motivated, as is indicated by the sentencing framework and the new 
purposes of sentencing, by the desire to show those who are engaged in such 
actions that there will be clear and unequivocal consequences. …   I am also 
engaged with the need to punish.  Punishment means that there is an element 
of retribution on behalf of society. These aims are not the least contradictory 
and that is why we were careful to ensure they were not contradictory in the 
provisions on the purposes of sentences. 48 
 
Blunkett’s defence, stressing the need for retribution and deterrence, is perhaps unsurprising 
in light of the gravity of the particular crimes he was discussing.   Eight years earlier, another 
politician, Ann Widdecombe, when a Home Office Minister, had stressed that punishment for 
criminal behaviour is morally appropriate in its own right and by punishing the offender society 
expresses its condemnation of his or her wrongdoing.49   This idea of sentencing reflecting a 
legitimate expression of society’s condemnation has also been acknowledged by academics.   
                                                     
44 See Appendix A for the relevant sections of the Act:  Sections 269 & 270 and Schedule 21.  
45 CJA 2003 Schedule 21 4 (1)    
46 Ashworth (2005):74 
47 Hansard HC  20 May 2003 col 868  (John Bercow) 
48 ibid  col 867-8 
49 Widdecombe (1995):2 
 28 
Wasik argued for desert based punishment, saying its defining feature is ‘the formal and 
official imposition of blame and censure’ and citing von Hirsch, who stated that punishment is 
‘a blaming institution which reflects the widely understood and widely endorsed moral practice 
of blaming.’ 50    The concept of condemnation and blaming is perhaps particularly apposite 
when considering those being punished for crimes leading to a whole life order.  It echoes the 
belief expressed by Lord Denning forty years earlier, when he stated that the ultimate 
justification of punishment is not that it is a deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation 
by the community of a crime. 51  In the same period, in debates on the abolition of the death 
penalty, Lord Goddard had pointed out that there were certain offenders who demonstrate the 
basest level of depravity human nature can sink to. 52 
 
The group of offenders receiving the whole life order is very small in number yet often it is the 
focus of such denunciation by the public and media, who treat these offenders with particular 
abhorrence.  Cullen and Newell wrote of the tendency of the public to consider some offenders 
as a class apart, one requiring very particular, perhaps unique, punishment:  ‘There seems an 
instinct in man to create a distance between those of us who live (relatively) law-abiding lives 
and those who commit terrible crimes, particularly those who kill.’ 53  Von Hirsch has warned 
against such an attitude, arguing that any sanctioning system should not be seen as one which 
‘we’ devise to prevent ‘them’ from offending. 54   The idea that there should be no ‘them’, in the 
form of offenders likely to be given a whole life order and ‘us’ in the form of the public, would, it 
is suspected, gain little support.  The public might accept that there is a possibility of overlap 
between the victim population and the offender population in the case of petty crime and even 
some violent offences.  However, few are likely to consider an overlap in relation to crimes at 
the pinnacle of any scale of heinousness.  
 
Denunciation is, of course, not the only rationale for the punishment of offenders.   Hirst has 
argued that the punishments that are commonly available at any given time mainly prevail not 
because they are chosen as the most efficacious means to an end, but because they are the 
consequences of the prevailing mode of social organisation. 55   He concludes his treatise with 
‘how and why we punish is a political issue.’ 56   To understand why, in 2003, the judicially 
imposed whole life order was introduced, it is necessary to consider the political, legal and 
societal issues, not only at the start of the 21st century, but also how these issues came to 
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2.2. The death penalty 
 
2.2.1 Changes in the death penalty to 1931 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s the ‘political issue’ that dominated debate on punishment was the 
state penalty in its most severe form, the death penalty, and on what would replace it.  This 
was a debate that would continue and ultimately lead to the introduction of the whole life order.   
By 1960, the death penalty was primarily limited not just to murder, but also to particular 
categories of murder. 57  Earlier, in the 18th century, the number of offences punishable by 
death had numbered over 200.   In the second half of that century when the so called Bloody 
Code was at its height, murder and piracy were perhaps predictably included in the list, but so 
too were stealing linen, maiming cattle, cutting down a tree, destroying a fishpond causing the 
loss of fish and sending threatening letters.58   Although it is tempting to think of this Bloody 
Code as demonstrating a bloodthirsty desire for punishment, Gatrell argues 59 that in an era 
with neither a police force nor a proper penal or prison system, it was understandable that 
politicians would wish to preserve such a sentence. 
 
The extent of punishment by death had reached its peak, however, and the first call for reform 
came in 1810 from Samuel Romilly, an ex Solicitor-General, who argued that hanging should 
be reserved for only the most serious of offences.  As a result of his work, the death penalty 
was removed for those found guilty of pick-pocketing and other similar minor offences.  Even 
over such offences, Romilly had to fight against vehement opposition in parliamentary 
debates, twice having Bills defeated when attempting to abolish capital punishment for theft of 
at least 40 shillings and shoplifting of goods to the value of five shillings.  Lord Ellenborough, 
for example, felt that such moves were ‘pregnant with danger’ and claimed, ‘Such will be the 
consequence of the repeal of this statute that I am certain that depredations to an unlimited 
extent would immediately be committed’.  He claimed that if anyone left his home for an hour 
‘every vestige of his property will be swept off by the hardened robber.’ 60  This form of 
scaremongering was still to be used the following century during the debates on the abolition 
of the death penalty.  
 
Despite entrenched attitudes, reductions in the number of capital crimes were achieved little by 
little during the first half of the 19th century, many during Robert Peel’s time as Home 
Secretary. 61   By 1861, murder along with the far less frequent crimes of treason, arson in 
royal dockyards and piracy were the only capital crimes.  The 1861 Offences Against The 
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Person Act stated for the first time in a statute that the penalty for murder was death, with 
judges and juries having the right to recommend mercy.  This prerogative of mercy was in the 
power of the Home Secretary, acting on behalf of the Crown, whereby the death sentence 
could be commuted to a life sentence.   By 1861, murder was, therefore, well on its way to 
becoming ‘a crime apart’. 62 
 
The erosion of capital punishment, even for murder, continued with the Children Act 1908 
finally ending the possibility of juveniles under 16 being hanged.  Instead, any juvenile of this 
age found guilty of murder would serve a period of detention at His Majesty’s Pleasure.  It took 
until the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 for juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 to 
escape the possibility of hanging.  By then the offence of infanticide had been introduced in 
1922 63 to replace a murder charge for any mother killing her child under the age of twelve 
months.  Pregnant women found guilty of murder also were exempt from the death penalty 
after 1931 64 with a mandatory life sentence being substituted instead.  The stage was now set 
for the very existence of the death penalty to be challenged seriously, and for demands for a 
wider debate on the justification of the penalty.  
 
 
2.2.2    Parliamentary moves to abolish the death penalty  
 
Although the abolition of the death penalty is most commonly associated with Sydney 
Silverman’s Bill of 1965, some parliamentarians had been advocating the action over the 
previous three decades.  As early as 1927, the Labour Party had published its Manifesto on 
Capital Punishment.  Although the Manifesto was strongly supported by leading members of 
the Party, when Labour formed the government in 1929, no action was taken, as Labour did 
not have an overall majority in the House of Commons.  In 1938, the issue was finally debated 
in parliament with a clause within the Criminal Justice Bill recommending a five year 
suspension of the death penalty.  Before the Bill could be fully debated and passed into law, 
World War II was declared. The Bill was postponed and the first serious opportunity to abolish 
capital punishment was lost.  
 
In 1947, the Bill was reintroduced with a five year suspension of the death penalty at its centre.   
The result was the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which was deeply disappointing to abolitionists.  
Although the House of Commons passed the clause on a free vote with a tight majority of 245 
to 222, the House of Lords immediately defeated the clause and the Labour Government did 
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not seek to re-introduce it, perhaps aware of its unpopularity in the country at large, and wary 
of the prospect of having to use the Parliament Act to overcome the opposition in the Lords.  
Bailey describes the passage through parliament as ‘a tortuous journey marked by ironies, 
dilemmas, embarrassments and recriminations’. 65  The Attlee government which, despite a 
huge majority and a media which were surprisingly abolitionist, 66 deferred to the House of 
Lords which was predominately Conservative and retentionist.  The then Lord Chief Justice, 
Lord Goddard, as seen, was particularly outspoken in his defence of the death penalty,67 
arguing that the perpetrators of certain crimes which had made him feel physical nausea were 
incapable of reform and deserved the death penalty.  He backed his argument with the claim 
that public opinion (‘public conscience’ as he said he preferred to call it) was on his side and 
the public would have no respect for the criminal law if it weakened on this issue.  
 
The following year, the Labour Government, presumably aware of the strength of feeling of 
many Members who had backed the Bill, set up a Royal Commission chaired by Sir Ernest 
Gowers.  An examination of the relevant Cabinet minutes reflects the rather reluctant approach 
of the government.  The minute reports:  ‘Most Ministers thought it inevitable that the question 
(of abolition) would be raised in one way or other during the course of the current Session and 
they feared that it would give the impression of weakness if the Government took no action 
until forced by public pressure.…  The Cabinet therefore concluded that some form of enquiry 
ought to be set on foot.’ 68  This early example of a government feeling the need to 
acknowledge the force of public opinion is noteworthy. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the remit of the Commission was less focused on the desirability of 
abolishing the death penalty than on examining ‘whether the liability to suffer capital 
punishment should be limited or modified.’  The stress was therefore not on the abolition of the 
death penalty, but how to ease the physical suffering during the act.   In a subsequent debate 
in the House of Commons it was pointed out that it took the Royal Commission four years to 
reach a conclusion after which it took the government two further years to make up their minds 
about it. 69  Even with its restricted remit, the Commission’s Report was clearly considered 
contentious.  In line with its remit, the Royal Commission concentrated on methods of capital 
punishment and made recommendations mainly related to the process rather than the 
existence of the death penalty itself.  It concluded that it was difficult to say if the death penalty 
was a successful deterrent or not, having inconclusively compared homicide rates in American 
states which had abolished the death penalty with those which had not. 70   By the time the  
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Commission reported, a Conservative government had been elected.  With the government 
appearing reluctant even to debate the Commission’s findings, it seemed the status quo would 
remain.    
One of the recurring themes in this study is how the force of public opinion and of the media 
can at times influence political decisions.   This occurred during the years of legislative 
inactivity after the Commission’s Report.  The event that drew unprecedented public and 
media attention was the execution of Derek Bentley in 1953.  Bentley was hanged, despite a 
mental age of ten and despite doubts over his role in the crime, the murder of a policeman 
shot, not by Bentley, but by his co-defendant, Christopher Craig.   Although there were public 
demonstrations and 200 members of parliament signed a motion requesting mercy for Bentley, 
the then Home Secretary Sir David Maxwell Fyfe rejected the appeal.  Bentley was executed 
and the death penalty continued.   However, a turning point had been reached and a more 
confident anti-hanging lobby emerged.  In the same year, significant public concern and 
frustration was expressed when an enquiry, set up by the Home Secretary, reported that the 
conviction and execution of Timothy Evans was safe. 71  This attracted wide criticism from the 
public and the media.  Strength was further added to the lobby when the public expressed 
sympathy towards Ruth Ellis, a mother of two, hanged in 1955 for the murder of her lover. 72  
Roy Greenslade, has claimed that how the media treated Bentley, Ellis and Evans was a 
catalyst for the abolition campaign. 73  This was, of course, before the days of televised 
debate.  Then, Britain had a vast newspaper readership and editors ensured public debate 
was kept alive, holding their own polls on the subject and encouraging their readers to 
participate in national Gallup polls.  The Mirror, for example, had major headlines on the day 
Ellis was due to hang, asking ‘Should Hanging Be Stopped?’ 74  Despite this, Gallup polls 
continued to show that the majority of the public was still opposed to abolition.  Greenslade, 
while acknowledging the influence of newspapers, accepts that the abolitionist movement 
mainly reflected liberal opinion which failed to persuade the majority of the population and that 
it was ‘primarily, as is often the case, the liberal elite speaking to the liberal elite.’ 75  76  
 
Public sympathy for Ellis, however, encouraged Sydney Silverman, in 1955, to introduce 
another abolition bill that, as in 1948, was passed by the Commons but heavily defeated in the 
Lords.  Many Members, during the earlier attempt to abolish capital punishment in 1948, had 
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been swayed by the strong conviction expressed by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe that no 
miscarriage of justice relating to the death penalty could ever take place.  Members were now 
aware that two years later Timothy Evans had been executed, shortly before evidence had 
came to light seriously questioning his guilt. 77  The government itself introduced a Bill 
designed to appease the abolitionists by limiting the instances when the penalty could be 
imposed.  This Bill would lead to the 1957 Homicide Act that would classify murders into 
capital and non-capital offences.  The Commission had argued against the classification of 
murder into capital and non-capital crimes, stating that although they had made a determined 
effort to discover an effective measure to classify murders,  ‘We conclude with regret that the 
object of our quest - that is, a compromise - is chimerical and that it must be abandoned.’ 78 
Despite the Commission’s concerns, the 1957 Act in Section 5 retained the death penalty for 
specific categories of murder:    
• murder done in the course or furtherance of theft; 
• murder done by shooting or causing an explosion; 
• murder done in resisting lawful arrest or helping someone to escape from custody; 
• murder of a police officer acting in the course of duty; 
• murder of a prison officer by a prisoner. 
 
The Homicide Act 1957, with its categories selected specifically to deter professional crime, 
would come in for serious criticism.  Blom-Cooper and Morris state that it ‘must rank as the 
most unsatisfactory examples of legislation affecting criminal justice in the twentieth century.  
Instrumentally reactive rather than constructively proactive, it began its working life with few 
friends and the number of its critics grew with the passage of time.’ 79  Certainly, in the 1965 
parliamentary debate on the abolition of the death penalty, it was variously described as being 
‘a terrible thing full of anomalies, 80  ‘a tissue of anachronisms’ 81 and requiring the 
replacement of its ‘illogicalities and ineffectiveness.’ 82   The Act’s classification of murders into 
capital and non-capital murders particularly comes in for criticism and in some instances, 
mockery.83  This classification was also criticised by the then Lord Chief Justice in 1962 as a 
‘hopeless muddle’.84  Despite the criticism, the 1957 Act resulted in fewer death penalties 
being imposed,85 but hanging as a penalty continued until the 1960s.  By this time Britain and 
France were the only two Western European countries to retain capital punishment.  Other  
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countries had abandoned the death penalty over the previous half-century 86 and statistics 
showed that in these countries where the ultimate punishment had been removed, no increase 
in murder had taken place. 87   
A new Labour Government in 1964 allowed a Private Member’s Bill proposing the abolition of 
the death penalty, again presented by Sydney Silverman.  An important clause was inserted, 
proposing abolition to be not permanent, but for a five year trial period.  Unlike earlier attempts 
at abolition, the government seemed to be more proactive in its support.  The Cabinet papers 
show that, on condition Sydney Silverman withdrew his amendment, 88 the government would 
allow sufficient time for the debates.  The minutes also show that although it was a free vote, 
any Minister who supported retention was asked to abstain rather than vote against the Bill. 89  
Despite the concerns expressed, both Houses voted through the Bill 90 to suspend capital 
punishment for five years, replacing the death penalty with a mandatory life sentence. 91  
Parliament did not wait the full five years to reassess the situation.  In December 1969, the 
Labour Government introduced a proposal to abolish the death penalty permanently, with the 
then Home Secretary James Callaghan quoting figures showing that the murder rate had 
remained stable since the abolition of the death penalty.   Both Houses voted for the final 
abolition. 92 
 
In both the 1965 and 1969 debates similar themes emerged.  Abolitionists refuted the 
deterrent value of capital punishment, claimed that public protection could be safeguarded by 
the use of life sentences and argued that giving offenders an opportunity for redemption 93 was 
more important than using the death penalty as a display of condemnation.  They also widely 
used the moral argument that capital punishment was a ‘gruesome obscene procedure’ 94 and 
that it lowered the moral standard of the whole community. 95  Public opinion polls, however,  
demonstrated that abolition would be against the preferences of the public.  More than one 
Member quoted Gallup Poll figures showing that 70% of the public were in favour of retaining 
the death penalty and Lord Tenby argued that parliamentarians could not bring forward 
legislation on behalf of the people as there was no proof at all that this is what the people 
wanted. 96  
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Sandbrook has commented that abolition could be successful in the 1960s but would not be so 
today because then there was no ‘populist political culture’. 97  It is, indeed, of interest to note 
that the governments of the day in 1965 and 1969 allowed a free vote and felt no compulsion 
to follow public opinion in the matter. 98  This contrasts with governments’ actions in the 
decades leading to the CJA 2003, which this study will examine in detail later, where pressure 
from the public and the media appeared to play an undeniable part in politicians’ approach to 
legislation.   
 
An examination of the debates on capital punishment from 1948 to 1969 show deeply 
entrenched attitudes.  On such an emotive issue perhaps this is not surprising.  Both sides 
produced statistics on public opinion and on crime levels, and conflicting claims were made 
about the levels of crime in general, but especially for murder.   Although the main debate on 
capital punishment ended in 1965, it revived during Margaret Thatcher’s time as prime 
minister when IRA terrorist atrocities occurred in England.  Thatcher was the first prime 
minister since 1969 to support the return of capital punishment.  Ironically, however, trials 
associated with IRA terrorism changed the opinions of some parliamentarians:  the cases 
involving the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four.  The defendants had been found guilty, 
sentenced and then later cleared of charges when their convictions were held to be 
miscarriages of justice. 99  These ten people would have hanged if capital punishment had 
been in force.  Michael Howard was one politician who has stated in interview that this alone 
changed him from being a supporter of the reintroduction of capital punishment to being an 
opponent. 100   
The death penalty was retained after 1969 for piracy, arson in royal dockyards and treason.  
These grounds for capital punishment were abolished in 1998, and finally in 1999 parliament 
ratified the 6th Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibiting 
capital punishment except for certain circumstances in wartime.  The wartime exceptions 
were also abolished with the ratification of the 13th Protocol in 2002.   Previously Bills to 
reinstate the death penalty had been presented unsuccessfully in the House of Commons.101 
Britain can now only restore the death penalty if it withdraws from the Council of Europe. 102 
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2.3   The mandatory life sentence 
Another important development in the genesis of the whole life tariff and the whole life order 
was the introduction of the mandatory life sentence.  In the 1957 Act the offence of non-
capital murder attracted the penalty of a mandatory life sentence.  In the debates leading to 
the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 Section 1(1) proposals were made to 
replace this sentence with a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment, but this was 
defeated in parliament and the mandatory life sentence for all murders became law.  This is 
still in place today.   Despite ongoing criticism, successive Home Secretaries, and more 
recently Secretaries of State for Justice, have stressed that there is no plan to replace the 
mandatory aspect of the sanction.   
Lord Mustill in Doody commented at length on the uniqueness of the mandatory life sentence 
and continued ‘in truth the mandatory life sentence for murder is symbolic’. 103  In large 
measure this symbolism is linked to the sentence being the replacement for the death penalty. 
There is certainly a widely accepted belief that the abolition of the death penalty was made 
more acceptable to politicians and the public because of assurances given that murder would 
always be treated as an exceptional crime with a corresponding exceptional penalty.  An 
examination of parliamentary debates relating to criminal justice in the following forty years 
and of related literature over the same period - whether in the media, in statements from 
members of the judiciary, in academic papers, in campaigning reports - reflects an overriding 
suggestion that the mandatory life sentence for murder was introduced as a quid pro quo for 
the ending of hanging.  The assertion is frequently made that almost as a way to get the 
legislation through parliament - against, after all, public opinion and against right wing political 
opposition - an agreement was made that those who were convicted of murder would always 
receive a life sentence.   
 
In 1996, for example, the all-party organisation Justice wrote confidently that, despite the 
considerable lobby in parliament to remove the mandatory aspect of sentencing, ‘in order to 
achieve the passage of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 it was necessary 
to reach a compromise that life sentences should be mandatory for all murders.’ 104  Two years 
earlier Lord Mustill, giving judgement in the House of Lords, talked of the mandatory life 
sentence and of it representing the assurances given in 1965 to those nervous of losing the 
death penalty. 105  In 1991, during an oral question in parliament to the then Home Secretary, 
Ivan Lawrence spoke of the assurances given when capital punishment was abolished for it to 
be replaced by a mandatory life sentence and of the dangers of undermining public trust. 106  
In 1995 the influential Home Affairs Committee also echoed this implication, stating that 
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abandoning the mandatory life sentence would betray those who had voted to abolish the 
death penalty on the understanding that the life sentence for murder would continue to be 
mandatory. 107  In 2002 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) commented that the first 
section of the 1965 Act was made in order to assuage public concern about the possible 
release date of those convicted of murder who would probably have been sentenced to 
death.108   This view has persisted and has been expressed by a wide variety of interested 
people.  In the parliamentary debate leading to the CJA 2003, the Home Secretary referred to 
the presumption by the public that the abolition of the death penalty would mean that those 
who would previously have hanged would face a mandatory life sentence and ‘going down for 
life.’ 109   In 2004, the Director of Victims against Crime also argued that when the death 
penalty was abolished, mandatory life sentences were henceforth to mean life imprisonment 
‘to stabilise public fears’.110   In 2007, Simon Heffer, writing in The Telegraph, stated that ‘The 
only way the liberal establishment of the 1960s sold the abolition of the death penalty was that 
the life sentence for murder that would replace it would be mandatory, and in some cases 
would mean life.’  111 
 
During the interviews undertaken for this present study, although not raised in questions, 
various respondents referred to this concept of a quid pro quo.   David Blunkett, the former 
Home Secretary, used this actual expression and talked of how, as a civilised country, we no 
longer take a life literally, but instead ensure that certain offenders can be kept out of harm’s 
way for life.  He spoke of a ‘contract’ with the British people whereby those who committed the 
most heinous crimes, who would have been hanged previously, had to be dealt with harshly 
and never be given a second chance.   The word ‘compact’ was also used by another political 
respondent in interview, when he said that removing the mandatory aspect of a life sentence 
would break the compact made with the public in the 1960s at the abolition of the death 
penalty.   A current Minister of Justice, Lord McNally, also recalled the days of the death 
penalty and referred to the understanding that after its abolition, for some people committing 
‘horrific’ crimes, a life sentence would be mandatory and could mean whole life.   Simon 
Hughes, the deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats, talked of the uncertainty people felt over 
a sentence of life not really meaning life and that after the abolition of the death penalty, the 
public assumed that the mandatory life sentence was there to bring permanent certainty and 
clarity.  One of the senior judges interviewed also expressed the opinion that in view of the 
public understanding that the mandatory life sentence was introduced to ease the abolition of 
the death sentence, any move to replace it would be politically difficult.   
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However, a detailed examination of all the parliamentary debates in the Commons and the 
Lords, which lead to the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965, and of relevant 
Cabinet papers, produces no evidence of any formal agreement by any member of the 
government to gain backing for the Bill by giving assurances of a mandatory sentence.  Morris 
and Blom-Cooper, who studied the question, came to the same conclusion and claimed that 
there was no evidence to suggest that any deal had been struck in public or private in respect 
of replacing the death penalty by a ‘mandatory life sentence’.112   S1(1) of the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, simply substituted the mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment for the penalty of death.   Importantly, the Act did not formally define the term 
mandatory life sentence.  
 
With this unwritten but apparently implicit and widely shared perception, it is of little surprise 
that no politician would lightly take a decision to alter it, partly to stay true to the alleged 
agreement to appease retentionists, but also to give ongoing assurance to the general public.  
During the debates on the abolition of the death penalty there was discussion about the 
possibility of allowing judges discretion when sentencing offenders convicted of murder.   The 
opposition to the mandatory sentence was led by the then Lord Chief Justice, who moved an 
amendment at the Committee Stage to make the sentence discretionary.  His amendment was 
accepted but, in the face of government opposition, he subsequently withdrew it.113 
 
It was not only in the Lords that the debate had raged.  In the Commons, Richard Glyn argued 
that, as murders ranged widely in quality and in different degrees of criminality, to use ‘a parrot 
formula of words’ would be ‘absolutely inappropriate’. 114  John Hobson also argued against the 
introduction of a mandatory life sentence for all murders and against the Home Secretary, 
alone, being allowed to exhibit discretion: ‘ ‘The quality of mercy is not strained’ was not 
intended to apply to the exercise only of the Home Secretary's powers. Surely it is the great 
tradition of this country that the judges hold the balance between mercy and justice, and it is 
right that they should continue to do so in all cases.’ 115  Hobson’s concern was an early sign of 
the disquiet that the judiciary would later take up.  
In 1989, the Nathan Committee 116 recommended the replacement of the mandatory life 
sentence with a discretionary one.  In the ensuing parliamentary debate on the Committee’s 
report, perhaps not too surprisingly, the Law Lords strongly argued for the end of the 
mandatory life sentence.  Lord Irvine was one of those arguing for more judicial discretion, 
describing the mandatory life sentence as a blunt instrument, and stating that he believed 
sentences should be modulated according to the gravity of each individual case.117  Lord Lane, 
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who four years later would chair an influential commission funded by the Prison Reform Trust 
which recommended the end of mandatory life sentences, also backed its abolition in this 
debate.   As too did Lord Ackner, who would still be arguing the case fourteen years later in the 
2003 debates when, interestingly, he also referred to the ‘often thought’ 118 notion that the 
introduction of the mandatory life sentence was a compromise to induce the legislature to drop 
the death penalty.    
Lord Nathan’s proposals were defeated but he continued to argue the case, stating in 1991 
that the mandatory life sentence had caused distortions, due to the wide scope of the crime, 
and that he had no doubt that ‘public confidence in the administration of justice would be 
greatly enhanced’ by the end of the sentence. 119    Between 1965 and 2003, however, each 
time the subject of the mandatory life sentence was debated, the government of the day 
rejected any call for its abolition with, for example, Kenneth Baker adopting what became the 
standard Home Secretary’s response saying ‘the argument for retaining the life sentence for 
murder still seems very strong’. 120  Being in government, in fact, seemed to determine 
politicians’ responses on the subject.  In 1989, as seen, Lord Irvine had argued eloquently for 
the removal of the ‘blunt instrument’ but eight years later, as Lord Chancellor, while 
acknowledging that he was aware of both sides of the argument, he referred to the ‘balance 
and the wisdom of current arrangements’. 121   If Lord Irvine was uncomfortable with his 
apparent change of view, his position may have become worse when Lord Hunt reminded him 
during the 2003 debates that at one time he had said that ‘To put legislative straight-jackets 
on the judge’s discretion to sentence for serious crimes is almost always a mistake’. 122  
Although, as will be seen later in the study, the CJA 2003 changed sentencing guidelines for 
murder, there was never any question of the government considering the possibility of 
removing the mandatory life sentence, despite very strong argument, particularly in the House 
of Lords. 123  It came as no surprise, therefore, when the Law Commission was asked by the 
government to review the law of murder in 2004, that the terms of reference included the 
continuing existence of the mandatory life sentence.  The Law Commission published a 
consultation paper in December 2005 and its final report in November 2006. 124  It proposed 
that the mandatory life sentence should be more restricted, and recommended a three-tier 
offence structure.  The government proceeded in 2008 with its consultation but, significantly, it 
chose not to consult on the Commission’s proposals for a three-tier offence structure. 125 
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Interestingly, although the government did not ask in their consultation for comments on the 
mandatory life sentence, some of the respondents to the consultation did raise the issue.  In 
the published summary of responses it is acknowledged that criticism had been made about 
the government’s unwillingness to allow the mandatory nature of the sentence to be included 
in the review, mentioning particularly the lobby groups Liberty and Justice, with the former 
claiming that the sentence ‘cannot be justified’, 126 and the latter stating that it presents ‘a very 
difficult problem.’ 127  The government, however, retained its defence of the sentence, partly on 
the ground of the need for public confidence in the criminal justice system.  
 
Since then a significant piece of research in 2010 by Barry Mitchell and Julian Roberts 128 
found that ‘there is cause to doubt the assumption that the overwhelming majority of the public 
support the current law that all convicted murderers should automatically be sentenced to life 
imprisonment.’  They concluded that since the level of public support for the mandatory life 
sentence was greater for the more serious murder scenarios, an argument could be made for 
more research to determine whether there is a sufficient degree of public consensus that the 
mandatory sentence should be retained for a narrower and particularly serious group of 
murders. 129  Two months later, the Ministry of Justice published a Green Paper looking, 
among other things, to simplify the sentencing framework but using the opportunity once again 
to state that the government had no intention of abolishing the mandatory life sentence.130  
This was underlined in parliament when Lord McNally, Minister of State for Justice, argued that 
‘the time is not right to take forward such a substantial reform of our criminal law’. 131  
 
Further pressure was directed at the government with the publication in December 2011 of 
Public Opinion and the Penalty for Murder,132 which used the research by Mitchell and 
Roberts to rebut the main justification for retaining the mandatory life sentence often cited by 
politicians, 133 namely that the public would not accept any lessening of the penalty.   The 
argument was made for a major rethink on the mandatory life sentence.  However, politicians 
remain extremely wary of anything that could be seen as watering down any determination to 
tackle law and order issues.134  
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2.4    The role of the Home Secretary to 1983 
The issue of judicial discretion, or lack of it, in relation to the life sentence is an important 
element of the present study on the whole life order.  Central to this controversy is the role of 
the Home Secretary.  He had historically been responsible for authorising release of an 
offender sentenced to life imprisonment or commuting a capital sentence.   Before 1948, this 
was carried out under the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.  In 1948 the Home Secretary’s role 
was made statutory:  he could authorise release and determine the conditions of release. 135  
A life sentence was regarded as a complete life sentence, in the sense that release was on 
licence.  If any just cause arose, an offender could be recalled to prison any time until his 
death.  
Until the abolition of the death penalty, therefore, the Home Secretary had sole discretion 
over substituting a life sentence for a death penalty, along with determining the conditions and 
timing of any subsequent release.  The Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 
introduced changes.  Section 1(2) allowed the trial judge the discretion, when imposing a life 
sentence for murder, to recommend to the Home Secretary the minimum time to be served 
before release was considered. 136  Under Section 2, the Home Secretary was required to 
seek the views of the Lord Chief Justice and also the trial judge, if available, before releasing 
mandatory life prisoners. This restriction was altered two years later when, as part of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967, the Parole Board was established.  The 1967 Act created a 
framework for considering the early release of prisoners.   The Home Secretary still had to 
consult relevant judges.  The Parole Board reviewed cases, if  (but notably only if) referred to 
them by the Home Secretary.   If, and only if, the Parole Board recommended it, the Home 
Secretary could order release.  However, he retained the right to reject any recommendation 
and to refuse release.  This system remained in place for the next decade.  During this time 
the severest state penalty for the most heinous murders remained the mandatory life 
sentence, with the possibility of release under licence.  At this point the whole life tariff was 
not a concept that had been publically discussed, with no offenders known to have been 
specifically sentenced to spend the rest of their natural lives in prison.  Nevertheless, Roy 
Jenkins, the Home Secretary, in December 1966 in the course of a debate on the Crime 
Justice Bill had acknowledged that there would be ‘a few killers for whom a life sentence 
means exactly what is says.’ 137 
In this study of the genesis of the whole life tariff, one of the most crucial dates undoubtedly is 
30 November 1983.  The then Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, announced changes to the 
administration of life sentences.  This was pivotal for two reasons:  the actual changes 
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themselves were fundamental, but equally important was the fact that, important as they 
were, they were created not by statute but by ministerial statement under discretion granted 
by statute.  It was the beginning of a process whereby legal challenges would result in further 
ministerial statements, then further legal appeals – not only in domestic courts but also in the 
increasingly influential European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  The process, many 
judgments later, would lead directly, in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to the judicially imposed 
whole life order.   
Before looking at the details of Brittan’s tariff system, it is interesting to note the social and 
political background that contextualised the Home Secretary’s statement.  The statement 
came in the same year as the Conservatives had been returned to office with a huge majority 
in June 1983.  The Labour Party, led by Michael Foot, polled its lowest number of votes since 
1918.  Much of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s popularity was thought to have come from 
the decisive victory in the Falklands.  Leon Brittan was appointed Home Secretary and, with 
such a large majority in the election, it might appear that there was little pressure for change.  
There were, however, multiple pressures.  The public felt that crime was increasing and, in 
the years before the election, there had been much public disquiet.  Counter-terrorist activities 
centred on Northern Ireland were continuing: soldiers were being killed and, in 1979,  Lord 
Mountbatten, the Queen’s cousin,  had been murdered while on holiday in Ireland.  
Republican prisoners had died on hunger strike in the Maze prison.  The siege at the Iranian 
Embassy in 1980 had seen armed forces authorised to use lethal force on the mainland for 
the first time in seventy years.    High unemployment - the highest since World War II - and 
racial tension had contributed to the 1981 Brixton riots.  The public had continued to be 
confronted with the crimes of Hindley and Brady, whose cases were still in the media because 
of the continuing efforts of two of the victims’ families to find the still-missing bodies of their 
children.  The public had also witnessed the trial of Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper, and 
in the same year as the election, Dennis Nilsen, another notorious serial killer, had been tried 
and found guilty.  Brittan, as the new Home Secretary of a party traditionally associated with a 
tough approach to tackling crime, was under pressure to reassure the public that the 
government was in control and understood their need to have confidence in the criminal 
justice system.  His response was his ministerial statement in November 1983.   
In his statement – first flagged up in a speech to the Conservative Party Conference two 
months earlier – Brittan made it clear he was acting ‘to take account of the general public’s 
concern about the increase in violent crime and the growing criticism of the gap between the 
length of sentences passed and the length of sentences actually served.’ 138  Fundamental 
change to the release of offenders, especially those in the category this study relates to, were 
introduced: 
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• For the first time, life sentences would be considered in two parts: firstly,  the tariff – a 
determinate sentence, to reflect the period felt necessary to meet the needs of 
retribution and deterrence.  
• For terrorist murder, murder of police or prison officers, sexual or sadistic murders of 
children; murders by firearm in the course of a robbery the tariff would be at least 
twenty years. 139 
• After serving the first punitive stage, offenders would face an indeterminate stage 
when they would only be considered for release once the possible risk to the public 
had been assessed.  Brittan stated that risk to the public ‘always has been, and will 
continue to be, the pre-eminent factor determining release.’ 140 
• For the first period of imprisonment the Home Secretary would ask the judiciary for 
advice on length of sentence.  For the second period – the risk stage – the Home 
Secretary would depend on the Parole Board for advice.  
• The statement made no reference to juvenile offenders sentenced under Section 53 
of the Children and Young Persons Act. 
Some aspects of the statement are noteworthy and would later be challenged in litigation. The 
Home Secretary retained the power to reject judicial advice on the penal tariff.  He retained 
not only the power to reject the advice from the Parole Board but also to decide which cases 
were to be referred to the Board.  For the first time, he separated the deterrent and retributive 
purpose of imprisonment (with the judiciary advising on an appropriate tariff) from the 
question of public protection and the possible future risk posed by the offender (to be decided 
upon by the Parole Board).  Lord Mustill expresses in Doody, with perhaps a certain irony, 
that ‘Whereas at the outset the power of the trial judge to recommend a minimum term, and 
the duty of the Home Secretary to consult the judges before release had been a protection 
against a foreseen risk of excessive leniency by the Executive, the new regime was intended 
to forestall excessive leniency by the judges, or the Parole Board or both’. 141 
The seeds of many contentious issues which dominate this study can be traced to Brittan’s 
statement: the role of the Home Secretary, the separation of powers between the judiciary 
and the executive and the political desire to take into account public concern about crime.  
The question of whether the Home Secretary was taking an administrative decision or 
adopting a sentencing role – and thereby straying into judicial territory – would be considered 
in future legal challenges.  The Home Secretary’s sole discretion in deciding the length of 
imprisonment in cases of murder, sometimes overriding previous sentencing decisions, would 
also be challenged in appeal courts.  The practice of ministerial statement driving the law 
would be alluded to by the judiciary years later, with Lord Hope in 1997 saying of the process 
started by Brittan in 1983 that changes in policy had had a marked effect on the way in which, 
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in practice, mandatory life sentences were administered.  These changes, he noted, had not 
been introduced by parliament, and indeed parliament had been remarkably inactive in this 
field. 142 
Twenty years later Lord Woolf would speak of the ‘geological fault’ between the judiciary and 
the Home Office, which he had hoped to see bridged during his time as Lord Chief Justice, 
but admitted that his optimism had been dashed. 143  Brittan’s statement in 1983, if not the 
start of this ‘geological fault’, certainly contributed to it.  
 
2.5    Effects of Brittan’s Statement 1983 – 1990 
The lawfulness of Brittan’s new policy was challenged in the House of Lords quite promptly.  
In Findlay 144 four prisoners challenged the policy on the grounds that they had suffered loss 
of expectation of parole; the Home Secretary could not change the policy without consulting 
the Parole Board; and classifying offences as Brittan had done was inconsistent with each 
case being considered individually on its own merits.  The appeal was dismissed, although 
there was perhaps implied criticism of the lack of relevant legislation in Lord Scarman’s 
comment,  ‘The duty of the Secretary of State is, as I have already shown, a very complex 
one.  Indeed, the complexities are such that an approach based on a carefully formulated 
policy could be said to be called for.’ 145  The judges upheld the Home Secretary’s right to 
make final decisions on release and they rejected the idea of the prisoners having suffered 
loss of expectation of parole.   They said that the most that a convicted prisoner could 
legitimately expect was that his case would be examined individually in the light of whatever 
policy the Secretary of State saw fit to adopt, provided always that the adopted policy was a 
lawful exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by the statute. 146 
It was, however, Lord Scarman’s comments on the role of the Home Secretary in relation to 
his need to take public confidence into consideration that was to have an important effect on 
future developments: 
But neither the board nor the judiciary can be as close, or as sensitive, to public 
opinion as a minister responsible to Parliament and the electorate. He has to judge 
the public acceptability of early release and to determine the policies needed to 
maintain public confidence in the system of criminal justice. 147 
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Lord Scarman confirmed, therefore, the Home Secretary’s right to introduce new policies, 
justifiable on the basis that they were required to ensure the public had confidence in the 
criminal justice system.  Public acceptability was not a new issue but, as will be seen, 
ministerial statements would increasingly reflect the perceived need for strong executive 
involvement in order to retain public confidence.  In the shorter term, the effect of the 
Findlay appeal was a simple statement by Brittan on 1st March 1985 amending his policy on 
when the first formal review date should be set. 148 
The next litigation against Brittan’s policy came with the Handscomb appeal 149 which claimed 
that the Home Secretary was acting unlawfully by delaying until three years after sentencing 
his consultation with the judiciary to fix the first review date; and secondly that he was bound 
to set the first review date strictly in accordance with the penal element recommended by the 
judges. The appeal was successful.  What is particularly interesting for the present study is 
that, although the appeal judges did not differentiate in their ruling between discretionary and 
mandatory life sentences, the Home Secretary – by then, Douglas Hurd – issued a ministerial 
statement on 23 July 1987.  In it, he accepted the ruling about the first formal review taking 
place as soon as practical for both mandatory and discretionary life prisoners, but stated that 
in all other matters, the original details of the policy would remain in force for mandatory life 
prisoners.  Hurd differentiated between life prisoners in an important way:  he would accept 
the judicial view on tariff for discretionary prisoners but not in the case of mandatory life 
prisoners.  The justification was to ensure ‘the worst offences of violence fully reflects public 
concern about violent crime.’ and to recognise ‘the need to maintain public confidence in the 
system of justice.’ 150  The Home Secretary also stressed that in the case of mandatory life 
prisoners, release would be ‘solely at his discretion’. 151 
The Home Secretary, therefore, retained power to determine both the penal and risk element 
of the mandatory life sentence, referring to the need for politicians to ensure public confidence 
in the justice system in relation to violent crime.  The public’s view of the rigour of the 
government’s stance on crime was obviously important, as was, perhaps, the view of 
members of parliament: both Brittan in 1983 and Hurd in 1987 made their hard-line ministerial 
statements very close to a parliamentary vote on the reintroduction of the death penalty.   
Before the decade ended, the Nathan Committee 152 shone a valuable light on the Home 
Secretaries’ decisions on the imposition of tariffs.  These decisions since 1983, if not official 
secrets, were certainly not publicised.  The Committee asked the Home Office for figures 
relating to tariffs set by the Home Secretary and how these compared to the tariffs proposed 
and submitted to him by the judiciary.  The Committee was given figures for the years 1983 to 
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1988 which showed the trial judges’ recommendation, the Lord Chief Justice’s 
recommendation and the actual tariff set by the Home Secretary. 153  In 1984, from a total of 
159 cases, the Lord Chief Justice recommended a higher tariff than that of the trial judge in 
12 cases, while the Home Secretary set a higher tariff in 80 cases – almost 50% of the total.  
In 1988 the Home Secretary set a higher tariff in almost 60% of the cases:  63 cases out of 
106, while the Lord Chief Justice had recommended a higher tariff in 16 cases.   Overall, the 
figures show that although the Home Secretary did set a lower tariff than the trial judge’s 
recommendation in some cases – in almost every case following the Lord Chief Justice’s 
recommendation for a lower tariff – the pattern was one of the Home Secretary setting a 
harsher tariff than recommended by the judiciary.  The organisation Justice, when analysing 
the figures, claimed that the process remained ‘slow and secretive’ and the figures ‘give a 
picture of disturbingly inconsistent and potentially arbitrary system of tariff increases.’ 154 
Justice may have been arguing from a campaigning organisation’s point of view, but any 
disinterested analysis of the 1980s reveals a system where the executive appeared 
determined to demonstrate to the public that the government was taking public fears of violent 
crime seriously and was willing if necessary to counter any perceived leniency on the 
judiciary’s part.  In the next decade this process would be repeated, whereby life prisoners 
would continue to appeal against a system that lacked openness and fairness.  Both the lack 
of openness and disquiet over the Home Secretary’s powers had been highlighted during the 
debates on the Nathan Committee Report.  One concern raised in the debate was that while 
the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice reported to the Home Secretary, their views on the 
length of time which the particular prisoner should serve on grounds of deterrence and 
punishment ‘are not communicated to the prisoner by the judge - except perhaps at the end of 
the trial - or by the Lord Chief Justice. Indeed he (the Home Secretary) never hears any 
representations from the prisoner. That cannot be right.’ 155  Lord Nathan, in the debate, 
speaking on behalf of the Committee, expressed its disquiet not only at the secretive nature of 
the process but also at the Home Secretary’s powers: 
We were gravely concerned that the present system for administering a life 
sentence gives Ministers inappropriate powers to determine the length of 
time actually to be served in prison by lifers.  It is unnecessarily secretive and 
has grown up piecemeal over many years.  It represents a confusion 
between the proper functions of Ministers and the judiciary and has led to 
devaluation of the life sentence.  Effectively, the Executive - the Minister  - 
has the power to decide the term of detention in life imprisonment cases, 
with consequent risks of political influences in sentencing.  Sentencing in all 
other aspects of criminal law is a judicial function.  Our recommendations are 
designed to bring the administration of a life sentence for murder into an 
entirely judicial context. 156  
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These issues - the Home Secretary’s role impinging on a judicial role and the overall secrecy, 
including the fact that prisoners were not involved in the process of considering tariffs - as will 
be seen, would play an important role in litigation in the following decade but would not be 
resolved fully until 2003.   The debate on the Nathan Committee’s Report is of particular 
importance to this present study as it foreshadows Anderson and Stafford and the resultant 
clauses in the CJA 2003, all central features of the study. 
 
 
2.6  The Criminal Justice Act 1991 
 
This growing concern with the powers of the Home Secretary in respect of prisoners serving 
life sentences for murder needs to be set into the context of the sentencing purpose clearly 
articulated in the 1990 White Paper Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public, 157 and in the 
subsequent CJA 1991.  Over the decade this coherent philosophy was to be ‘modified’ both by 
judicial decision and legislation.  Part of the explanation for this lies in the changing views of 
politicians of both main parties and their attitudes to the media and the public.   
 
Criticism of the criminal justice system was not limited to the role of the Home Secretary.  
There was concern over the lack of a clear rationale for sentencing, forcibly expressed by 
academics, with Ashworth commentating in 2000:  ‘Freedom (of judges) to select from among 
the various rationales is a freedom to determine policy, not a freedom to respond to unusual 
combinations of facts.’ 158   Wasik and von Hirsch were even more critical of the situation: 
‘Allowing sentencers to pick and choose at will amongst the diversity of sentencing aims is, of 
course, a recipe for disparity and injustice.’ 159   However, this issue was addressed in the 
1990 White Paper.  Its central proposal was the creation of a statute to provide for sentencing 
‘a coherent framework for the use of financial, community and custodial punishments.’ 160   The 
White Paper explicitly rejected that sentencing ‘policy’, for constitutional reasons, should be left 
to the judiciary.  
 
Sentences should be based primarily, the White Paper said, on the principle of proportionality: 
the more serious the crime, the more severe the punishment.  It was believed that the best 
way to achieve this was by extending the use of the rationale of ‘just deserts’.  Punishment 
should be given for the crime currently before the court rather than for past crimes or possible 
future ones.  It was further argued that there should be less use made of imprisonment and 
greater use of non-custodial sentences.  Imprisonment was memorably declared to be ‘an 
expensive way of making bad people worse’. 161  General deterrence as a purpose of 
sentencing was decried: ‘It is unrealistic to construct sentencing arrangements on the 
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assumption that most offenders will weigh up the possibilities in advance and base their 
conduct on rational calculation’. 162 
 
Before turning to the relevant sections of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, it is worth considering 
the concept of ‘just deserts’ and its concomitant principle of proportionality because of its 
relevance not only to the 1991 Act but also to the CJA 2003.   Ashworth has asserted that the 
strength of desert theory may be recognised in its basis in everyday conceptions of crime and 
punishment and its close links with modern liberal political theory:  the insistence that state 
power be subject to limitations;   its model of individuals as autonomous choosing beings; and 
its protagonists’ insistence that sentencing systems should have coherent aims and 
predictable sentences.163  ‘Just deserts’ carries the requirement that only those who have been 
proved to have committed an offence should be punished.  This differentiates it from the theory 
of deterrence in particular, and utilitarianism in general.  To the question of ‘how much to 
punish?’ desert theorists answer that sentences should be proportionate in their severity to the 
seriousness of the criminal conduct.  For proportionality to be a powerful concept, it is 
necessary to have, or create, an ordinal scale: a hierarchy of crimes ranked according to their 
seriousness.  While this may be problematic for crimes ranked as of moderate or minor 
seriousness, it is generally not so for murder.  Or rather, while it has been discussed above 
that murder includes both mercy killing and sadistic or sexual murder of children or vulnerable 
people, there is nonetheless a broad consensus that the latter grouping would be placed at the 
top or very near the top of any ordinal scale. 164  However, while ordinal proportionality 
provides the rank ordering of crimes, it does not directly address the question of how severe a 
sentence should be.  It does not, for example, say how long the sentence for murder should be 
compared with that, say, for armed robbery.   
 
Lord Justice Lawton essayed in Turner 165 an attempt at cardinal proportionality when he 
related the sentences, or rather the time served, for armed robbery to that served for murder. 
This judgment, however, appears to stand alone.   Von Hirsch has asserted that desert theory 
does not assist in creating cardinal proportionality since it provides little guidance on anchoring 
points or on maximum and minimum punishments.166  However, attempts have been made in 
statute to provide a limited degree of cardinal proportionality.  The distinction was made 
between capital and non-capital murder in the Homicide Act 1957.   Another attempt was 
made when Schedule 21 of the CJA 2003 provided three starting points when considering the 
sentences for adults convicted of murder.   
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The 1990 White Paper was widely, if cautiously, welcomed by academics but less so by the 
judiciary, some of whom believed it infringed the separation of powers. 167   The CJA 1991 
enacted the main principles of the White Paper.  It is Part 1 of the Act that is of relevance to 
this study.168  It stated that sentences were to be commensurate with the seriousness of 
offences, reflecting desert theory and proportionality.  Exception was made, however, in 
respect of violent or sexual offences where there could be longer sentences for public 
protection, that is, incapacitation.    Later Ashworth declared that the twin track of ‘just desert’ 
and incapacitation is both practical and consistent with the rule of law: a primary rationale is 
declared but in certain types of cases another rationale might be given priority.169  However, 
there was no change to the mandatory life sentence for murder and consequently no attempt 
in statute to provide ordinal proportionality for different types of murder, let alone cardinal 
proportionality.   Power remained with the Secretary of State to determine whether, and when, 
life sentenced prisoners would be released. In terms of this study then, the CJA 1991 was a 
missed opportunity to bring clarity to determining what a life sentence meant.  
 
 
2.7 Reaction against the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
 
This missed opportunity was of less significance than might have been thought at the time, as 
the 1991 Act quickly became a ‘non-Act’.   Ashworth has drawn attention to the Lord Chief 
Justice subverting the ‘just deserts’ philosophy when he stated that ‘commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence’ 170 should be interpreted to mean ‘ commensurate with the 
punishment and deterrence which the seriousness of the offence requires’.171   Ashworth 
averred: ‘This set the tone for a reading-down of many parts of the 1991 Act in which the 
judges made sure it affected their daily sentencing as little as possible.’ 172   
 
Moreover, in 1993, Michael Howard’s speech at the Conservative Party Conference reflected a 
further shift in public policy.  The 1990 White Paper had regarded prison as ‘an expensive way 
of making bad people worse’, but Howard now declared that ‘prison works’.  As attempts at 
rehabilitation in prison were widely regarded as ineffective, it would seem that this was largely 
on the grounds of incapacitation:  if offenders were removed from society then they could not 
commit crimes in society during the time they were incarcerated.  1993 may indeed be 
regarded as a pivotal year: a year in which the mood of the government and the judiciary 
coincided, although this was not to last.   In 1991 when the CJA was passed, the judiciary had 
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complained about the fettering of their powers to deal condignly with certain types of offender, 
the government appeared relatively liberal and the press paid little attention.   Since 1993, it 
has been the senior judiciary who have appeared liberal in policies, for example when they 
criticised government proposals in the 1996 White Paper - widely supported in the media - for 
mandatory minimum sentences. 173  It is also pertinent to note that the same year, 1993, 
witnessed the political, media and public outrage at the murder of three year old James 
Bulger.174  This outrage was directed, not only at the two ten year old children convicted of this 
murder, but also at what had happened to a society which allowed such a crime to take place, 
and how best to remedy the situation.  As Ashworth has put it  ‘When Mr Howard began to 
weave his web at the end of 1993 – or perhaps I should say, began his journey into the night -  
it quickly became apparent that he would mostly be introducing  restrictions on sentences.’ 175 
 
Woodhouse has chronicled the resulting deteriorating relations between the government and 
the judiciary in the period April 1995 - March 1996. 176  At the 1995 Conservative Party 
Conference, Michael Howard announced his proposal to increase the severity of sentences for 
particular crimes.  The senior judges had not been consulted and Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Taylor, publically condemned the proposals, which would reduce judicial discretion. 
Woodhouse noted that Howard’s proposal did little for judicial-executive relations and brought 
to the fore the dispute over whether sentencing is a judicial or an executive function.   In 
January 1996 Lord Donaldson, former Master of the Rolls, said he considered that Howard’s 
statement that there were a number of prisoners who would spend the rest of their lives in jail 
not only prejudiced his consideration of the Hindley case but also appeared to tie the hands of 
Howard’s successors.  Finally, in March 1996, Lord Taylor returned to the attack in a lecture at 
King’s College London, repeating his criticism, this time more stridently.  Woodhouse 
concluded that the confrontation between the judges and the government arose from a number 
of issues including:  the increase in judicial review cases, the dispute over sentencing 
discretion, a lack of mutual respect between government and judges and a blurring of 
boundaries between the ‘political’ and ‘judicial’. 177  
 
Despite the confrontation, Howard moved forward with the Crime (Sentences) Bill 1996, two 
proposals of which were:  serious violent and sexual offenders would receive, for a second 
offence, an automatic life sentence with the tariff, based on retribution and deterrence, set by 
the trial judge; and there would be mandatory minimum sentences for persistent drug dealers 
and burglars.  
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A great deal had changed between the CJA 1991 and the 1996 legislation.  An explanation of 
why the Conservative government first introduced the 1991 Act and then readily moved away 
from it has been provided by Lacey.178  She has argued that in the context of the 1980s the 
‘law and order issue’ became embroiled with government concerns for the ‘3 Es’ - economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness -  in, for instance, the Rayner Inquiries, with the government 
presenting itself as an efficient ‘manager’ of the law and order issue.  From the perspective of 
the Home Office, and the government more generally, the criminal justice system was ‘just one 
more hopelessly inefficient and chaotic part of the public sector’. 179  More particularly, Part 1 of 
the 1991 Act could be seen as an attempt to impose, in the face of the interest group involved, 
a coherent system on an inefficient area of public administration.   The dual track approach - 
more severe sentences for more serious offences, less use of prison for relatively minor 
offences - would satisfy the economy goal by having fewer offenders in prison. 180  But Lacey 
argued this managerialist approach ‘provides a highly unstable framework for the maintenance 
of given policies.’ 181   In this analysis when ‘consumers’ were critical there were no strong 
grounds of principle on which to stand.  On this account, the weakness of the government and 
a resurgent Labour Party playing the law and order card explains the retreat from the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.  
 
It might have been thought that the Crime (Sentences) Bill of 1996 would show clear water 
between the two main political parties. This did not prove to be the case.  The Labour 
opposition joined with the government to support the automatic life sentence and mandatory 
minimum sentence provisions, making passage through the Commons relatively smooth.  This 
was not true for the Lords.  Lord Chief Justice Taylor referred to the government’s figures on 
the expected effects of the Act as ‘shallow and untested’ and continued ‘never in the history of 
the criminal law have such far reaching proposals been put forward on such flimsy and 
dubious evidence.’ 182  Lord Bingham, however, in an article written that year, signalled what 
was to be the ending of the ‘judicial independence argument’ and concluded decisively that the 
Bill raised ‘policy’ issues:  ‘This is, in the widest sense, a political question - a question of what 
is beneficial for the polity - not a constitutional question.’  183  In the end, because of pressure 
of parliamentary time, and despite Labour’s support for the Bill, an alliance in the House of 
Lords of Law Lords, bishops and Liberal Democrat peers forced the government to accept an 
amendment, which inserted a broad power for courts to avoid imposing a minimum sentence if 
it would be ‘unjust in all the circumstances’ to do so. 
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3 DECISIVE CHALLENGES TO THE HOME SECRETARY’S POWERS  
 
 
3.1 New Labour and the power of the media 
 
In the same year as the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 received the Royal Assent,  New Labour 
was elected.   Earlier, just as 1993 represented a turning point in the Conservative Party’s 
approach to law and order, the same year had also proved pivotal to the Labour Party.  Labour 
had been out of government since 1979 and in the process had suffered a series of electoral 
disasters.  It appeared that certain elements in the parliamentary party would do anything to 
gain power, including outflanking the Conservatives on what had been their ‘banker’ - law and 
order.   At the beginning of 1993 Tony Blair and Gordon Brown travelled to the USA to witness 
for themselves the secrets of the Democrats’ success.  According to Anderson and Mann, Blair 
was particularly impressed by the way President Clinton had managed to overcome the 
Democrats’ long-standing vulnerability to attack from the Republicans, for being “soft” on 
crime, welfare dependency and family values, by taking aggressively populist anti-liberal 
stances.184  Clinton was far from the traditional left wing liberal.  By 2000, drug prosecutions 
had increased from 15,000 in the middle of President Reagan’s second term to 60,000, and 
offenders were getting longer sentences.185  Clinton supported the expansion of the death 
penalty and encouraged the growth in prison construction to cope with a massive increase in 
incarceration in the USA following 1992 when the Democrats came to power.   
 
While there, Blair was almost certainly made aware of the William Horton case five years 
earlier which illustrated the dramatic effect on politicians of the interplay of crime, the media 
and the public.  Horton was a convicted murderer who committed further violent attacks and 
rape while on a weekend furlough from prison.  George Bush, at the time, was trailing Michael 
Dukakis in the opinion polls for the presidential election.  Dukakis, as State Governor, had 
previously vetoed a bill that would have made inmates convicted of first-degree murder 
ineligible for furloughs, saying it would ‘cut the heart out of inmate rehabilitation’.  Supporters 
of Bush relentlessly used the Horton case as an example of Dukakis being soft on crime, 
pointing out that he did not support the death penalty and allowed prison furloughs to first-
degree murderers not eligible for parole. In July, 23% of people in polls said Bush was ‘tough 
enough’ on crime but by late October - after the publicity over Horton - this had risen to 60%.  
On the other hand, during the same period the percentage of those feeling Dukakis was ‘not 
tough enough’ on crime rose from 36% to 49%.  There were obviously other issues raised 
during the campaign but it was the crime issue that was played to devastating effect.  By the 
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end of the campaign the public would usher in a surprise winner, and George Bush moved into 
the White House. 186   Blair returned to Britain convinced that elections could be the occasion 
for particularly brutal crimes to be picked up by the media, affecting public opinion and forcing - 
or enabling -  politicians to respond.   
 
Public opinion and media attitudes and the influence these can exert on political decision-
making is one of the themes running through the present study.  The response of government 
and politicians to this has varied over time and, in future, pressure from the public and the 
media may well be significant if the current appeal of Vinter, Bamber and Moore to the ECtHR 
about the whole life order is successful.    
 
In the debates on the Bills to abolish capital punishment, many members of parliament, mostly 
abolitionists, declared that they would vote with their consciences despite public opinion, as 
they were representatives not delegates.187  Almost twenty years later, when an attempt was 
made to reintroduce capital punishment, Edward Heath echoed the earlier arguments by 
defending Members’ sustained position of voting against the public’s wishes on the death 
penalty, claiming that a politician should have the ‘courage and responsibility to form his own 
judgment and own views and then act upon them in the Division Lobby’. 188   Silverman argues 
that a change occurred in the 1990s, after which politicians went over the heads of their civil 
servants, using the media to project populist policies.189  Certainly by the 1990s, even the 
Home Secretary was to regard himself as bound to follow the public mood, rather than lead 
public opinion.  This, however, was potentially problematic because evidence from the 1996 
British Crime Survey 190 and the 2001 Halliday Report 191 pointed out that public perception of 
crime varied widely from the reality.  There were also widespread misperceptions about 
sentencing.192  In respect of homicides, an article by academics from Lancaster University193 
examined the contribution of newspapers to the social construction of homicide.  They 
concluded that, although newspapers selected material on the basis of what would entertain 
their readership, this selection was usually unchallenged.  No alternative information was 
made available to the readers, giving the newspapers’ selection criteria ‘an astonishing level of 
social and political power,’ and over time ‘the odd becomes the public construction of what 
homicide is’.194   It was not newspapers alone among the media that appeared to distort 
perceptions of crime, especially homicide.  Gruesome crimes were also brought into homes by 
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television so that, as it has been colourfully portrayed,  ‘the unruly mass at the gallows are now 
the voyeurs on the sofa’.195   It is understandable how a politician could gain popularity and 
support by offering to protect the innocent and come down hard on the guilty few.    
 
This may have been particularly true when the country was faced with an exceptionally horrific 
crime: the murder of a child, for example.  Following the conviction of Thompson and Venables 
for the murder of James Bulger, most of the media were baying for blood. The Sun handed in 
a petition of 278,300 signatures to the Home Secretary asking for a life sentence. 196  Almost 
6,000 petitions wanted their tariff increased to 25 years. The Sun also published a preprinted 
form asking the public to send them direct to the Home Secretary demanding that he concur 
with the parents of James Bulger that his murderers should be held in prison for the rest of 
their lives.  Over 20,000 people sent these forms to the Home Secretary.  When he increased 
the recommended tariff of Venables and Thompson, the extent to which Howard was reacting 
to media coverage and public demand is, of course, unknown, but the importance of public 
acceptability was presumably on his mind.  The Guardian was one of the few newspapers to 
caution restraint: on the morning after the guilty verdict, its leader warned that Bulger’s death 
should not be ‘an excuse for reversing ten years of criminal justice policy.  A system designed 
to deal with five million crimes must not be steered by one’ and referred to the ‘misguided 
response of ministers in the midst of February’s moral panic.’ 197   Lord Donaldson criticised 
Howard’s intervention, describing the increased tariff imposed on Venables and Thompson as 
‘institutionalized vengeance ...by a politician playing to the gallery’. 198   
 
One issue in Venables and Thompson’s appeal was whether the Home Secretary should have 
taken heed of the public outcry surrounding the trial and conviction.  The Law Lords were 
divided in their response.  Lord Goff was critical of the public clamour and ruled that the Home 
Secretary should have ignored it.  He felt that events such as Bulger’s murder tended to 
provoke a desire for revenge and to call for the infliction of the severest punishment upon the 
perpetrators of the crime.  Although this could be a natural reaction, there was a tendency for it  
‘to be whipped up and exploited by the media’.199  Lord Browne-Wilkinson took the view that a 
Home Secretary was entitled to have regard to broader considerations of a public character 
and argued that he would only get such information from the media and from petitions.  Lord 
Lloyd felt that parliament had entrusted to the Home Secretary the task of maintaining public 
confidence in the criminal justice system and so he was entitled to gauge public concern.  
However, the Law Lords by a majority of 3 to 2 supported Lord Goff’s view: 
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If the Secretary of State implements a policy of fixing a penal element of the 
sentence…he is to this extent exercising a function which is closely analogous 
to a sentencing function with the effect that, when so doing, he is under a duty 
to act within the same constraints as a judge will act when exercising the 
same function.  In particular, should he take into account public clamour 
directed towards the decision in the particular case which he has under 
consideration, he will be having regard to an irrelevant consideration which will 
render the exercise of his discretion unlawful. 200 
 
These measured tones of the Law Lords may be contrasted with Hay’s words that the Bulger 
case represented ‘the judicial internalization of the discourse of moral panic.’   He thought it 
was in part at least a consequence of the media’s presentation of each moral panic as a trial, 
not so much of those charged, as of British justice per se.  201 
 
It could be argued that the trial judge in Venables and Thompson had allowed, if not 
encouraged, the public’s attitude by referring to the crime as ‘an act of unspeakable evil’ and 
by allowing the boys to be named.  The judge’s phrase was used as the headline in the 
following day’s Daily Express while the Daily Mirror used ‘Freaks of Nature’ as a heading 
beside the photographs of the boys who had killed Bulger. The photographs also were used in 
the Daily Star with the headline ‘How Do You Feel Now, You Little Bastards?’   Referring back 
to the incident almost twenty years later, a newspaper article sums up the effect of this crime: 
‘To say that the murder of James Bulger horrified the nation, risks understating the impact it 
had on the country and the way society perceives children.’ 202 
 
Following Bulger’s murder, John Major, the then Prime Minister, was quoted as saying ‘I would 
like the public to have a crusade against crime and change from being forgiving of crime to 
being considerate of the victim.  Society needs to condemn a little more and understand a little 
less’.203  His words were similar in sentiment to those expressed by Blair at the time, and 
interestingly, were to be echoed very closely by Blair almost exactly ten years later in the run 
up to the CJA 2003.  
 
Then a party in opposition, Labour used the Bulger murder as a way of claiming that under 
successive Conservative Governments society had broken down.  Tony Blair, then Shadow 
Home Secretary, was particularly outspoken, tackling the subject with vigour and warning of a 
‘descent into moral chaos.’ 204 In a speech within days of the Bulger murder, Blair said: ‘We 
hear of crimes so horrific they provoke anger and disbelief in equal proportions’ and he talked 
of the crime as  'a hammer-blow against the sleeping conscience of the country, urging us to 
wake up and look unflinchingly at what we see'.205   Perhaps it was an early example of Blair’s 
‘spin’ on an event and, if so, it was successful.   Blair’s more colourful and forceful language 
                                                     
200 ibid  
201 Hay (1995):200  
202 Haroon Siddique  The Guardian 3 March 2010 
203 The Mail on Sunday, 21 February 1993. 
204 The Guardian 20 February 1993 
205 Speech in Wellingborough, Northamptonshire  19 February 1993 
 56 
when he talked of the Bulger murder seemed to be more in tune with the public’s sense of 
abhorrence than Major’s comments.  One biographer of Blair has said that his attitude to the 
Bulger killing showed that Labour ‘had taken the issues of law and order away from the 
Conservatives and made it part of Labour’s agenda;’ and that suddenly Blair was seen as 
someone who could bring Labour back to power. 206   Interestingly, when Blair wrote his 
autobiography in 2010 he admitted that his analysis of society in his post-Bulger speeches was 
‘faulty’ and that he regretted his frank outspoken views.207   
 
Some Conservatives did not believe that Blair’s new enthusiasm for tough action on crime 
would last.  Kenneth Clarke, the then Home Secretary, is reported to have noted that Blair had 
been inspired by the success of Clinton, who had proved he was a credible contender for the 
White House by ordering the execution of a mentally handicapped black convict.  Clarke did 
not think the conversion to ‘Clintonite viciousness’ would last. 208  However, Blair’s interest in 
criminal justice reform did indeed last.  After the landslide election success in 1997, one of the 
first White Papers issued by New Labour was targeted at youth crime and was entitled ‘No 
More Excuses,’ 209 demonstrating a more accusatory and morally blaming viewpoint. 
 
 
3.2 Steps to restrict the powers of the Home Secretary 
 
The first five years of New Labour were to see the introduction of no fewer than fourteen 
criminal justice Bills.  More significantly for this study, these years also saw the Home 
Secretary finally losing his remaining tariff-setting powers.   This process did not begin, 
however, in 1997 with Jack Straw.  It is necessary to go back to the beginning of the decade to 
put into context the developments by which the Home Secretary would be stripped of his 
powers.   A significant decision came in 1990 in Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell. 210  The three 
men applied to Strasbourg, alleging their rights under Article 5(4) had been breached: the right 
to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of detention shall be decided speedily by a court.   
All three were serving discretionary life sentences and, the tariff part of their sentences having 
been completed, were being detained on the orders of the Home Secretary because of their 
perceived risk to the public.  The appeal was successful.  As a result of the ruling all such 
prisoners, after the expiry of the retributive element of their sentence, would be able to take 
proceedings at reasonable intervals to have their continuing detention decided by a tribunal.   
That is, by the Parole Board, not the Home Secretary.  The CJA 1991 Section 34 incorporated 
the ECtHR determination into UK law.   
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Section 35 of this Act, however, restated the position in respect of mandatory life prisoners.  It 
confirmed that the Home Secretary had the power to release such prisoners if recommended 
by the Parole Board and after consultation with the judiciary.  Sub-section 3, however, 
prohibited the Parole Board from making a recommendation for release unless the Home 
Secretary had first referred the case to the Board, and there was nothing in the Act that 
required the Home Secretary to refer any particular case.   For those prisoners who had 
committed the most serious crimes, the crimes the public might well have strong opinions 
about, the Home Secretary retained the right to determine when, and even if, they should be 
released as, without his referral, the Parole Board could not consider their cases.  
To clarify and reaffirm the government’s position, Angela Rumbold, a Minister in the Home 
Office, made a statement acknowledging that, in the case of discretionary life prisoners, they 
should be released if they had served their tariff and were considered no danger to the public.  
However, in the case of a mandatory life sentenced prisoner, he could be detained for life 
without the necessity for subsequent judicial intervention.  The presumption was, therefore, that 
the offender should remain in custody until and unless the Home Secretary concluded that the 
public interest would be better served by the prisoner's release than by his continued 
detention.211  This concept that those who had been convicted of such crimes forfeited their 
whole life to the state, might have reflected the position in 1965, but deviated from the then 
current executive and judicial positions.  Mrs Rumbold’s statement was belatedly given short 
shrift in Doody, when Lord Mustill ruled that it was at odds with the practice established by 
Leon Brittan in 1983.  After examining the two incompatible statements, Lord Mustill  - 
accepting that the earlier statement by Brittan had been the one followed by successive Home 
Secretaries - decided that it was ‘essential not to cloud the discussion by introducing the 
inconsistent theory enunciated by the Minister of State.’ 212 
The secretive nature of the sentencing and of the release process for mandatory life prisoners 
was attracting criticism.  This included the fact that they had no information given to them 
about the judiciary’s view of their tariff or the reasons for the Home Secretary’s refusal to 
release.  This was challenged in 1992 when two mandatory life prisoners, Creamer and 
Scholey, sought the right to have access to information about their parole review and access 
to the Home Secretary’s reasons for refusing their release.  The application was denied by 
Lord Justice Rose in the High Court.  However, he stated that a prisoner’s right to make 
representations was valueless unless he knew the case against him.  Secret, unchallenged 
reports which might contain damaging inaccuracies and which resulted in continuing loss of 
liberty were, or should be, anathema in a civilized, democratic society. 213 In the light of this 
judgment, breaking with the policy of his predecessors, Kenneth Clarke, the then Home  
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Secretary, revised the policy before the Court of Appeal could hear the case.  He stated that 
the process relating to release for mandatory life prisoners would now follow more closely that 
of discretionary life prisoners.  
The concession was not enough, however, to deter a more pivotal legal appeal:  that of 
Doody. 214  The Law Lords, led by Lord Mustill, in this case declared that:  
• The Secretary of State is required to afford to a prisoner serving a 
mandatory life sentence the opportunity to submit in writing representations 
as to the period he should serve for the purposes of retribution and 
deterrence before the Secretary of State sets the date of the first review of 
the prisoner's sentence. 
• Before giving the prisoner the opportunity to make such representations, the 
Secretary of State is required to inform him of the period recommended by 
the judiciary as the period he should serve for the purposes of retribution 
and deterrence, and of any other opinion expressed by the judiciary which 
is relevant to the Secretary of State’s decision as to the appropriate period 
to be served for these purposes.   
• The Secretary of State is obliged to give reasons for departing from the 
period recommended by the judiciary as the time that he should serve for 
the purposes of retribution and deterrence. 
In his speech, Lord Mustill drew attention to the fact that:  
(The prisoner with a mandatory life sentence) never sees the Home 
Secretary; he has no dialogue with him: he cannot fathom how his mind is 
working.  There is no true tariff, or at least no tariff exposed to public view 
which might give the prisoner an idea of what to expect.  The 
announcement of his first review date arrives out of thin air, wholly without 
explanation.  The distant oracle has spoken, and that is that. 215 
 
Similar criticism was made by Lord Lane in evidence to a Commons Select Committee when 
he declared it  ‘unsatisfactory, to say the least, that the length of a prisoner’s stay in prison 
should be determined, or partially determined, behind the scenes by someone who had not 
heard any representation by, or on behalf of, the prisoner, on grounds the prisoner does not 
know.’ 216  While giving the Doody ruling, Lord Mustill included some outspoken criticism of the 
system in force at the time, contrasting the mandatory sentence with discretionary life and 
determinate sentences:  
The giving of reasons may be inconvenient, but I can see no ground at all why 
it should be against the public interest: indeed, rather the reverse. This being 
so, I would ask simply: Is refusal to give reasons fair? I would answer without 
hesitation that it is not. …  My Lords, I am not aware that there still exists 
anywhere else in the penal system a procedure remotely resembling this. 217 
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Within a very short time the new Home Secretary, Michael Howard, made his response.  
Perhaps predictably, it took the form of a ministerial statement, the first of three he would make 
on the subject between 1993 and 1995.   In this statement he accepted the necessity of 
complying with the ruling to give mandatory life prisoners more information but, importantly, he 
included an additional element to the release process which would affect all those convicted of 
heinous crimes:  he would consider not merely the requirements for retribution and deterrence 
and the consideration of risk to the public but also ‘ the public acceptability of early release’. 218 
This phrase had been used, as has been seen, by Lord Scarman eight years earlier in Findlay.  
Lord Scarman, however, while accepting that the Home Secretary was the most suitable 
person to judge public acceptability of early release in individual cases, had also implicitly 
argued that a sense of fairness to prisoners was important and should be taken into 
consideration.  Howard, however, appears to have used the phrase as a means to confirm and 
retain the Home Secretary’s right to be the sole arbiter of when a prisoner convicted of the 
most serious crimes should be released. 
Howard made two further ministerial statements. 219   In the first of these, the Home Secretary 
stated that prisoners with a mandatory life sentence would continue to have a review after ten 
years to consider the public acceptability of early release.   Those serving a whole life tariff 
would have a ministerial review after 25 years, and subsequently every five years, to consider 
whether to convert the tariff to a determinate period.    The review would be confined to a 
consideration of retribution and deterrence. 220   A similar statement was made in the House of 
Lords. 221   In answer to an oral question, Baroness Blatch stated that those serving a 
mandatory life sentence could ask for a review of their tariff at any time.  It would be up to the 
Home Secretary to consider this. 222   This review process for those serving whole life tariffs 
has been regarded as an important procedural safeguard:  ‘The process provided hope to 
those facing whole life imprisonment and ensured that offenders would not be kept in custody 
for the rest of their lives without justification.’ 223    The 1995 statement pointed out that the 
system was now ‘fair, open and sensible’ while, importantly, stressing that any 
recommendation made to him by the judiciary was ‘just that -  a recommendation -   the role of 
the judiciary in a mandatory life sentence case is purely advisory.  The final decision is 
mine...’.224  The decision was indeed solely his but the next seven years would see that position 
fundamentally altered.    
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However it is noteworthy that Michael’s Howard’s statement in December 1994 was radical in 
one specific way that is particularly relevant to this study: it was the first public admission that 
certain prisoners had been given a whole life tariff.  
At the time of Howard’s first ministerial statement, the government was already under siege on 
the subject of serious crime, especially murder.  It was being attacked on various fronts.  The 
judiciary had kept up pressure on the Home Secretary, criticising his role in relation to the 
release of mandatory life prisoners and on the lack of discretion the judiciary had when 
sentencing convicted murderers.  An influential committee - the Committee on the Penalty for 
Homicide 1993  - had also been particularly critical.  The Lane Committee, as it became known, 
upheld the earlier Nathan Committee’s position on mandatory life sentences and in a triple 
attack stated that ‘logically, jurisprudentially and constitutionally decisions on imposing 
punishment should be made by the judiciary and in open court.’ 225  The Committee also 
argued that the mandatory life sentence for murder was founded on the assumption that 
murder is a crime of such unique heinousness that the offender forfeits for the rest of his 
existence the right to be set free.  But ‘that assumption is a fallacy.  It arises from the 
divergence between the legal definition of murder and that which the lay public believes to be 
murder.’ 226 
Politicians were increasingly being influenced by public perception of crime, and the role of the 
media was progressively more significant.  Public interest, for example, in the Moors Murders 
had continued throughout the 1980s, kept alive when more information was given by Hindley 
about the remaining undiscovered bodies of the victims.   However, as seen, an even stronger 
public reaction had occurred following the murder of James Bulger, and the ensuing trial was to 
lead to further restrictions on the Home Secretary’s powers.   
 
3.3 Detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure: 
 V & T   [1997] UKHL 25;    [1999] ECHR 171 
 
The trial of two children, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, for the murder of James Bulger 
was held in a Crown Court.  Lesser charges would have been held in the less formal setting 
and procedures of a Youth Court.  Some adaptations were made to procedure to cater for the 
youth of the accused.   For instance, social workers took the boys to the court before the trial 
and its procedures were explained to them; the boys were seated with their social workers; 
the hearing times were shortened, and during adjournments the boys were allowed to spend 
time with their parents and social workers in a play area.  However, the formality and 
solemnity of the process was maintained, symbolised by the judge and counsel wearing wigs 
and gowns.   
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The boys were sentenced to be detained during Her Majesty’s Pleasure.  The trial judge 
recommended a tariff of eight years and the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, ten years.    
Amidst a public and media ‘moral panic,’ 227 the Home Secretary set a tariff of fifteen years.  
There was a judicial review to examine whether the Home Secretary had the power to impose 
a penal tariff.  The decision was referred to the Court of Appeal in 1996 and finally the case 
went to the House of Lords in 1997.  By a majority, the Law Lords determined 
• That it was unlawful for the Secretary of State to adopt a policy in the context 
of applying the tariff system which even in exceptional circumstances treated 
as irrelevant the progress and development of a child who was detained 
during Her Majesty’s Pleasure. 
• That the Secretary of State was required to remain detached from the 
pressures of public opinion as he was exercising a power equivalent to a 
judge’s sentencing powers. 228 
It should be noted, that Lord Steyn criticised the Home Secretary’s role and stated clearly his 
opinion that:  
In fixing a tariff the Home Secretary is carrying out, contrary to the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the executive and 
the judiciary, a classic judicial function. Parliament entrusted the underlying 
statutory power, which entailed a discretion to adopt a policy and fix a tariff, to 
the Home Secretary. But the power to fix a tariff is nevertheless equivalent to 
a judge's sentencing power. 229 
The House of Lords quashed the tariff set by the Home Secretary.  The government referred 
the case to the ECtHR where it was heard in the Grand Chamber.  The Court determined that 
there had been breaches of Article 6 (1) relating to the boys’ understanding of the 
proceedings in the trial;  of Article 5 (4), the boys having been deprived of the opportunity to 
have the lawfulness of their detention reviewed by a judicial body;  and of Article 6, that the 
fixing of their tariff had amounted to a sentencing exercise and should therefore have been 
carried out by a judge.230  
The determination is relevant to this study in that, following Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell, 
which resulted in the Home Secretary losing his power to set tariff for discretionary life 
prisoners, V & T  similarly stripped the Home Secretary of his powers in determining the tariff 
of young people convicted of murder and sentenced to detention during Her Majesty’s 
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3.4   The power of the Home Secretary to increase tariffs:  Pierson   [1997] UKHL 37 
 
While Venables and Thompson caught the public eye, an equally significant legal ruling was 
made in Pierson, although the public in this case paid little attention.   Pierson, a double 
murderer, had been one of the successful applicants in Doody.  As a result of the earlier 
appeal, Pierson was informed of the Home Secretary’s reasons for imposing a tariff of 20 
years, five years longer than the judiciary had recommended.  The Home Secretary’s reasons 
were based on the fact that Pierson had been convicted for a double premeditated murder.  
Pierson had sought and successfully gained a judicial review on the basis that the murders 
were not premeditated and had been committed at a single event, and that the Home 
Secretary had unlawfully increased an existing tariff.  This, in turn, was appealed by the Home 
Secretary and Sir Thomas Bingham, then Master of the Rolls, found in favour of the Home 
Secretary saying : ‘If, by way of exception to the general rule that a penal term once fixed 
remains fixed, the Home Secretary revises upwards a term fixed by his predecessor on the 
grounds that it does not adequately meet the requirements of retribution and deterrence, there 
is nothing in law to stop him’.  He added, perhaps with a measure of implied criticism, ‘If this 
practice is seen as unacceptable, and one can well understand the despair of a prisoner 
serving a long sentence of imprisonment as a date of expiry of his penal term recedes before 
him, the remedy must lie elsewhere’. 231 
 
Pierson appealed the decision and the Law Lords gave judgment on 24 July 1997.  Two Lords 
found in favour of the Home Secretary but both expressed their misgivings, with Lord Brown-
Wilkinson saying: ‘Much as I personally dislike the effective increase in tariff of this applicant, I 
can find no ground on which such an increase can be held unlawful.’ 232   The other three 
Lords allowed the appeal and, in doing so, delivered scathing criticism of the Home 
Secretary’s policy.  Its relevancy to the ongoing process of change relating to mandatory life 
sentences, which would result in the CJA 2003, justifies a lengthy extract:  
 
The critical factor is that a general power to increase tariffs duly fixed is in 
disharmony with the deep-rooted principle of not retrospectively increasing 
lawfully pronounced sentences.  It must be presumed that Parliament entrusted 
the wide power to make decisions on the release of mandatory life sentence 
prisoners on the supposition that the Home Secretary would not act contrary to 
such a fundamental principle of our law…. What Parliament did not know in 
1991 was that in 1993 a new Home Secretary would assert a general power to 
increase the punishment of prisoners convicted of murder whenever he 
considered it right to do so.  It would be wrong to assume that Parliament would 
have been prepared to give to the Home Secretary such an unprecedented 
power, alien to the principles of our law. 233 
 
This outspoken criticism suggested that Parliament itself gave no approval to the successive 
Home Secretaries’ powers to increase ‘duly set’ tariffs and it might well not have given 
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‘unprecedented power’ if it had known what was to happen.  Lord Hope was also critical, 
stating: ‘the root of the problem  … seems to me to lie in the tariff system as it has now 
developed and in the absence of any regulation of it by Parliament.’ 234  Lord Steyn’s criticism 
makes very clear his reservations about the practice of ministerial statements driving the law.    
The case also raised the question of whether the Home Secretary, in setting a tariff, was 
carrying out a judicial function.   Lord Steyn asserted:  
 
This case should also not be decided on a semantic quibble about whether the 
Home Secretary’s function is strictly ‘a sentencing exercise’.  The undeniable 
fact is that in fixing a tariff in an individual case the Home Secretary is making a 
decision about the punishment of the convicted man. 235 
 
He noted that Lord Goff in V & T held that the Home Secretary is ‘exercising a function which 
is closely analogous to a sentencing function.’  In that case a majority of the Law Lords 
agreed.  The issue of whether the Home Secretary was acting judicially when setting a tariff 
would lead later to determinations in the courts.  
 
 
3.5 Ministerial response 
 
Following New Labour success in 1997, Jack Straw, now as Home Secretary, had to take 
account of the ECtHR’s determination in respect of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson.  
Straw found himself following in his predecessors’ footsteps in making a ministerial 
statement.236   He introduced a new procedure based on his receiving annual reports of 
progress and development of young people sentenced under Section 53(1) of the Children and 
Young Person’s Act 1933.  He did still, however, stress the need to pay regard to public 
opinion, although not in respect of individual cases:  ‘The public properly expects the unique 
crime of murder to attract an appropriate punishment, regardless of the age or circumstances 
of the offender.’    Public confidence in the sentence would not be maintained if that initial tariff 
was curtailed lightly. 237 
 
In the same ministerial statement dealing with Venables and Thompson, Straw referred to 
Pierson.238   A prisoner would now be allowed to make representations to the Home Secretary 
if the former was informed that his tariff might be increased, or indeed, reduced. The Home 
Secretary would also take into consideration any exceptional progress made by prisoners 
while serving their tariff.  Straw used the statement to make the situation the same for whole 
life tariff prisoners:  
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I shall have this possibility in mind when reviewing at the 25 year point the 
cases of prisoners given a whole life tariff and in that respect will consider 
issues beyond the sole criteria of retribution and deterrence…. Prisoners will 
continue to be given the opportunity to make representations and to have 
access to the material before me.  239 
Straw drew attention to the fact that the position of mandatory life prisoners remained distinct 
from that of discretionary life prisoners, who could have their final release decided by the 
Parole Board.   Mandatory life prisoners, including those with whole life tariffs, would continue 
to have their release decided by the Home Secretary alone.  
Nowhere in the ministerial statement, did Straw refer to, let alone take into account, the 
judicial criticism in both V & T and Pierson of the Home Secretary acting judicially.  However, 
by the ruling in respect of V & T, the Strasbourg court had made clear its support for the 
domestic judicial concerns about the powers of the Home Secretary.   These powers in 
respect of discretionary life prisoners and in determining, without any review, the duration of 
detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure had been successfully challenged.  The remaining 
battleground was therefore the powers of the Home Secretary in respect of the mandatory life 
sentence for murder. 
 
3.6   Hindley  [2000] UKHL 21 
 
Straw’s statement on 10 November 1997 was followed nine days later by another statement, 
this time definitely very much less public.  At the beginning of the year his predecessor, 
Michael Howard, had communicated to Myra Hindley that in her case the tariff necessary to 
meet the requirements of retribution and deterrence would be whole life.  On 19 November 
1997 Straw decided that, despite the progress she had made in prison, he saw no reason to 
depart from Howard’s decision and confirmed her tariff as whole life.  Hindley contested the 
tariff the following month and the Divisional Court dismissed her application.  This dismissal 
was followed by a rejection in the Court of Appeal, but she was given leave to apply to the 
House of Lords.  The High Court had found that Hindley’s original whole life tariff, imposed by 
the then Home Secretary David Waddington in July 1990, was unlawful but that it had 
become lawful as a result of the ministerial statements of Howard and Straw. 240   
The appeals Hindley made are of particular relevance to this study as the basis of these was 
that the whole life tariff was unlawful and that the imposition of such a tariff was unlawful on 
various public law grounds.  As this appears to be the first time the lawfulness of the whole 
life tariff is discussed and ruled on by the House of Lords, the views expressed are worth 
detailed consideration.   
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Lord Steyn identified the Prison Act 1952 (Section 27) and the Murder (Abolition of the Death 
Penalty) Act 1965 Section 1 as the pertinent laws in question.  His ruling was that neither 
excluded the possibility of life to mean the whole of natural life because, ‘as a matter of law, a 
sentence of life imprisonment was understood to authorise the detention of a person 
sentenced to life imprisonment for an indeterminate period which is only brought to an end by 
the death of the prisoner or if and when the Secretary of State in the exercise of his discretion 
decides to release him or her.’ 241  Later legislation, he argued, including the CJA 1967 and 
the CJA 1991 and the Criminal (Sentences) Act 1997 had not changed the position.   
Straw’s November 1997 statement - following the ruling relating to Venables and Thompson - 
was examined by Lord Steyn in the light of Straw’s remark within the statement that in 
exceptional circumstances, including for example exceptional progress, a review and 
reduction of tariff could be appropriate.  Lord Steyn noted that counsel for the Home 
Secretary had confirmed that this included whole life tariff prisoners and confirmed also that 
the Home Secretary was  ‘prepared to reconsider and review any whole life tariff decision 
from time to time even in the absence of exceptional progress’. 242  Lord Steyn said that the 
Parole Board had recommended the transfer of Hindley to an open prison in 1997 and that 
the Home Secretary had rejected this, as was his right. 
Lord Steyn dismissed Hindley’s argument on all four aspects of the appeal:  
 
• the whole life tariff being unlawful; 
• the whole life tariff unlawfully fettering the Home Secretary’s discretion;  
• the exclusion of the Parole Board in reviewing whole life tariffs;  and  
• the inconsistency of whole life tariffs with the concept of a tariff being expressed in 
terms of years to be served.   
While the powers of the Home Secretary were to disappear, the first, third and fourth points 
were still relevant post 2003.   
 
For the part of her appeal relating to the claim that the Home Secretary had unlawfully 
increased her tariff from that set in 1985, Hindley depended on Pierson, examined above, 
relating to what information had been released to the prisoner at the time and whether a Home 
Secretary could retrospectively increase a tariff.   This was dismissed on the basis that the 
earlier ruling did not apply to Hindley’s case.  Lord Steyn ended by stating that Hindley, with 
her partner Brady, had committed crimes which were ‘uniquely evil’ and that ‘if it be right, as I 
have held it to be, that life-long incarceration for the purposes of punishment is competent 
where the crime or crimes are sufficiently heinous, it is difficult to argue that this case is not in 
this category’.  243   
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The decision of the Law Lords was unanimous, with Lord Hobson reconfirming the Home 
Secretary’s position of being under no obligation to direct the release of any person who had 
been sentenced to life imprisonment as a convicted murderer.  He was under no statutory 
obligation to refer any case to the Parole Board nor was he under any statutory obligation to 
accept a recommendation of the Parole Board.  ‘The discretion is his alone.’ 244  The Home 
Secretary must have sighed with relief that the appeal had confirmed his status so 
unambiguously and did not necessitate another ministerial statement.   
 
Straw must also have been relieved that the Law Lords had not focused at all on the point 
made in the earlier High Court hearing when the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, had stated   
 
There is room for serious debate whether the task of determining how long 
convicted murderers should serve in prison as punishment for their crimes 
should be undertaken by the judiciary (as in the case of discretionary life 
prisoners) or, as now, by the executive. That is, in large measure, a political 
and constitutional question. It is not a question for decision by this court. 245 
Although he had not thought it a decision for the court, in March 1998 in a lecture to the Police 
Staff College he returned to the subject.  A new government might be in place with a new 
Home Secretary but Lord Bingham had not altered his position. He stressed that ‘the 
sentencing of criminals is not …  a political matter.  It is a job for judges, not politicians or 
officials….   If such a system had been operated in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Hitler’s Germany or 
Amin’s Uganda, we would have been quick to condemn it as a glaring violation of democratic 
principle.’ 246   Lord Bingham had made this criticism before but this time, in 1998, he saw 
hope:  ‘But we live in a time of change.  Bold certainties are being questioned.  Old 
orthodoxies challenged.’ 247 
 
This question of the balance between judiciary and executive power in sentencing may not 
have been tackled by the House of Lords in Hindley and was certainly still not resolved.  It 
would soon re-emerge as a contentious issue awaiting a final decision.   
 
3.7    Stafford  [1998] UKHL 30;    [2002] ECHR 470  
Two names were to feature in legal appeals that would lead to clarification of the whole life 
tariff and would finally resolve the tension between the judiciary and the Home Secretary over 
roles in sentencing and prisoner release.   Ironically, the names featured were not those the 
public had grown used to seeing in headlines over the years: Hindley, Brady, Sutcliffe, Nilson,  
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West.  The names that were to have major repercussions for the Home Secretary’s powers 
were Stafford and Anderson. 
Originally convicted of murder in 1967, Stafford was released on licence in 1979.  In breach of 
the terms of his licence he moved to South Africa and was re-arrested in the UK when he 
returned ten years later.  Over the following 12 years Stafford was convicted of non-violent 
offences relating to forging travellers’ cheques and passports, and was imprisoned when 
convicted.  When the Parole Board recommended release in November 1996, the Home 
Secretary rejected the recommendation on the ground that Stafford was at risk of committing 
serious non-violent offences, but allowed a transfer to open prison with a review to be held 
two years later.  Stafford appealed the lawfulness of the Home Secretary’s actions.   
In Doody 248, Wynne 249 and Raja 250 the courts accepted that the setting of tariffs for 
murderers was an administrative, not a judicial function.  When Anderson’s case came before 
first the High Court, and then the Court of Appeal,  judges believed that tariff setting imposed 
a sentence and so was subject to the ECHR Article 6(1). 251  However, they were constrained 
by precedent and therefore rejected the appeal.  
A further appeal by Stafford to the House of Lords in 1998 also found in favour of the Home 
Secretary.  Two important points, however, were raised.  Lord Steyn expressed his concern 
that the Home Secretary’s submission had referred to ‘the wider political consideration’ of 
release.  Lord Steyn felt that this could be held to include party political considerations and 
recommended a rephrasing of the expression.  He also echoed the concerns expressed by 
Lord Bingham at the earlier appeal and ended by re-quoting them: ‘The imposition of what is 
in effect a substantial term of imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, without 
trial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law’. 252 
Stafford had lost his appeal in the domestic courts but he applied to Strasbourg.  The ECtHR 
reconsidered its determination in respect of Wynne 253 in the light of views expressed in 
domestic courts.  Because of the central importance of the final ruling in Stafford, it is worth 
examining it in some detail.  It referred to relevant UK judgments including the V and T 
appeal,254 citing Lord Steyn’s finding:   
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In fixing a tariff the Home Secretary is carrying out, contrary to the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the executive 
and the judiciary, a classic judicial function.  Parliament entrusted the 
underlying statutory power, which entailed a discretion to adopt a policy 
and fix a tariff, to the Home Secretary.  But the power to fix a tariff is 
nevertheless equivalent to a judge's sentencing power. 255 
It also referred to Pierson and to Hindley, including Lord Steyn’s ruling that ‘life-long 
incarceration for the purposes of punishment is competent where the crime or crimes are 
sufficiently heinous’.256  Doody and Lichniak and Pyrah were also cited as was Anderson and 
Taylor. 
In its consideration, the ECtHR recognised that parts of the UK had already changed their 
legislation relating to mandatory life sentences.  In Scotland, the Convention Rights 
(Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001 now provided that in the case of mandatory life sentences 
the trial judge fixes the punishment part of the sentence, on the expiry of which the Parole 
Board decides on possible release on licence. 257  In Northern Ireland, the Life Sentences 
(Northern Ireland) Order SI no. 2564 provided that the trial judge decides on the tariff for a 
mandatory life prisoner and that release post-tariff is determined by Life Sentence Review 
Commissioners (with a status and functions very similar to those of the Parole Board operating 
in England and Wales). 258    
In its ruling, the Court tackled the contentious issue of the separation of powers, noting that the 
abolition of the death penalty in 1965, and the conferring on the Home Secretary the power to 
release convicted murderers, had represented a major and progressive reform.  It further noted 
that now, however, the continuing role of the Secretary of State in fixing the tariff and in 
deciding on a prisoner's release following its expiry, had become increasingly difficult to 
reconcile with the notion of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary.259  
The Court considered that the mandatory life sentence did not impose imprisonment for life as a 
punishment.260  The tariff, which reflected the individual circumstances of the offence and the 
offender, represented the element of punishment. 261  This distinction between the sentence - 
mandatory life - and the punishment - the tariff, which is individualised - was to prove to be 
significant later. 262 
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The Court ruled that as Stafford had served the punishment element of his sentence for murder  
- illustrated by his release in 1979 - this could not be used by the Home Secretary as grounds 
for further detention.    Article 5 (4) of the Convention had therefore been breached 263 as had 
Article 5 (1). 264 
A statement was made in parliament on 17 October 2002 on behalf of the Home Secretary, 
now David Blunkett, in which he accepted that Stafford had to be accommodated and 
announced new ‘interim’ measures. 265  These measures would mean that Parole Board 
recommendations favouring release of a mandatory life sentence prisoner whose minimum 
term had been served would ‘normally’ be accepted by the Home Secretary.  He confirmed 
that once again an exception was being made over offenders with a whole life tariff, who 
would continue not to have their cases referred to the Parole Board.  
On the basis of Stafford, lawyers for Myra Hindley lodged an application with the ECtHR to 
have her whole life tariff overturned.  Before it came to the Court, she died in November 2002, 
and the application lapsed.  
 
3.8 Anderson [2002] UKHL 46 
Within a month of the Stafford ruling another judgment, this time in the House of Lords, would 
cement Stafford and would have far reaching effects, leading directly to changing 
fundamental aspects of the Home Secretary’s role.  Anderson had been convicted of two 
murders in 1988. The trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice had both recommended a 15 year 
tariff.  The Home Secretary rejected the recommendation and imposed a tariff of 20 years.  
The judicially recommended tariff was coming to an end and Anderson sought a ruling that 
the Home Secretary’s power to impose a higher tariff than the judicially recommended one 
was unlawful and sought a more immediate review and release.   
The purpose of the appeal was clearly stated: ‘This appeal concerns the sentencing, 
punishment and detention of adults convicted of murder in England and Wales and, in 
particular, the power now exercised by the Home Secretary to decide how long they should 
spend in prison for purposes of punishment.’ 266  Edward Fitzgerald for Anderson made 
perhaps his simplest and yet most effective speech in his role as a defence QC.  He argued:  
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1. Under Article 6(1) of the Convention a criminal defendant has a right to a fair 
trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
2. The imposition of sentence is part of the trial. 
3. Therefore sentence should be imposed by an independent and impartial 
tribunal. 
4. The fixing of the tariff of a convicted murderer is legally indistinguishable 
from the imposition of sentence. 
5. Therefore the tariff should be fixed by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
6. The Home Secretary is not an independent and impartial tribunal. 
7. Therefore the Home Secretary should not fix the tariff of a convicted 
murderer. 
 
Giving the leading judgment, Lord Bingham accepted this argument for all seven steps.  He 
also made reference to other cases to bolster his determination, including Benjamin and 
Wilson 267 where the ECtHR had ruled that it was not sufficient for the Home Secretary to 
show he had always acted in accordance with the recommendation of the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal:  ‘This is not a matter of form, but impinges on the fundamental principle of 
separation of powers and detracts from a necessary guarantee against the possibility of 
abuse.’ 268 
Lord Bingham covered in more detail much of what had been dealt with in Stafford.  He found 
in favour of Anderson and echoed much of what had been said in the European ruling.  He 
argued that ensuring the Home Secretary should play no part in the fixing of convicted 
murderers' tariffs made for much greater uniformity of treatment, as already his role in tariff 
setting for discretionary life sentence prisoners and for young murderers had been 
withdrawn.269  He retained power only in respect of mandatory life prisoners.  
Lord Steyn was critical of the Home Secretary’s powers but accepted that the judiciary must 
accept parliament’s decision on the matter.  He questioned, however, if the powers were 
compatible with the ECHR, especially Article 6 (1).270  Lord Nicholls interpreted the Article as 
there being a requirement for judicial and executive powers to be separate and for judicial 
functions only to occur in courts of law. 271  He went on to state that it was clear from Article 
6(1) that only a court could decide the guilt of an accused person and only a court could 
decide on punishment for anyone convicted in a court.  He continued:  ‘The power of the 
Home Secretary in England and Wales to decide on the tariff to be served by mandatory life 
sentence prisoners is a striking anomaly in our legal system,’ 272 and on the Home Secretary’s 
arguments against previous Anderson appeals: ‘The persuasiveness of the advocacy of 
counsel for the Home Secretary cannot hide the fragility of the argument presented.’ 273 
Acknowledging the ECtHR ruling on Stafford as ‘a coherent and inescapable one,’ Lord 
Nichols also found against the Home Secretary.  Reflecting the importance of the appeal, 
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seven Law Lords heard the case and all declared the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 Section 
29274 was incompatible with a Convention right.   
Before leaving the judgment, however, one other argument, particularly pertinent to this study, 
should be noted.  Lord Steyn was at pains to point out that, if the appeal succeeded, it would 
be important to avoid misunderstanding in one respect: 
 
If the role of the executive in setting the tariff should cease it does not follow 
that life imprisonment for murder may never, even in the worst cases 
imaginable, literally mean detention for life. … In Stafford the ECHR observed, 
"that a whole life tariff may, in exceptional cases, be imposed where justified 
by the gravity of the particular offence": p 21, para 79. If in future the judiciary 
and the Parole Board are given the sole responsibility for the system there 
may still be cases where the requirements of retribution and deterrence will 
require life-long detention.  275 
 
The ultimate punishment available in the UK for the most heinous crime was, therefore, 
acknowledged as the whole life tariff, whether set by the Home Secretary as then was the 
case or, in the future, by the judiciary.   
After the Anderson ruling there was no ministerial statement.   Instead, a Criminal Justice Bill 
was brought forward, with Tony Blair declaring at the time of its introduction that it was 
necessary to change the legal system as it was ‘a nineteenth century system trying to solve 
twenty-first-century crimes.‘ 276   
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4 THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003  
 
 
4.1 The penological context 
 
As seen, in the decade before the CJA 2003, increasing emphasis was placed on law and 
order issues by both main political parties, with competing rhetoric employed to persuade the 
public that one could be trusted more than the other to tackle crime.  Perhaps in response to 
the growing pressure from the media and the public on the subject - and the awareness of the 
need to address these concerns in order to be elected - both parties strove to demonstrate 
their ability to control crime.  In this study, such criminal justice developments have been 
principally examined in terms of their political and social context.  However, valuable additional 
insight can be gained by examining these developments in the light of relevant penological 
theories.    
 
David Garland’s study 277 charts the changes that society underwent in the last third of the 20th 
century, mainly in the USA and the UK, and the resultant changes in penology.  He asserts 
that a pervasive culture of control emerged, demonstrated through retributive and restrictive 
penal policy.  He explains the change by exploring how governments were reacting to 
fundamental changes in society, which had led to new levels of crime, disorder and public 
insecurity.  Garland argues that governments felt the need to reassure the public that they 
could be trusted:  by establishing their ability to control crime, by punishing offenders forcefully 
and by protecting communities from wrongdoers.  Garland has further written 278 of how the 
protection of the public became not simply one objective of criminal justice but became ‘the 
alpha to omega’ of penal policy. He argues that the emotional tone of penal discourse shifted 
‘from cool to hot’, 279 contributing to the emergence of the victim as a central focus. 280    
 
It is easy to see echoes of Garland’s view in the changes in criminal justice in the UK towards 
the end of the 20th century, especially in the Conservative change of position on the value of 
imprisonment, or Michael Howard’s retreat from the principles of the CJA 1991.  It can also be 
seen in New Labour’s rhetoric after James Bulger’s murder or their frequently stated stress on 
victims’ rights over offenders’ rights.  Within both parties, attitudes to criminal justice did indeed 
appear to move from ‘cool to hot’.  Traditionally, it might have been expected that there would 
be a difference between the Conservative and Labour parties over law and order issues but,  
as a senior judge said in interview for this study, in criminal justice matters ‘there was not a 
cigarette paper between them in the 1990s’.  
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This view is similar to one expressed by Jonathon Simon, who has argued that ‘New Labour 
embraced crime as a defining domestic policy problem, proving that (the) right has no 
particular advantage in governing through crime, but, linked to right rhetoric (‘tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime’), it is fully consistent with efforts by left of centre politics to 
manage problems of governance and legitimacy.’281  Writing earlier,282 Simon discussed the 
last decades of the 20th century in terms similar to Garland.  He considered that concern for 
crime permeated all public life: schools must be so safe that they become custodial 
institutions; welfare so averse to fraud that recipients should be treated as potential criminals; 
and the public square must be so safe that it is relocated into an enclosed shopping mall. 283  
Crime policy, Simon asserted, was the one area government could not surrender.  Most  UK 
politicians were also only too aware of the importance of the subject to the electorate.  Tony 
Blair reportedly commented that ‘A leader never loses votes by being tough on crime’. 284  This 
accords with the attention given by both Conservative and New Labour to the issue of law and 
order.  There was not only a tendency for prisoner numbers to rise after 1990, with the 
resultant escalation in costs of the prison service, but also an inclination for politicians, like 
Jack Straw, to take pride in prisoner numbers, on the basis that it made the public safer.285    
 
In New Labour‘s time in government, the multiple criminal justice bills that were introduced 
demonstrated the increasing stress on bolstering statutory powers to ensure public protection 
and the conviction of offenders.  It has been argued that the increasingly heightened rhetoric 
on the need to tackle crime, along with the skewed coverage of crime by sections of the mass 
media, encouraged insecurity and anxiety in the public. 286  Barak has said that ‘The 
contemporary mass media seem to have almost single-handedly raised the phantom of the 
predator criminal from a minor character to a customary, ever-present icon’.287   With the mass 
media’s ‘predator criminal’ appearing to be an increasingly serious threat, public concern 
mounted.  Simon reflects on this, stating: ‘When a problem for 10% becomes a paradigm for 
all, it is the mark of the hold of crime over our contemporary political imagination.’288   This 
seems an apposite comment on the UK in the 1980s and 1990s, when the perceived risk of 
crime was high, although not reflecting the actual statistics of crime.   The perception of risk 
was great enough to ensure that politicians felt the need to respond by trying to prove how 
effectively, efficiently and robustly they could control the problem.  
 
Feeley and Simon’s ‘new penology’ 289 sits very comfortably with this concern for efficiency in 
the control of crime.  The imperative of the new penology was managing a permanently 
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dangerous population while maintaining the system at a minimum cost.  They identified that 
rehabilitation was no longer at the heart of the criminal justice process, given the perceived 
failures of systems promoting rehabilitation.   This was replaced as the central tenet of the 
criminal justice system by incapacitation, which promised to reduce the effects of crime in 
society, not by altering either offenders or the social context, but by ‘rearranging the 
distribution of offenders in society’.290  The length of imprisonment should, it was felt, reflect 
the offenders’ risk factors.  The terms of the Crime Sentences Act 1997, which provided for life 
sentences for a second serious sexual or violent offence, can be interpreted as considering 
such offenders to be a high risk group who should, on the grounds of public safety, be 
imprisoned for a long time.  Michael Howard’s main justification for his view that ‘prison works’ 
was that incarceration removes people from the streets. 
 
According to Feeley and Simon, in place of the traditional emphasis on treatment (of 
offenders) and eradication (of crime), the central elements of the new penology are statistical 
predictions, the danger that identifiable groups pose, and management strategies.  Concern 
for efficient management was not limited to the USA in this period.  As discussed earlier in the 
study, Lacey has drawn attention to Margaret Thatcher’s concern for efficiency.  Many 
considered that the drive for efficiency helped create a segment of society viewed as 
permanently excluded from social mobility and economic integration.  This group was seen as 
dangerous and posing a constant, irritating threat.   
 
The New Labour government’s social policy was based on the premise that Thatcherism had 
created such an underclass.  In 1997, the Social Exclusion Unit was set up in the Cabinet 
Office with social exclusion defined 291 in similar terms to Feeley and Simon’s description of 
the underclass in the USA.  However, the effectiveness of the Unit’s policies has been 
questioned, for example in the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Reports.292 
 
Despite this policy initiative by New Labour, an examination of the proposals in the Criminal 
Justice Bill 2002 identifies preventative sentencing, aimed at controlling risk posed by the  
‘dangerous’ in society.  These, and other New Labour initiatives, seem to accord with Feeley 
and Simon’s analysis of New Labour widening the concept of an underclass, to include those 
who indulge in what was seen as anti-social behaviour.  Tonry has pointed out that not even 
right-wing Republican governments in the USA tried ‘to enact Anti-social Behaviour Orders, 
threaten parents of wayward children with criminal convictions and maintain DNA from 
innocent people in police databases.’ 293  He argues that, by introducing such measures, New 
Labour not only was encouraging increased public discontent and intolerance, but helping 
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create social cleavages between ‘the comfortable haves and the unruly and awkward have-
nots’, 294 again echoing Feeley and Simon’s concept of a deprived underclass viewed with 
suspicion and distrust.   
 
Perhaps the clearest study of the effects of developments in penological thinking in relation to 
Britain is Brownlee’s 1998 paper 295 which examined the criminological steps taken by the 
Labour Party retreating from its position at the 1983 election regarding the social causes of 
crime, to New Labour’s concern for individual responsibility.  He argued that a radical agenda 
on crime and punishment tackling social issues was gradually dismantled and replaced by 
‘here-and-now’ policies of Left Realist criminologists. The increasing costs of ‘welfarism’ from 
the cradle to the grave made it difficult to sustain, and this led to an emphasis on personal 
responsibility in policy areas including crime and sentencing.  Brownlee asserted: ‘How short is 
the step… from a position, which maintains that people are individually responsible for their 
own wrongdoing, to another which asserts that punishment in itself is a sufficient response to 
that wrongdoing, being the just desert for such free-willed choices’. 296   Such a position is, 
perhaps, not even that short step away from the first half at least of Blair and New Labour’s 
mantra ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’.  Just desert can be seen as a 
reference back to the 1990 White Paper and the subsequent CJA 2001.  It also, however, 
looks forward to the Halliday Report, the White Paper of 2002 and the CJA 2003.   
 
When turning to examine the CJA 2003, another model of penology is of value.  Packer’s 
distinction 297 between two models - due process and crime control - provides insights into the 
different value systems within the criminal justice of New Labour.  While crime control and due 
process may be regarded as theoretical ideal models, they can be used as tools 298 to provide 
another approach when considering the Auld Review and the three Law Commission Reports 
that were the foundation of the CJA 2003.  The two models are also relevant when considering 
the clash between the executive and the judiciary over, for instance, anti-terrorism measures. 
299  It should not be thought, however, that the two models are irrelevant to developments 
before the time of the New Labour government.   For instance, the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 modified the police caution by the insertion of ‘but it may harm your defence if 
you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court’.  This can be 
regarded both as a weakening of due process, by its impact on the right to silence,300 and a 
strengthening of crime control or, as Duff prefers to refer to it, ‘efficiency’. 301  
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4.2    Context and origins of the Criminal Justice Bill 2002  
 
On the day in 2002 when the ECtHR announced its determination on Stafford, David Blunkett, 
the Home Secretary, declared that protecting the public was his top priority so he would fight 
any attempt by offenders with a whole life tariff to use the ruling to their advantage.   He 
continued ‘If this judgment were to be used to support a legal process to achieve this, I would 
seek to use domestic legislation to enshrine the power of Parliament to provide adequate 
punishment for the guilty - including life meaning life’. 302  As has been seen, the Anderson 
ruling by the House of Lords further circumscribed the Home Secretary’s powers.  Therefore it 
was entirely predictable that the issue of sentencing for murder would be a part of the 
forthcoming Criminal Justice Bill.   However, it should not be thought that the Anderson and 
Stafford determinations provided the motivation for the Act.  The gestation of the Bill was 
much lengthier than the time between these judgments and its publication, and its content, 
was far more wide-ranging.  It was intended to be a comprehensive and far-reaching piece of 
legislation that was central to the Government’s programme for that parliamentary year.  
However, as published, it contained no reference to the mandatory life sentence for murder, 
nor to tariffs for murders of differing heinousness. 
 
The Bill, introduced in November 2002, was based on several documents: three Law 
Commission Reports, 303  Sir Robin Auld’s Review of the Criminal Courts of England and 
Wales,304 John Halliday’s Report Making Punishment Work 305, and the White Paper Justice 
For All  306.   Although the Halliday Report’s recommendations are most relevant to this study, 
it was the proposals made in the Law Commission reports and in the Auld Review that would 
cause most controversy.   
 
The 1997 Law Commission Report’s recommendations included making it easier to put in 
evidence statements of witnesses who were afraid to testify or who were absent from court.  
The first 2001 Report recommended reform of the rule against double jeopardy and the rules 
relating to prosecution appeals.  Although the Report recognised the fundamental importance 
of the general rule against double jeopardy, it recommended limited exceptions.   The third 
Law Commission report made recommendations relating to evidence of bad character in 
criminal proceedings.    
 
Lord Justice Auld had been commissioned to review the criminal courts of England and Wales 
and he reported in September 2001. Some of his recommendations when incorporated into 
the White Paper and the Bill, were to provoke the most intense opposition from lawyers and 
                                                     
302 Blunkett’s response was widely reported in the media on 28/29 May 2002, for example in BBC News 
online and the Daily Mail. 
303 Law Commission Reports (1997)  (2001a)  (2001b)   
304 Auld (2001) 
305 Halliday Report (2001) 
306 Home Office (2002) 
 77 
others in both Houses of Parliament, and frequently dominated the debates.  These 
recommendations, which echoed elements in the Law Commission reports, included: the 
ending of the double jeopardy rule; the ending of trial by jury in complex fraud cases; and 
putting the criminal record of the accused before the jury.    
 
Many of these recommendations were included in the White Paper and the Bill.   Because 
they were deemed to be challenging both due process and the protection of individual rights 
that had been long established, this led to heated debate in parliament and outside 
parliament.  Some recommendations reflect Packer’s crime control model with its stress on 
efficiency.   The Bar Council, however, argued 307 that the recommendations, rather than 
easing the process, would cause inefficiency.  They maintained that restricting the double 
jeopardy rule would result in ‘sloppy investigations and the police being given a second bite of 
the cherry.’   They further claimed the justice system had seen too many trials fall apart 
because of such inadequacies and the Bill would only make things worse.   A more typical 
criticism has been made by Tonry who pointed out just how illiberal the recommendations 
were:  the abrogation of the eight-century old double jeopardy rule, incursions into jury trial 
rights and the weakening of evidentiary and procedural rules designed to protect against 
wrongful convictions. 308 
 
Apart from the areas criticised for threatening due process, a further group of 
recommendations, based on ‘crime control’ at the possible expense of individual rights, 
invoked strong reaction:  the introduction of the concept of ‘dangerousness’ and the proposals 
for preventative sentencing designed to limit risk to the public.  Proposals were for 
indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for public protection and extended (determinate) 
sentences for dangerous sexual or violent offenders.  Feeley and Simon noted that in the USA 
dangerous individuals were being identified as being an ‘underclass’.  New Labour can be 
seen as following in the USA’s footsteps by appearing to create a group of offenders destined 
to have extended incarceration on the grounds of potential future risk.   
 
Underlying the Act, and also open to criticism, was Tony Blair’s’ frequently expressed policy of 
rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of victims, which was referred to in the 
Queen’s Speech when the Bill was introduced to parliament. 309  This had been a theme 
expressed not only by Blair but also by his Home Secretaries, both Jack Straw and David 
Blunkett. 310    Although this focus was welcomed by some, for example the Director of The  
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Victims of Crime Trust 311  and the then Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 312 more 
commentators were wary of the concept of rebalancing justice in victims’ favour.  At the time, 
The Guardian wrote: 
The implication is that the system currently favours offenders. He (Blair) 
ought to know better. The founding principles of a criminal justice system 
must be independence, objectivity and neutrality. A system favouring 
victims is as unacceptable, dangerous and potentially corrupting, as one 
favouring offenders. MPs must restore the fundamental principles. 313 
 
More recently, writing of Blair’s wish to promote victims’ justice, David Faulkner questioned its 
legitimacy arguing that ‘convicting the guilty and protecting the public became not just as 
important, but perhaps more important, than acquitting the innocent.’ 314   Perhaps predictably, 
Tonry’s criticism is even more scathing, criticising the notion that the criminal justice system is 
‘a zero-sum game in which every gain for one player is a loss for another’.  The ultimate 
question, he argues, must be whether a defendant committed a crime, not whether a victim 
has been wronged and has a greater claim for sympathy. 315 
 
These criticisms, mainly based on proposals first suggested in the Law Commission Reports 
and the Auld Review,  were to re-emerge during the debate in parliament.   However, of the 
documents influencing the Bill, the most central for this present study was the Halliday Report.  
This fundamental review of sentencing and its impact on reoffending had been announced by 
the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, in May 2000 when he stated that the key question to be 
considered was whether a different legal framework to that established by the CJA 1991 
would facilitate better results. 316  Straw specified that by ‘better results’ he meant preventing 
more crimes, causing fewer victims and creating greater public safety.  These criteria would, 
for the government, be the key tests for any changes. 317    
 
Halliday’s committee consulted widely.  Its findings reaffirmed the central importance of 
sentencing to criminal justice, with the Report stating that sentencing contributed to good 
order by dealing appropriately with those who breached the norms and standards of society.  
The goal was to achieve punishments that worked as well as they could in terms of crime 
reduction and the satisfaction of victims and communities.  Equally important was the goal of 
achieving punishments that were just, and were seen to be just.   Halliday considered the 
various aims of sentencing.  On reviewing the evidence on deterrence and incapacitation he 
concluded there was insufficient evidence of either leading to crime reduction.  He put forward 
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a modified form of proportionality: that sentences should be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offence and to the seriousness of the criminal record.  As Ashworth noted, this latter 
point met the government’s concern about persistent offenders. 318 
 
On the whole, the Halliday Report was quietly received.   Justice was concerned about taking 
the seriousness of the criminal record into account. 319  The Howard League in its response to 
Halliday’s Report, supported the idea that proportionality should be a key principle of the 
criminal justice system.  It asserted that by tying the penalty to the seriousness of the offence, 
the court made it clear that offenders are sentenced not on the basis of who they are but what 
they have done. The Howard League saw proportionality as an essential guarantee of fairness 
and public confidence. 320    
 
Halliday’s views on purposes and principles of sentencing clearly influenced the White Paper, 
Justice For All. 321   It stated that, for the first time, the purposes of sentencing would be set 
out in legislation.   Sentences should:  first and foremost protect the public; act as a 
punishment and ensure the punishment fits the crime; reduce crime; deter; incapacitate; 
reform and rehabilitate; and promote reparation.322  This was despite Halliday’s reservations 
about insufficient evidence on the effectiveness of incapacitation and deterrence.  This all-
embracing list is followed in the White Paper by a statement that sentencers would be 
required to consider these purposes when sentencing, and to consider how the sentence they 
imposed would provide the ‘right balance’.323  However, the White Paper signally failed to 
provide guidance on how the ‘right balance’ was to be achieved. 324 
 
This was not the first criminal justice Bill introduced by the Blair Government.  Tackling crime 
was an on-going theme:  this was the fourteenth anti-crime bill since the 1997 election and 
was the clearest sign yet that its pledge to be ‘tough on crime’ was still central to the politics of 
New Labour. 325    In interview for this study,  David Blunkett reinforced this, saying he felt the 
introduction of the Bill in 2002 was important not only to show those who committed the worst 
crimes that they would be treated severely but also to show the public that New Labour could 
be trusted on law and order.  
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4.3      Passage of the Criminal Justice Bill through Parliament   
 
4.3.1   The House of Commons 
 
The resultant Act would introduce the judicially imposed whole life order.  However, just as in 
the debate outside parliament, this sentence was not the main focus of attention in parliament.  
The main areas for debate illustrate the conflict in penological ideas, and were concerned with 
the recommendations of the Auld Review and also the concept of rebalancing the criminal 
justice system in favour of victims.   The latter was attacked almost immediately in parliament, 
not on the grounds that victims and witnesses should not be treated better, but that changes 
here would lead to defendants losing their rights and legal protection.   Simon Hughes, the 
then Home Affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, expressed his concern: 
 
The prime minister sometimes says that the greatest miscarriage of justice is 
when the guilty go free, not when the innocent are convicted…. The price of a 
decent justice system is that, occasionally, the guilty go free … and it is wrong 
to think that in trying to deal with that very small number is a price worth paying 
if, as a result, we end up with a criminal justice system that convicts more 
people unjustly or treats them unfairly. 326   
 
Many Members were concerned about the threat to legal safeguards and to due process,  
deriving mainly from the proposals first laid out in the Auld Review.  However, the 
Conservatives seemed reluctant to appear soft on crime and their main home affairs 
spokesman, Oliver Letwin, accepted many of the proposals, including the changes to the rule 
of double jeopardy.   
 
At the end of almost seven hours of debate, the Second Reading was completed with barely a 
mention of sentencing.  When the Commons considered the Criminal Justice Bill in 
Committee, there were 32 sittings; predictably, there were long discussions on drug misuse, 
on the disclosure of evidence by the defence, on trials without juries, on double jeopardy, and 
on the evidence of bad character.  Less time was found for discussion on sentencing and its 
purposes, and on imprisonment for public protection. 
 
On the Report and Third Reading stage in the Commons, a large number of additional clauses 
were introduced.  On the first day of this stage, eight new clauses were introduced, and on the 
second day 21 new clauses were introduced, plus 3 new schedules.   New Clause 30 
concerned the mandatory life sentence and starting points for murders of differing 
heinousness.   New Schedule 2 proposed starting points including the whole life order. 327  In 
one sitting, however, the House of Commons had to debate all the clauses relating to 
sentences for murder, to death by dangerous driving and to firearm offences.  The amount of 
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new material and the shortage of time for debate was remarked on by Members, with David 
Heath criticising the extent of the Bill and the numerous new clauses, and claiming what was 
being held up as the flagship Criminal Justice Bill of the parliament would not receive the 
scrutiny it required because of lack of time.328  Many other Members raised their concern over 
the lack of time to debate such important issues, especially that of sentencing for murder.  
Dominic Grieve pointed out that the government had tried ‘to squeeze the quart into the pint 
pot, but the truth is that the quart will not go into the pint pot.  There is insufficient time to do 
justice to the legislation.’ 329  John Bercow noted that ‘even if we were to have six and a half 
hours uninterrupted debate without a single vote, which is wholly implausible, there would be 
under two minutes to debate each of the almost 200 amendments and new clauses today’.  330  
Another Member complained that the late introduction of important clauses was putting ‘the 
Commons in a straightjacket’. 331 
Nonetheless, David Blunkett started the debate by referring to the issue of the whole life 
tariff:332 
There is no question but that the public are bewildered by how sentences 
can be reached when they know that the crime that has been committed 
was so heinous that there could be only one sentence: life should mean life. 
When the death penalty was abolished it was presumed that those who 
committed such an act against their fellow human beings would go down for 
the rest of their lives. …  Successive Home Secretaries of all political 
persuasions have intended that we should not only send a signal to, but deal 
decisively with, those who threaten the life and limb of others, by saying that 
such people should be given life sentences that would literally put them 
away for the rest of their lives. 333  
In the debate that followed there was almost unanimous agreement that in some cases life 
should mean life.   Although there were few arguing against the whole life tariff, some issues 
relating to the tariff were raised.  The question of how prisons would cope with prisoners 
having to spend their extreme old age in custody was mentioned and the consequences of the 
likely increase in numbers of prisoners with whole life tariffs as a result of the proposals.334   
Several Members questioned the different starting points of the tariffs for murder and how they 
would relate to the, non-disputed, whole life sentence.  The official Conservative spokesman 
in the debate, Dominic Grieve, queried some of the starting points for particular categories of 
murder but again stated his support for the proposed whole life order:  ‘(The) new schedule … 
appears to have been properly drafted to respond to public anxiety on the topic.  The criteria  
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that the Government have set appear clearly set out.  There is also the possibility of making 
an exception if necessary.  The guidelines therefore strike us as sensible.’ 335  
Only two significant dissenting notes were introduced.  John Bercow questioned the morality 
of abolishing hope of possible release for offenders sentenced to whole life.  He believed that 
those who commit the most bestial murders but who, over a period, show sustained evidence 
of repentance and rehabilitation should always have the hope that they might be released. 336 
Bercow’s view echoed that of Simon Hughes who, in the earlier debate, had stated that he did 
not accept the Home Secretary’s view that there could never be redemption or rehabilitation, 
however terrible the crime.  He added that people could commit crimes ‘that make them 
reviled as the scum of the earth’ but the eventuality had to be allowed for that even some of 
those individuals could later come good and be safe to be released. 337  Both Hughes and 
Bercow, therefore, implied the need for a review mechanism.  
Blunkett, however, rejected Bercow’s request, both on the basis of the whole life prisoner 
being a threat to the public and that the public, in the shape of vigilante retribution, could be a 
danger to such a prisoner if released. 338  Lady Hermon also argued for life to mean life, 
pointing out that when some life prisoners were accorded early release in Northern Ireland, 
huge damage was caused to the community’s confidence in the Belfast agreement. 339  
Interestingly Hughes, despite his reservations, accepted that for some people life would in fact 
mean life but insisted that a whole life order would only be legitimate if it was imposed for the 
protection of the public and not for the purposes of retribution and deterrence.  He argued that 
where there was uncertainty about how long was necessary before it was safe to release 
someone, the power should be reserved to a court, not the Parole Board.  Unless it was safe 
to release someone, he would have to remain in prison.340  
The Liberal Democrats as a party chose to vote against the sentencing clause, not because of 
their stated objection to the whole life order specifically but because they believed that, 
although parliament should set the principles, it should not prescribe the minimum number of 
years to be served for particular offences. 341  Parliament should, they argued, provide 
guidance on sentencing and even set the maximum sentence, but specific sentences should 
be left to the discretion of the court. 342  
The proposed tariffs for murder ratcheted-up the length of imprisonment compared to previous 
and current practice, and this proved more contentious.   Various Members pointed out that 
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what was being proposed exceeded the guidelines set out in Practice Directions by the Lord 
Chief Justice in the previous year. 343  Simon Hughes queried the ‘jump’ in sentence length, 
pointing out that the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s advice to the Court of Appeal the previous 
year suggested that the starting point for murder should be 14 years, the higher level about 
four years above that, and the lower level about four years below it.  The advice had also 
indicated that the 30-year tariff should be applied only in exceptional circumstances and that 
whole life tariffs were not to be recommended.344   The Conservative MP, Douglas Hogg, 
echoed Hughes’ question, querying why the House was being asked to approve a range of life 
sentence tariffs that were greatly in excess of the range set out in the Practice Direction.345   
Dominic Grieve was concerned that, in seeking properly to address public disquiet about the 
most serious murderers, parliament should not simply introduce an escalation of tariffs for 
every murderer, including those who could properly be rehabilitated and safely released.346 
Dominic Grieve also warned about the speed with which the government was making change.   
He worried about hastily prepared reforms because they often failed to bear close scrutiny, 
and, above all, tended to prove unworkable when implemented.   Nevertheless, he agreed 
with the Home Secretary’s message that those who committed the more serious murders 
should go to prison for a long time and that those who committed the most serious offences 
should never be released.  However, he felt that if the guidelines which were being 
established, particularly those specifying 30 and 15 years, bore no relation to the reality of 
sentencing practice or to the diversity of the criminals to be sentenced, parliament could be 
straying down the wrong road. 347 
 
The Home Secretary, however, remained firm declaring that it was up to parliament to lay 
down a framework that responded to the wishes of the people, adding that strengthening 
public confidence in the justice system would also strengthen liberty, freedom and democracy.  
He further argued that  ‘If we have clarity, consistency and confidence, we also have a better 
debate about the way in which we deal with the underlying issues of prevention and bring 
other forces of social policy to bear so that we have a safer, more sustained and desirable 
community in which to live.’ 348 
In summing up the debate for the Government, Paul Goggins, Under Secretary of State, also 
stressed the need for the public to have confidence in the criminal justice system, claiming 
that ‘mob rule’ had to be avoided and that constituents demanded severity in sentencing.   He 
argued that if parliament got the balance right, with a robust framework in which the judges  
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had the final say, not only would parliament's credibility be strengthened, but so too would the 
credibility of the judges and the wider criminal justice system. 349 
The debate in the Commons reveals that there was little evidence of politicians arguing 
against the whole life order in principle.  Bercow and Hughes were the only two Members to 
raise the question of possible rehabilitation for those serving the sentence, but both accepted, 
in principle, the possibility of certain offenders serving whole life for public protection.  In 
common with Blunkett, they acknowledged the need for sentences to act as punishment and 
deterrence, but also for incapacitation and the protection of the public.  They did not think that 
a whole life term could be justified on the grounds of retribution alone.  They accepted it only if 
there was a continuing danger to the public.  
Blunkett had stated early in the debate ‘We are talking, thank God, about a small number of 
people, but we are also dealing with the nature of the impact that they have.’ 350  This seemed 
to have been accepted in the House with even those who were uncomfortable with the 
principle accepting, as in the case of Hughes, that for certain people the judges should rule 
that they remain in prison on grounds of incapacitation. 
The House of Commons approved the Criminal Justice Bill after the Third Reading on 20 May 
2003.  Clause 30 of the Bill, which contained sentencing proposals for murder, including the 
whole life order, was passed decisively:  Ayes 325;  Noes 52.   Having passed through the 
Commons, the Bill went to the House of Lords. 
 
4.3.2    The House of Lords 
The Bill was introduced by Lord Falconer, the Lord Chancellor.  As in the Commons, the 
exceptionally large number of clauses in the Bill was criticised, as was the speed required to 
try to debate them all.  One Member noted that Lord Falconer had sped through the 
introduction, covering 26 clauses within one minute. 351   Immediately, the same concerns that 
had initiated the debate in the House of Commons were repeated here:  the need for the 
public to have confidence in the criminal justice system and the need to protect civil liberties. 
One of New Labour’s own Members, Baroness Kennedy was one of the strongest critics of 
the moves to attack due process: the weakening of the rule on double jeopardy; the  
introduction of evidence of bad character;  and the restriction of trial by jury.  She implied 
these were crime control measures: 
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Law matters.  Liberty matters.  When the government talk about rebalancing the 
system… we are not talking of rebalancing in favour of the victims, we are talking 
about rebalancing in favour of the state.  The Bill gives huge increased powers to 
the state, which is why it is so pernicious. 352 
Sentencing was more widely debated in the Lords than in the Commons.  Lord Woolf, Lord 
Chief Justice, spoke on behalf of the judiciary, voicing concerns particularly about the 
restrictions on judicial discretion.  In a paper that he circulated to all Members of the Lords,353 
he accepted that there was no constitutional principle preventing statutory guidelines.  
However, he questioned their advisability at that time, given that the government was setting 
up a new expert independent body specifically to develop sentencing guidelines utilising the 
expert advice of the Sentencing Advisory Panel. 354  He drew attention to the fact that the Bill 
proposed tariffs for murder that were out of line with the guidance he had issued in the 
Practice Direction the previous year.  Furthermore, the proposed tariffs for murder would 
mean that sentences for other offences would also have to be increased to take account of 
this. 355  Pointing to the heterogeneous nature of murder cases before the courts, he argued 
that the judiciary was the institution best placed to decide on tariffs.   He did not, however,  
dispute the possibility that some murderers would never be released 356 and conceded that 
there were a few cases of exceptional gravity where the judge could state that no minimum 
sentence could properly be set, resulting, of course, in a whole life order. 357  
Lord Ackner supported Lord Woolf and felt that the intended effect of the Bill was to drive life 
sentence tariffs up and to constrain the judiciary. 358  He produced data about the number of 
life sentence prisoners who had been imprisoned for longer than their judicial tariff, and 
maintained that these argued against the Home Secretary’s claim that the judiciary was 
under-sentencing. 359  He claimed that the courts in England and Wales already imposed the 
longest sentences of any country in the European Union, with - in 2001  - the number of lifers 
in England and Wales being equal to the total population serving life sentences in the rest of 
the European Union.  
Lord Donaldson also supported his fellow judges.  He said that the Home Secretary appeared 
to assume that parliament is omnipotent and could dictate to the judges, in detail, how they 
should perform their constitutional duties.  ‘Indeed, in the context of mandatory life sentences, 
Schedule 17  360 assumes that the judges are mere bean counters: think of a starting point for 
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the minimum time which the accused should stay in prison, and then add or subtract in 
accordance with what are virtually statutory formulae.’ 361    Lord Donaldson’s position was 
perhaps not too surprising, being a former Master of the Rolls.  It reflected the long-standing 
judicial stance on the separation of powers: that legislation on sentencing infringed the judicial 
sphere.  It ignored, however, the central constitutional position that parliament is sovereign. 
Most of the debate in the Second Reading, as in the Commons, concentrated not on the 
whole life order, or even on mandatory sentencing, but on the double jeopardy proposal and 
the possibility of future trials without jury.  However, more time than in the Commons was 
spent on sentencing.  The influence of the Law Lords made sure that the role of the judiciary 
was debated with vigour and that their views on the mandatory life sentence was well 
documented and debated.  Possibly as a result of this, more Lords than MPs expressed 
concerns about the possible restrictions on judges when sentencing in murder cases. 
Lord Dholakia was one of the few to discuss at any length the whole life order and was 
vehemently opposed to it:  
In the case of whole-life tariffs, Parliament will require judges to deprive 
offenders of any possible hope of release, whatever changes they may go 
through by way of remorse, repentance, personal change, the influence of 
other people or the ageing process.  They will condemn the Prison Service 
to cope with a growing number of prisoners deprived of all hope and with 
little to lose. 362 
Lord Dholakia was, however, an exception and, as in the Commons, the majority of the Lords 
who addressed the subject accepted the whole life order as being a required part of the 
sentencing armoury.  The session closed with Baroness Scotland, Minister of State for the 
Home Office, stressing that the Bill was not designed as a sentencing ‘straightjacket’ and that 
the ‘Herculean task’ of getting agreement about the Bill would continue.  That ‘Herculean task’ 
continued in the Lords at the Committee Stage and Third Reading of the Bill.  
The Third Reading was spent examining the wording of the many amendments, the debate 
dealing with sentences for murder being the most pertinent to this study.   Most of this again 
concerned the question of mandatory and discretionary life sentences.   Baroness Anelay, 
Conservative Home Affairs spokesman, introducing  - but not supporting - an amendment 
which would provide for discretionary sentences for murder, discussed at length whether 
victims and the general public understood the differences between the wide range of 
categories of murder and the differences in sentencing.  She referred to the Nathan Report’s 
claim that the fact that the life sentence was mandatory, actually reduced any deterrent value 
a life sentence might have.  It diluted what should be the awe-inspiring nature of the life 
sentence.  Because many murderers received unnecessary life sentences, the average time 
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served was reduced, giving credence to the common belief that 'life' means nine years.  If the 
life sentence became discretionary, the average time served by lifers would be substantially 
increased.363 
Summing up for the Government, Baroness Scotland adopted the classic interpretation of a 
life sentence: 
A "life sentence" means just that: it extends to the whole of the defendant's 
life. There is a misunderstanding about the fact that part of the life sentence 
will be spent in custody and the remainder in the community.  It is possible for 
a person, for the duration of their life, until the day on which they die, to be 
recalled to prison, if they breach the undertakings or conditions on which they 
remain in the community on licence. 364 
Baroness Scotland’s statement was, of course, technically correct in that offenders sentenced 
to life imprisonment and released on parole can be recalled to prison at any time for the rest of 
their natural life - but only for ‘just cause’.  There is, of course, a wide difference between her 
definition of a life sentence and a whole life order.  
 
The passage of the Criminal Justice Bill through Parliament had taken a full year.  Simon 
Hughes had stated that Members would ‘do a service to no one by having a histrionic and 
aggressive debate’. 365   Histrionics and aggression were avoided on the whole, 366 with the 
most spirited debate being concerned with the general question of where the balance should 
lie between victims’ rights and offenders’ rights.  In his response to the White Paper, David 
Etherington had raised concerns about the way forward for the Bill, complaining of the 
government’s ‘dangerous habit of raising public expectation beyond that which can be truly 
achieved’ and its tendency to underestimate the need for judicial independence in a free, 
democratic and civilised society.  He hoped that the scrutiny of both Houses of Parliament 
would enforce the good and ameliorate the bad in these proposals. 367  The issues that had 
caused most controversy were undoubtedly the proposals for trial without jury, the abolition of 
the double jeopardy rule and the changes proposed to the rules of evidence.  These highlight 
the crime control emphasis of the Bill, at the expense of due process.   Members in both 
Houses had expressed concern that the government was perhaps too concerned with public 
opinion and party political influences.  This concern was expressed most colourfully by 
Baroness Kennedy who described the government’s proposals as ‘some kind of swaggering 
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machismo’, dictating law reform to demonstrate that it could be tough on crime.  She 
continued, ‘That reminds me of nothing more than men who boast about size to mask 
uncertainty about their masculinity, and my God, we have a big Bill here.’ 368 
 
The introduction of a judicially imposed whole life sentence had proved less contentious than 
might have been expected.  Perhaps this was because, unlike much of the rest of the Bill, the 
whole life order strengthened due process since the Home Secretary had lost his tariff-setting 
powers.  Perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes had in the past, of course, served ‘natural 
life’ sentences on the basis of a Home Secretary’s judgement that the crime committed was 
considered too heinous for the offender ever to be released.  Virtually unanimously, the 
Members of both Houses agreed that, although the practice of the Home Secretary making 
that decision had gone, the option should still exist, but now in the hands of the judiciary.  The 
government had argued that it was crucial that the Bill got the balance right to ensure public 
confidence, not only in the criminal justice system but also in parliament itself.369  Most 
Members in the House of Commons seemed to agree that the difficult balance was achieved, 
with the Liberal Democrats the only party to vote against the central clauses related to 
sentencing.  More dissent was demonstrated in the Lords particularly, perhaps, in respect of 
the mandatory life sentence for murder and the role of the judiciary.  
 
Having guided the Bill through all the necessary stages of parliamentary procedure, the 
government had a very tight timescale for it to receive Royal Assent before the end of the 
parliamentary session.  Other amendments were returned to the Commons, which used its 
power to override the Lords amendments, and the Bill was given Royal Assent on 20 
November 2003.  
 
4.4     The rush to pass the Act and initial reaction to the Act 
To ensure that the Bill could be passed in the last few minutes before the end of the 
parliamentary year, the Home Secretary had to offer concessions both to the Commons and 
the Lords on a number of contentious crime control measures.   The range of fraud trials that 
could be tried without a jury was reduced from the original proposals after particularly strong 
opposition in the Lords.  The proposal to allow defendants to waive their right to a jury trial 
was dropped.  Civil liberty groups were relieved that the admissibility of ‘bad character’ had 
been curtailed, as had the plan to retain DNA samples from suspects never charged with an 
offence.   
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Members of the both Houses had criticised the lack of time available to spend on so many 
important clauses in the Bill, and there did appear to be a certain sprint in the later stages, 
perhaps as a result of the insertion of a large number of significant new clauses and 
schedules at Report stage, when they could be given little scrutiny and they could only be 
accepted or rejected, not amended.  Indeed, as pointed out by Lady Anelay on two occasions 
on Report in the Commons, government ministers ran out of time before they could even 
finish introducing their own amendments.   She felt that such procedures were unacceptable 
and that the guillotine had been wielded with perhaps too much vigour. 370 
Any coverage in the media the morning after the Royal Assent tended to concentrate on the 
last minute concessions, with newspapers such as the Independent and the Daily Mail sharing 
the word ‘climbdown’ within their headline. 371   Newspapers speculated on whether Tony Blair 
was determined that his government would not suffer an embarrassing defeat so soon after 
the newly appointed Leader of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard, had taken up his 
position.   
Although the Bill had taken the full year to pass through parliament, it had generally attracted 
little public attention during its passage.  2003 was the year British headlines were dominated 
by the Iraq war.  During the early stages of the debates on the Bill, the public opposition to the 
war culminated in February with a march in London of almost a million people objecting to 
Britain’s military involvement.   As the debate on the Bill continued, parliament was also 
involved with debates over the ‘rights and wrongs’ of the war, and the government was forced 
to answer questions about so called ‘dodgy dossiers’ and ‘sexed up evidence.’ 372   By July, 
media attention was focused on David Kelly’s ‘suicide,’ 373 and Iraq continued to dominate the 
news until Sadam Hussein’s capture in December.   
It was not, however, only the war that kept the Criminal Justice Bill out of the headlines.   On 
the day it was given Royal Assent, President George Bush was in Britain on a state visit.  The 
measures taken to avoid his coming into contact with anti-war protesters made much more 
tempting headlines for the newspapers than the final passage of the Criminal Justice Bill.   
Where politics did attract news coverage,  media headlines were more likely to feature 
controversies surrounding the introduction of the congestion charge in London or the 
installation of the first gay Anglican bishop in the United States than they were to focus on the 
escalation of life sentences for convicted murderers.   Without this coverage, therefore, the 
Act was passed with little public awareness and, for the first time in English Law, a whole life 
order to be imposed by the judiciary had been established. 
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4.5 Commentary on the Act 
 
 
It is not surprising that an Act of such length and complexity and dealing with so many key 
issues in the criminal justice system should attract widespread comment from both academics 
and judges.  Much of the commentary is not relevant to this study - for instance, the 
thresholds for fines and for custody, or the provisions relating to risk and dangerousness.  
Comment, however, on the purposes of sentencing, given in the Act in s142(1) does have 
relevance.   In 2005 Ashworth declared that far from this being the great advance that the 
government claimed, it was ‘vacuous’ since it was simply a list that provided no means of 
resolving the inevitable conflict between purposes, and nor did it establish any order of 
priority.  Contrary to the Council of Europe resolution of 1992 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, it also failed to ensure proportionality.374   Ashworth and Player 
refer to the 2003 Act as presenting  ‘a confused and inconsistent articulation of purposes’ and 
continue: 
 
It is as plain as a pikestaff that these purposes may conflict in their application to 
any case.  While the Home Secretary incomprehensibly claimed the Act’s 
statement of sentencing purposes is a major step forward, it is actually a major 
step backwards.  If courts really did have regard to all five purposes in every 
case, and then chose among them (why else ‘have regard?’) this would 
undermine the point of having guidelines and lead to chaos.375 
 
This multiplicity of sentencing purposes could mean that the court might not regard 
proportionality as its main concern.  However, Jacobson and Hough, in their study examining 
the role of personal mitigation in sentencing, asserted that the 2003 Act left the principle of 
proportionality in place by making it clear that offence seriousness should be the overriding 
consideration in passing sentence, except in cases of repeat offenders and issues of 
dangerousness.376   In addition, Dingwall has drawn attention to the accepted view among 
academic commentators that the CJA 2003 reduced the importance of proportionality in 
sentencing, but he argues that this is not necessarily the case.377  Dingwall believes that a 
degree of cynicism is called for in respect of the role to be played by proportionality in 
sentencing, given its interpretation in the CJA 1991, and despite its declared primacy as a 
sentencing rationale.   For this to be effectively reasserted under the 2003 legislation, he 
believed that the Court of Appeal would have to give clear guidance (which, in fact, was to be 
provided in Sullivan 378) and the courts would have to adhere to any overarching principles set 
out by the Sentencing Guidelines Council, which had been established by s167 of the CJA 
2003 to give authoritative guidance on sentencing. 379    
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On examining the Act itself, however, it should be remembered that s143 states:  ‘In 
considering the seriousness of any offence, the court must consider the offender’s culpability 
in committing the offence and any harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause or 
might foreseeably have caused.’   This is, of course, the Halliday Report’s view of the 
centrality of proportionality in determining the severity of a sentence.380    In addition, the issue 
of seriousness was thought sufficiently important by the Sentencing Guidelines Council for 
one of its first guidelines to be on this subject.381    The Guideline started by saying the court 
must have regard to the five principles of sentencing in s142(1).   It noted that the Act did not 
indicate that any purpose should be more important than any other.  It then continued:   
 
The sentencer must start by considering the seriousness of the offence 382    
A court is required to pass a sentence that is commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence.  The seriousness of an offence is determined 
by two main parameters; the culpability of the offender and the harm 
caused or risked being caused by the offence. 383 
 
 In consequence, it can be argued that by reading s143 of the Act along with the Guideline, 
‘just deserts’ or proportionality is reasserted as the dominant factor in sentencing.  This is in 
accord with Jacobson and Hough’s view that proportionality has long been established as the 
fundamental guiding principle of English sentencing law 384 and answers Dingwall’s need for 
clear guidance on the subject.  
 
In respect of the mandatory life sentence, there can be no question of any lack of guidance on 
proportionality if s269 and Schedule 21 are considered.   Section 269 of the Act is explicit.   
Subsection 3 states that if the early release provisions are to apply, the court should 
determine the sentence according to the seriousness of the offence.  Subsection 4 states that 
if the court is of the opinion that because of the seriousness of the offence no order should be 
made under subsection 2, the court must order that the early release provisions are not to 
apply to the offender. 385  No other sentencing rationale is mentioned. 
 
This detailed sentencing framework caused Ashworth to write of the increasing forays made 
into the area previously left to judicial discretion.   He asserts that the ‘high water mark’ of this 
is s269 and Schedule 21 of the Act. 386   Later, he described the attitudes of the government 
and the judiciary as a ‘struggle for the upper hand in sentencing policy’. 387  Certainly, judges, 
in interviews reported by Jacobson and Hough, thought the legislation would never be able to 
take account of the full range of circumstances of offenders coming before them, and that 
mandatory sentences and similar statutory provisions risked driving the humanity and justice 
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out of sentencing.  388   One particular focus for criticism by judges was Schedule 22 of the 
Act, which deals with transitional arrangements resulting from Anderson, Stafford  and the 
2003 Act.  This Schedule is concerned with whole life tariffs/orders, and appeal cases 
concerning such offenders will be discussed as part of Chapter 6.   
 
As has been seen, aspects of the Act came in for almost immediate critical comment.   Lord 
Bingham quotes 389 comments made by Lord Justice Rose describing the provisions of the Act 
in one case as ‘labyrinthine’ and ‘astonishingly complex’ and in another case as ‘deeply 
confusing’.   Part of the problem may lie, he believed, in what a parliamentary committee 
described as ‘the tendency of all governments to rush too much weighty legislation through 
Parliament in too short a time’. 390  
 
 
4.6   The effects of the Act relating to the whole life order 
 
How the Act is judged depends on viewpoint.  In interview for this study, David Blunkett talked 
passionately of the necessity of providing the clear, logical and robust sentencing structure 
that the public deserved.  Democracy and free speech were important so, he continued, 
debate was crucial, and democratically elected politicians should and must decide on 
sensitive issues like law and order.  Others may have sympathy with Garland’s view 391 that 
governments, when unable to control crime easily or wishing to appeal to particular sectional 
interests, fall back on ‘acting out,’ by adopting particularly robust measures which will be 
popular with the electorate. 392  He writes of the vigorous use of the state’s power to punish;  a 
power that declares ‘the state is in charge, something is being done, crime will not be 
tolerated.’  The elements of the CJA 2003, which challenged both due process and individual 
rights in the cause of efficient crime control and public protection, could be seen as an 
example of Garland’s ‘acting out’.  Simon may have preferred this reading of the Act when he 
writes: ‘Like Robert Kennedy and Bill Clinton, Tony Blair combined the kind of moralistic and 
muscular liberalism, with a religious streak…that finds in a tough, punitive, prosecutorial 
approach to wrong doers just the right tonic for self and society.’ 393 
 
Whatever the interpretation put on the Act, its clearest impact pertinent to this study was that, 
following Anderson and Stafford, the power to set tariffs in the case of mandatory life 
sentences, had been transferred from the Secretary of State to the judiciary.  This applied to 
all mandatory life sentences including those with a whole life tariff.   The secrecy surrounding 
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tariffs and their setting disappeared, since trial judges would now be required to give the 
period to be served, including whole life, in open court and in ordinary language.394  The 
sentence imposed by the trial judge, subject of course to any appeal, meant that whole life 
was exactly that.  The practice of Home Secretaries reviewing whole life tariffs after 25 years, 
and subsequently every five years, ended: there was now no machinery for review.  It is true 
that the powers of the Home Secretary to order release on compassionate grounds still 
existed, but in extremely restricted form.  The grounds for imposing a whole life order were 
that the murder had to be judged as being one of exceptionally high seriousness.  The criteria 
were exemplified in Schedule 21.  
 
All those who had previously been given a whole life tariff would have the opportunity to seek 
a judicial review of this ‘sentence’.  All those convicted and given a mandatory life sentence 
but whose tariff had not been set would have their case reviewed and a term applied by a 
judge.   
 
The so called ‘Blunkett’s revenge’ had effectively inflated sentences for murder:  the three 
starting points meant that sentences were significantly higher than those exemplified in Lord 
Chief Justice Woolf’s Practice Direction of 2002, where he had recognised in passing that 
some crimes should attract a whole life sentence.  However, it should be remembered that 
whole life, 30 years and 15 years were ‘starting points,’ and the lists of mitigating and 
aggravating factors meant that a wide range of terms were likely to be served.  
 
Lord Phillips, in interview for this study, still believed that the judiciary had flexibility post-2003, 
but agreed that sentences had lengthened.  Other members of the judiciary and of the legal 
profession, also in interview, were strongly of the view that it was not only sentences for 
murder that had been inflated.  They felt that sentences for manslaughter, grievous bodily 
harm and other violent crimes had increased sharply in order to maintain the gradation of 
sentencing, that is, proportionality, both ordinal and cardinal.  Tension had been exhibited 
between the judiciary and the executive in the debates, particularly in the House of Lords, and 
the tension was not fully resolved.  Many of the judiciary were not convinced of the legitimacy 
of parliament legislating on sentencing and, in particular, the setting of minimum terms.  
 
The overarching question was whether the latest legislation, in the CJA 2003, would satisfy 
Blair and New Labour or whether there was still mileage in making changes to the criminal 
justice system in order to ‘rebalance’ it, and to allay the public’s fears by demonstrating the 
government’s resolution to control crime.  
 
                                                     





5 PUNISHING THOSE CONVICTED OF CRIMES  





The 2003 Act, as has been seen, established a statutory framework for the retribution and 
deterrent element of sentences for murder, within which judicial discretion is allowed. 
In interview for this study, Edward Fitzgerald QC, confirmed that the ECtHR takes into account 
the position in jurisdictions other than the one of the applicant.  The decision pending from the 
Grand Chamber of Vinter, Bamber and Moore is likely to compare the whole life order in 
England with punishment for the most heinous of crimes elsewhere.   Issues likely to be of 
concern include proportionality, the penological justification for continued imprisonment and 
the existence and scope of review mechanisms.  Consideration, therefore, in this chapter of 
punishment in other jurisdictions will focus on these questions.   
 
However other jurisdictions differ from England and Wales, they all have one thing in common: 
those convicted of crimes of high seriousness will be sentenced to very long terms in prison. 
England and Wales, however,  is one of the few jurisdictions where certain prisoners face not 
simply long terms but the whole of life terms in prison.  These pose challenges to the prisoners 
themselves and to prison authorities.   This chapter, therefore, will look at the challenges 
facing such prisoners especially in the light of the fact that they will grow old and, probably, die 
in prison.  It will also consider challenges faced by prison authorities, especially in balancing 
the needs of the prisoners with the necessary strict security, all in the context of national policy 
on prisoner management and containment.    
 
 
5.2   The approach of other jurisdictions to offenders convicted of the most  
 heinous crimes 
 
5.2.1    The rest of the United Kingdom:  Northern Ireland and Scotland 
 
In Northern Ireland there is power to make whole life orders coming from the Life Sentences 
(Northern Ireland) Order 2001 which in 5.3 states ‘If the Court is of the opinion that, because of 
the seriousness of the offence or of the combination of the offence and one or more offences 
associated with it, no order should be made under paragraph (1) (early release provisions) the 
Court shall order that … the release provisions shall not apply to the offender.’  The similarity 




On conviction for murder, a mandatory life sentence is imposed.  The Order continues that 
there is no set period of custody but that the term recognises the need to punish the offender, 
to deter others and to protect the public, and that the court will set a life sentence tariff.  The 
Judicial Studies Board for Northern Ireland on its website has a section concerned with Life 
Sentence Tariff Rulings up to and including 2008.  There the longest tariff is for 30 years in 
Irwin [2008] NILST 5, for multiple counts of terrorist murder by firearms, and showing 
meticulous planning. 
 
In the trial in Northern Ireland of Robert Black for yet another child murder, 395 on conviction 
the prosecutor sought a whole life order.  The judge, however, took as his sentencing 
framework Practice Direction 2002 (Crime – Life Sentences) and he refused to make a whole 
life order on the grounds that this crime was committed before the ones for which he had been 
sentenced in Scotland and England. 396  Instead, Black was sentenced to a minimum of 25 
years.  In the sentencing, no mention was made of the ECHR.   
 
The position in Scotland changed with the Convention Rights (Compliance) (Scotland) Act 
2001. 397  The explanatory notes to the Bill stated in para 35  that it was open to a judge in 
sentencing a designated life prisoner not to set a minimum term to be served as punishment  
where he considered that the prisoner should remain in prison for the remainder of his natural 
life.   In the ensuing Act, it was made clear that there should be a punishment element of a life 
sentence intended to ‘satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence’ (section 1(3)).  
The Act ended the freedom of judges not to set a punishment tariff.  It made clear that the 
judicial order determining the punishment should, firstly, specify the period that the court 
considered appropriate in years and months; and, secondly, could specify any period, even if it 
was likely that such a term would exceed the remainder of the prisoner’s natural life.  The then 
Justice Minister certified that the Bill was within the competence of the Scottish Parliament. 398  
He noted, in correspondence for this study, that he had power to order release on 
compassionate grounds (as, of course, his successor did for the Lockerbie Bomber, Al 
Megrahi) and he did so on six occasions:  one where the Parole Board had already 
recommended release and the others where the prisoner was in the very final stages of a 
terminal disease or was so incapacitated that he could not move from a hospital or hospice 
bed.   
 
Al Megrahi, after a trial in the Netherlands under Scots law and before Scots judges, was 
sentenced to 30 years.  There consequently grew up a belief in Scotland generally, but more 
particularly in the Scottish legal profession, that there was in effect a maximum term of 30 
years for murder.  The Lord Advocate sought clarification of this from the judges in the Court of 
                                                     
395 He had previously been convicted of one child murder in Scotland and three in England. 
396 [2011] NICC 40 
397 It should be noted that unlike in Westminster, Bills in Holyrood must be compliant with the ECHR,     
otherwise they will (and must) be struck down by Scottish courts. 
398 Information from the former Justice Minister contained in personal correspondence for this study.  
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Criminal Appeal.399  In the opinion of the Court, provided by the Lord Justice General, new 
guidelines were issued.  These restated the position in the 2001 Act and continued:   
 
In our view there may well be cases (for example, mass murders by terrorist 
action) for which a punishment part of more than 30 years may, subject to any 
mitigating considerations, be appropriate.  Insofar as … Al Megrahi  may 
suggest that 30 years is a virtual maximum punishment part, that suggestion is 
disapproved.400  401 
 
Despite the legal differences, from the prospective of the prisoner convicted (to use the 
terminology of the CJA 2003) of a crime of ‘exceptionally high seriousness’, the situation in all 
jurisdictions of the United Kingdom is essentially the same:  imprisonment for the rest of his 
natural life whether by means of a whole life order or by a term of imprisonment in excess of 
his life expectancy; and with no machinery for the review of sentences. 402 
 
 
5.2.2    Jurisdictions influenced by the English legal tradition  
 
In the USA, the decision of the Supreme Court in 1972 in Forman v Georgia 403 appeared to 
have abolished the death penalty.  Its replacement was imprisonment for life without parole 
(LWOP).   By 2009 there was only one state, Alaska, which did not have LWOP as a 
sentencing option.404  The sentence is available not only in respect of murder, but a range of 
other crimes, especially those involving drug trafficking.  However, there is a major difficulty 
with the expansion of the range of crimes for which LWOP is a possible sentence: that of the 
inability to maintain proportionality between the seriousness of the crime and the severity of 
the sentence.  Or, that the use of such sentences may be regarded as grossly 
disproportionate.   
 
In 1983, in Solem v Helm 405 the Supreme Court adopted a tripartite test when considering if a 
life sentence was disproportionate:  the nature of the offence; the sentence imposed for the 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions; and the sentence imposed for other 
crimes in the same jurisdiction.  It concluded that a LWOP sentence imposed on a petty and 
alcoholic fraudster for repeated offences was unconstitutionally disproportionate, in terms of 
the Eighth Amendment: ‘a cruel and unusual sentence’.  In 1991, however, in Harmelin v 
                                                     
399 http://news.stv.tv/scotland/121541 
400 [2009] HCJAC 89 para 13  
401 Applying the court’s opinion, in April 2013 two men were sentenced to a minimum of 33 years and 30 
years for the abduction, torture and murder of a woman.  
402 In Scotland the court still sets a minimum term specified in years.  This sets a finite limit and may be 
regarded as proportionate.  The whole life term without a minimum period of retribution may raise 
questions about proportionality when the term served will vary considerably depending on whether the 
offender is 22 years of age or 62 years, on conviction.  See below for further consideration of this point. 
403 408 US 238 
404 In www.deathpenaltyinfo.org 
405 463 US 277 
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Michigan 406 the same Supreme Court, failing to use the tripartite test, declared that LWOP for 
possession of illegal drugs was constitutional.  The broader effect of Harmelin was to 
emasculate consideration of proportionality in life sentence cases.  
 
In Australia, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission asserted the importance of the 
common law principle of proportionality against what it viewed as American use of ‘just 
deserts,’ which was criticised for focusing on the objective gravity of the offence to the 
exclusion of the individual circumstances of the offenders and their prospects of 
rehabilitation.407  Following the abolition of capital punishment in Australia’s states, the most 
severe sentence was life imprisonment, but for most of those convicted, ‘there is the possibility 
of release at some date.’ 408  A judge, however, could recommend that a particular prisoner 
sentenced to penal servitude for life should never be released.  In 1987 in New South Wales a 
judge, after the conviction of the murderers of Anita Cobby, said that each of the prisoners’ 
official files would be marked “Never to be released,’ but this was a recommendation 409 and 
very unusual because, at that time, courts did not have the power to set minimum terms.  
Anderson in his paper 410 comments that this implicitly acknowledged that a life sentence did 
not ordinarily involve imprisonment for the rest of life.   It was noted, however, that this could 
not bind the Royal Prerogative.  
 
In 1988, a coalition government was elected which had campaigned on ‘truth in sentences’.  
The aim was to ensure that the length of time specified by judges should be the sentence 
served in practice, without political ‘interference’.   In an amendment to the Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW) s19A (2) a life sentence was prescribed as the sentence to be served ‘for the term of 
the person’s natural life’.   However, the Act provided at s 19A (6) that nothing in the section 
affected the Prerogative of Mercy.  The Crimes Act was further amended in 1995 when s 431B 
provided for a mandatory sentence of penal servitude for life in cases of murder where ‘the 
level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest 
in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the 
imposition of that sentence’.   
 
While attention has been paid to developments in New South Wales, most other states have 
instituted sentencing regimes where imprisonment for the whole of the prisoner’s natural life is 
possible:  Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania and Northern Territory. 411 
New Zealand, perhaps not unsurprisingly given its proximity to Australia, has a similar regime.  
The Sentencing Act 2002 Section 103 2 A provides ‘If the court that sentences an offender 
                                                     
406 501 US 957  
407 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 33: Sentencing (1996) 
408 Freiberg A & Biles D (1975): 22  The Meaning of Life: A Study of Life Sentences in Australia 
Australian Institute of Criminology Canberra 
409 Made to the Executive which could, in due course, consider release.  
410 Anderson (1999)   Information on the trial of the murderers of Cobby is taken from this paper as the 
New South Wales court data base gives no details.   
411 See Anderson (1999)  for fuller details. 
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convicted of murder to imprisonment for life is satisfied that no minimum term of imprisonment 
will be sufficient to satisfy one or more of the purposes (holding the offender accountable, 
denouncing the conduct, deterring the offender or others or protecting the community) the 
court may order that the offender serve the sentence without parole’.   Section 9 provides a list 
of mitigating and aggravating factors to be taken into account in all sentencing; and Section 8, 
Principles of Sentencing, requires proportionality.  
 
In Canada, in 1976, capital punishment was abolished and replaced with a mandatory life 
sentence for high treason and first and second degree murder.  At the same time, eligibility for 
parole was determined: for first degree murder there is an automatic 25 year period of parole 
ineligibility.  This, however, is subject to judicial review - ‘the faint hope clause’ - after 15 years, 
except in the case of multiple murders.  If the reviewing judge assesses there is a substantial 
prospect of success, the application then goes to a judge and jury, who decide whether the 
prisoner should be able to make an early application to the Parole Board (Section 741 of the 
Criminal Code).  When the prisoner is eligible to apply for parole, the Parole Board may decide 
not to grant it if it considers the risk to the public of his release is too great.412  In short, 
imprisonment for the whole of life is possible but it is not a sentencing option for judges, but 
depends on assessment by the Parole Board.  Moreover, Section 12 of the Canadian Charter 
states that punishment must not be grossly disproportionate to the offence: 
 
The court must first consider the gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the 
offender and the particular circumstances of the case in order to determine what range of 
sentences would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter this particular 
offender.  … This does not mean that the judge nor the legislator cannot consider general 
deterrence or other penological purposes that go beyond the particular offender in 
determining a sentence, but only that the resulting sentence must not be grossly 
disproportionate to what the offender deserves. 
 
There is, therefore, striking clarity in the constitutional and legal position regarding 
proportionality, or at the very least the avoidance of gross disproportionality.  
 
The position in South Africa is less clear-cut.  The death penalty had been found to be 
unconstitutional under the 1993 Bill of Rights:  the Constitutional Court found that the death 
penalty breached rights such as the right to life, dignity and not to be punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way.  Courts can impose a life sentence for certain specifically 
described aggravated forms of murder, for example cases showing premeditation or combined 
with rape or robbery.  The sentence, however, does not mean the whole of natural life: the 
Correctional Sentences Act of 1998 provides for the possibility of parole after serving a term of 
25 years. 413  Moreover, the question of release is considered by the court that imposed the  
 
                                                     
412 Library of Canadian Parliament Research Publications  Available: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/about/parliament/legislativesummaries/bills_is.asp?language=e&is=s6&s
ource=library_prb&parl=40&ses=3# 
413 Professor Terblanche (2008) ‘Sentencing Murder,’  Speech delivered in Dublin July 2008 
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original sentence and has the power to extend the term beyond 25 years.  A Law Commission 
discussion paper recommended that the sentence be limited to cases of extreme gravity, citing 
the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) 414 
 
Finally, two cases illustrate the South African courts’ respect for the principle of proportionality 
or at least the need to avoid disproportionality.  In S v Malgas, 415 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in March 2001 considered the meaning of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ 
referred to in Section 51 (3) (a) of the 1997 Criminal Law Amendment Act.  The court’s opinion 
was that any court was entitled to impose a lesser sentence where, in all the circumstances of 
the particular case, it is satisfied that the prescribed sentence would be unjust in that it would 
be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society. 416  In S v Dodo 417 in 
the South African Constitutional Court in 2001, Judge Ackerman, giving his opinion, stated that 
human beings ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to an end.  
Disproportionality between the offence and the period of imprisonment would tend to treat the 
offender as a means to an end thereby denying the offender’s humanity. 418 
 
Given that Namibia was governed after World War I by South Africa, it may be appropriate to 
consider it here.  In 1991, in the High Court (S v Nehenia Tjijo – unreported but quoted in 
Tcoeib419) it was argued that life imprisonment was a cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment and therefore contrary to the Constitution of Namibia: ‘When a term of years is 
imposed the prisoner looks forward to the expiry of that term when he shall walk out of jail a 
free person who has paid his debt to society.  Life imprisonment robs the prisoner of this hope. 
Take away his hope and you take away his dignity and all desire he may have to continue 
living,’ 420 
 
In Tcoeib, the issue again was whether a life sentence breached the Constitution. On this 
issue the Constitution is very close to German law. 421  Chief Justice Mahomed explained 
 
… there is no escape from the conclusion that an order deliberately incarcerating 
a citizen for the rest of his or her natural life severely impacts upon much of what 
is central to the enjoyment of life itself in any civilised community and can 
therefore only be upheld if it is demonstrably justified.  In my view it cannot be 
justified if it effectively amounts to a sentence which locks the gate of the prison  
irreversibly for the offender without any prospect whatsoever of any lawful 
escape from that condition for the rest of his or her natural life and regardless of 
any circumstances which might subsequently arise. 422 
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What is less often referred to is his conclusion that life imprisonment was not unconstitutional 
because provision had been made for a life prisoner to be released on parole in appropriate 
circumstances.  423   
 
These jurisdictions have all excluded members of the executive from sentencing in individual 
cases, with the exception of the power to exercise the prerogative of mercy.  The judiciary in 
all these countries, except USA, are concerned that sentences should be proportionate, or at 
least do not display gross disproportionality. The countries do, however, differ over whether life 
sentences should be subject to review, and this reflects the penological purposes of the 
sentences, whether, for instance, they are for punishment or public protection.  
 
 
5.2.3    The International Criminal Court  (ICC)  and Tribunals  
 
Some writers, for example Appleton and Grover (2007), when considering life sentences, refer 
to the ICC and its Rome Statute, drawing attention to the maximum sentence available to the 
Court.  Under Article 77 this is life imprisonment;  however, under Article 110 (3), such a 
sentence must be reviewed after 25 years.  Such writers use the Statute of Rome to buttress 
arguments against sentences of imprisonment for whole of life without procedures for review.  
The international position, however, is more complex: as well as the ICC there are the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  These two Tribunals have both imposed irreducible life 
sentences.  It is argued 424 that whole life sentences were not provided for under the Statutes 
but were a judicial invention based on the rule-making power given to the judges under the 
Statutes.  Rule 101 of ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that a convicted person 
may be sentenced to imprisonment of a term up to and including the remainder of the 
convicted person’s life.  The wording of Rule 101 of ICTR is virtually identical to this.  In the 
proceedings and judgments, no doubt is expressed that imprisonment for the remainder of a 
prisoner’s life is acceptable in terms of human rights.  In 2006, in the Stakic’s appeal 
judgment,425 it was held that neither Article 7 (prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment) nor Article 10 (the aim of imprisonment being reformation and social 
rehabilitation of the prisoner) of the UN International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
prohibited life imprisonment. 426 
 
Scalia 427 argues that : ‘The imposition of life imprisonment can only comply with the criteria 
established by the ECtHR if the ICC’s case law puts an end to the irreducibility that exists  
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today in the law and practice of the International Criminal Tribunals concerning life 
sentences.’428 429   It is appropriate, therefore, to turn back to some European jurisdictions and 
consider what is regarded as appropriate punishment for the most heinous of crimes,  
 
 
5.2.4     Europe 
 
England and Wales may be one of the few jurisdictions in Europe where judges are able to 
impose a whole life order, but it is not unique.  Perhaps surprisingly, the Netherlands is 
included in this number where all life sentences are imposed with no right of the individual to 
have his sentences reviewed.  Since 1986 only one (terminally ill) prisoner serving a life 
sentence has been released.  As in England and Wales, whole life sentences are never 
mandatory and, again like England and Wales, the number of such prisoners is small:  37 in 
2010. 430   
 
In Sweden, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Georgia a whole life order can be imposed.  The prisoner 
in Sweden has the right to petition parliament for pardon, and in Bulgaria and Ukraine to 
petition their respective presidents.  In Georgia, apparently, on abolition of capital punishment 
the intention was to provide for whole life imprisonment to satisfy the public.  431   
 
In contrast, some countries do not have a life sentence as a sentencing option.  Spain and 
Portugal and also countries that were once part of Spanish or Portuguese empires in the main 
also do not have a life sentence. 432  In Spain the legislature has chosen without direct 
constitutional compulsion not to make life imprisonment part of the criminal code. 433  Norway 
and Croatia similarly do not provide for life sentences. 434   
 
Most of the other members of the Council of Europe have replaced the death penalty with a 
discretionary maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  All these countries have systems 
whereby the prisoner can be considered for early release after serving a minimum term, 
ranging from 10 years in Belgium; 12 in Denmark; 15 in Austria, Germany, Luxemburg and  
Switzerland; to 20 years in the Czech Republic, Romania and Turkey; 25 in Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia; to 26 in Italy and Lithuania; and 30 in Estonia.  435  
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As far as the individual prisoner is concerned, what matters is less what the sentencing 
provision states and more what the sentence will mean to him as an individual.  In Eastern 
European countries, it seems the punishment for heinous crimes is a range of 15-25 years 
imprisonment, which is considered sufficient and proportionate. 436   Moreover, in those 
countries which have no legislative provision for life imprisonment, prisoners may spend as 
long or longer in prison as those sentenced to life elsewhere. 437   
 
The Code Pénal in France sets out crimes that have a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment: 
 
• a murder which precedes, accompanies or follows another crime (221.2) 
• a murder committed with premeditation (221.3) 
• a murder of a minor, a parent, a vulnerable person, a public official, a witness or 
victim;  a murder racially, ethnically or religiously inspired or on account of sexual 
orientation;  acts of torture or barbarity which lead to death  (221.4)  
 
There is then a ‘safety period’ that prevents early release in that time.  In the case of life 
imprisonment this is 18 years but the trial court may extend it to 22 years (Article 132.23). 438  
Van Zyl Smit referred to a decision of the Conseil Constitutional in 1994 which ruled that whole 
life sentences were ‘fundamentally unacceptable’. 439  Appleton and Grover make the point 
differently to similar effect: that those subject to life sentences have a right to be considered for 
release. 440 
 
In 1994, the Code Pénal was amended to allow for a sentence of life imprisonment with no 
minimum period in cases of murder of a child, with rape, torture or acts of barbarity.  The 
Conseil Constitutional upheld this provision in the same year.  When no minimum period has 
been set, there can be no application for release under licence until 30 years have been 
served.  Since 1994, only three prisoners have been so sentenced and obviously none has 
completed 30 years so there is no indication of how such an application would be  
approached.441  It is, however, suggested that imprisonment for the whole of life was abolished 
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The position in Germany regarding the punishment of the most heinous crimes has been 
widely discussed, in particular interpretation of the Basic Law in respect of murder.  Article 1 of 
the Basic Law declares that human dignity shall be inviolable.  Sections 211 and 212 of the 
Criminal Code provide for the imposition of life imprisonment in cases of intentional homicide.  
The Verden District Court made a finding of incompatibility with the Constitution and referred 
the case to the Constitutional Court.  The conclusion of the Court in June 1977 was that life 
imprisonment was not inherently unconstitutional. 443  It welcomed the Prison Act with its focus 
on a treatment regime during imprisonment.  The judgment stated:   
 
The threat of life imprisonment is complemented, as is constitutionally 
required, by meaningful treatment of the prisoner.  The prison institutions 
also have the duty in the case of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment to 
strive towards their re-socialisation, to preserve their ability to cope with life 
and to counteract the negative effects of incarceration and destructive 
personality changes that go with it. The task that is involved here is based 
on the constitution and can be deduced from the guarantee of the 
inviolability of human dignity contained in Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law.’ 444  
 
The Court held that the legislature was entitled to prescribe the heaviest penalty at its disposal 
for murder, because murder denied the citizen’s right to life, the highest legal interest of all.   
However the Court held that life imprisonment could only be regarded as compatible with 
human dignity if the prisoner retained a concrete and realistic expectation of eventually being 
released. 445 
 
After the 1977 Constitutional Court judgment, the Criminal Code was amended.  The new 
Section 57a provides that the court should grant conditional early release from a sentence of 
life imprisonment on probation if 15 years of the sentence has been served, and if the 
particular seriousness of the prisoner’s guilt does not require its continued enforcement.  Parts 
of Section 57 - Conditional Early Release Fixed Term Imprisonment - also apply to life 
sentenced prisoners.  The release has to be considered appropriate in terms of public security 
interests:  the decision shall particularly consider the personality of the prisoner, his previous 
history, the circumstances of his offence, the importance of ‘legal interest’ should he reoffend, 
the conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence, his circumstances and the effects an 
early release are expected to have on him. 446  
 
The effect of the change in German criminal law is that there are no whole life orders at the 
time of sentence, but there is a mandatory 15-year minimum term.  After the 15 years, a case 
is reviewed by a panel of three judges:  the effect of this could, in theory, mean that a whole  
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life sentence will still be served if either the guilt is so great or the prognosis for the prisoner is 
negative, but this is regularly reviewed by a court.  
 
A judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1992 held that establishing the facts that would lead 
to a view of the seriousness of the person’s guilt had to be made by the trial court not by the 
court considering parole.  The task of the Parole Court is whether there is a continued need for 
imprisonment.  The German Constitutional Court has routinely upheld life sentences extended 
beyond the 15-year review. 447  Bohlander notes that the elements that are routinely 
considered by trial courts overlap considerably with those used in England and Wales in 
making a whole life order. 448 
 
Also of relevance is the view of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, in the 
course of its report on a visit to Hungary in 2007, which stated its serious reservation about the 
very concept according to which ‘lifer’ prisoners, once they are sentenced, were considered to 
be a permanent threat to the community and were deprived of any hope of being granted 
conditional release. 449  
 
As has been seen, most other jurisdictions either rule out the whole life sentence or carefully 
circumscribe it.   There is a consensus, excluding the USA, that sentencing courts must ensure 
that punishments inflicted are proportionate to the crimes committed, or perhaps, more 
precisely not grossly disproportionate.  Sentences for the whole of natural life are legal in the 
Netherlands and in some of the states influenced by English criminal law.   Most countries 
allow appeals for clemency.  In the majority of countries there is a review mechanism to 
consider whether continued imprisonment is penologically justified.   The grounds for such 
reviews are not always clearly stated.  There is explicitly, or implicitly, most often consideration 
of the risk and dangerousness to the public that such prisoners pose.  However, consideration 
of the seriousness of the crime is frequently present.  (The views of the judge in New South 
Wales in the trial of the murderers of Anita Cobby are perhaps the most pointed.)   The issue 
of the continued penological justification of imprisonment will be considered more fully later in 
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5.3  Prisoners serving a whole life order 
 
The group of offenders sentenced to whole life is small in number, but they are unique within 
the prison system.  They are the only prisoners who have been sentenced to remain within the 
prison system until they die.  There are other prisoners who will spend the rest of their lives in 
prison, but they will do so after the Parole Board takes a decision that they are too dangerous 
to release.  Those offenders will face periodic reviews to assess future dangerousness and 
continued incapacitation where necessary.  For the whole life order offenders, the judgment 
has been made that on the grounds of retribution and deterrence alone, a just and 
proportionate sentence is life-long incarceration.  In prisons, in general, the regime is geared to 
progression towards release.  With no release possible, questions arise over the challenges 
faced by the prisoners themselves, and by the prison authorities over appropriate regimes for 
those with no natural progression to release within a system geared primarily for that.   
 
Accurate details of those serving a whole life sentence have traditionally been difficult to 
access.   Since the CJA 2003 was implemented, sentences have been imposed in open court 
so names and details have been available to all.  One of the effects of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000, when it came into effect, was a requirement for the Home Office to 
provide information on such matters on request, which allowed information about whole life 
prisoner numbers to be available. Since January 2012, the Ministry of Justice in its Offender 
Management Statistics Quarterly Bulletin provides such information quarterly. 450 Historically, 
the position was different in that the Home Office released no information.  This may be seen 
as part of the secretiveness of the Department, previously discussed in relation to tariff setting.  
After notorious trials, the media immediately sought to compile a list of names and give overall 
numbers of those sentenced to remain in prison until their deaths.  These details, however, 
were unreliable – differing from one another despite similar dates 451-  and by inaccurately 
including or omitting names. 452   
 
For earlier years, the most accurate information comes from ministerial answers to 
parliamentary questions.  In 2004, the Minister was asked to provide information on the 
numbers serving whole life orders in each of the previous ten years. 453   In 2008, a Minister 
provided an answer for the numbers of those with whole life orders in the previous year. 454  
The only information provided for which category of prisons these offenders were held in, was 
given in a parliamentary answer in 2009, but here care was taken, so that for categories with 
small numbers of such prisoners, the exact figure was not given. 455  Instead they were listed 
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as ‘Between 1 and 5’.   Similarly, in 2009, the exact number of female prisoners serving a 
whole life order was not given.  Instead it was given as ‘Fewer than five’.   This information 
was accompanied by a footnote:  ‘We have withheld exact numbers because to provide the 
information at this level could identify individuals’.456  The numbers of prisoners serving whole 
life orders in each of the years 1997 – 2007 was provided in a parliamentary answer.  457   The 
only source of information on names and the accumulative totals of those given whole life 
orders appears in determinations in Hindley 458 and Coonan.459     
 
From the information given to parliament, it is possible to gain some impression of how the 
numbers of whole life order prisoners have increased.  This would be expected as, so far, 











Total number of 
WLO prisoners 
1994 31  2004 20 
1995 32  2005  
1996 32  2006  
1997 31  2007 35 
1998 23  2008  
1999 23  2009 34-46 
2000 23  2010  
2001 22  2011 42 
2002 22  2012 43 
2003 21    
      
 Table 1   Number of prisoners with whole life orders as given to parliament  
 
NOMS provided information to Kandelia 460 that eight whole life tariff prisoners were 
repatriated to the Republic of Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement .  This accounts for 
the decline in numbers between 1997 and 1998.  The increase between 2004 and 2007, as 
will be seen in the next chapter, is due to the High Court setting a tariff in terms of the 
transitional arrangements of Schedule 22 of the CJA 2003, with the High Court deciding 
whether whole life orders or minimum terms were appropriate.    The range given in 2009 is 
due to the lack of exact numbers given in a parliamentary answer to avoid identification of 
individual prisoners.  That year there were 26-34 Category A prisoners; 7, Category B;  and 
less than 5, Category C.    Another consideration is whether or not figures for any year include 
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those of prisoners with whole life orders who were in secure mental hospitals.  The only clear 
statement relates to 2011, when there were five such prisoners in secure mental hospitals and 
42 in prisons. 461 
 
Given the quality of the data, it would be foolhardy to attempt to analyse whether the 
prevalence of committing such heinous crimes has varied over time.  Even where there is 
information on the date of sentence, there is great variation in the time elapsed between 
committing the crime and trial.  This varies from months to decades.  462   
 
While it is believed that the figures do not enable comment to be made on any changes in 
frequency of crimes resulting in whole life orders, it is possible to consider the nature of the 




Murder(s) by someone aged 21+ 
 
 
     (a)   Two or more murders, where each involves any of 
             i    a substantial degree of premeditation or planning  
             ii   abduction of the victims     







     (b)   The murder of a child involving abduction, or sexual or      





        (c)   Murders to advance political, religious, racial or      









Table 2    Schedule 21 (4) Categories of Murder 
       
Men almost exclusively commit the crimes of ‘exceptionally high seriousness’:  Myra Hindley 





                                                     
461 Given in interview by the Home Secretary. 
462 See for example Sawoniuk  [2000]  EWCA Crim 9,  below 
 108 
Lord Ramsbotham, in a 2012 debate in the House of Lords, drew attention to the youth of 
prisoners in jail:  one in three of those sentenced were aged 18 to 24. 463   The statistics 
available for prisoners with whole life orders do enable a view to be taken on the age at which 
offenders were sentenced and hence whether this population is significantly different from the 




























 Table 3    Age of prisoners when sentenced to whole life order  
 
Clearly the age of most prisoners when sentenced to whole life orders is significantly greater 
than that of the general prison population.  The age of prisoners with whole life tariffs/orders is 
an issue for the prison service.  Self evidently, such prisoners will grow old and (probably) die 
in prison, some serving decades there.  By the definition of the prison service, which classifies 
elderly as 50+,  17 offenders would be classified as elderly on conviction.  The highest 
numbers of prisoners in any age band (30-39 on conviction) face 40 or more years in prison if 
their life expectancy were to be the same as the male population at large; even if their life 
expectancy were only 70 years it would mean more than 30 years in prison.  This 
consideration of the age of prisoners illustrates the challenges that such offenders pose for the 
prison service.   
 
 
5.4   Imprisonment for those serving a whole life sentence 
 
5.4.1   The development of secure imprisonment for the most serious offenders 
 
As we have seen, the numbers of those in England sentenced to spend the remainder of their 
lives in prison is small.   For prison authorities, however, they pose particular challenges.  It 
would be remiss to undertake a study on the whole life order without including an examination 
of these challenges and also the associated challenges facing the offenders serving the 
sentence.  Many academics have commented on the fact that the move to abolish the death 
penalty was not necessarily accompanied by clear policies on its replacement.   Newcomen 
has argued that the abolition or suspension of the death penalty is the start of a penal journey 
not the end, and that penal administrators need imagination and humanity when dealing with 
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the group of offenders who could face long term or life-long imprisonment. 464  Hodgkinson, 
referring specifically to the European situation, also concluded that the alternatives to capital 
punishment emerged with little or no informed debate.  Developing penological strategies and 
discussion on resource implications came after negotiating the abolition of the death penalty, 
rather than being an integral and contemporaneous part of the negotiations.  465 
 
The Council of Europe has been criticised by Coyle for, at the time of underlining its 
commitment to end capital punishment, omitting to give directions as to conditions and 
standards relating to subsequent life imprisonment. 466  Yet, the debate over such conditions 
and standards was not new.  Bedau had long argued for a severe, but not intolerably cruel, 
punishment for those committing the gravest crimes, and that any punitive policy should be 
humane, feasible and effective.  He put practical flesh on the bones of his ideals by 
recommending a seven-stage process of reviews and judgments, with only those prisoners 
‘failing’ the review process serving a natural life sentence.  His proposals differentiated 
between life without the possibility of parole and life without the probability of parole. 467  He 
felt such a system, even allowing for an eventual life-long imprisonment, was still preferable to 
the death penalty.  On that basis, he answered Sheleff’s argument that ‘if a person has no 
prospect of being released,  (he) has no scintilla of hope … his punishment is tantamount to a 
delayed death penalty.’ 468  
 
Sheleff is not alone in equating whole life imprisonment with a form of living death.  Blom-
Cooper and Morris have written of ‘entombment for life’ and of an ‘immuring within prison 
walls’ and life within ‘an iron cage of vengeance’.  469  An American former lifer, referred to it as 
‘a death sentence by incarceration’ and wrote that anyone who escaped the death penalty but 
was given life without parole merely traded a faster form of death for a slower form of death.470  
An English prisoner, currently serving a whole life order, in personal correspondence for this 
study also wrote in terms of the sentence being a death sentence,   He argued that a whole life 
sentence is ‘a death penalty by the back door’ using old age and infirmity as the instrument of 
termination.  
 
Perhaps these views echo those within a Howard League for Penal Reform publication that 
claimed that England and Wales had become a jurisdiction that punishes excessively and 
harshly. 471  It claimed that prison had become the defining tool of punishment with little 
attention paid to the relationship between legislation and the increasing number of people 
being imprisoned.  It appealed for a revised system based on the philosophy of penal 
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moderation.  Others have made the same appeal.  Snacken argued that penal moderation 
places a stronger emphasis on human rights and, as many people cherish these rights, 
governments should be required to explain and defend any penal policy that appears harsh or 
disproportionate. 472  Duff also wrote of the harsh and destructive way punishment is imposed, 
pointing out that imprisonment, in effect if not by design, can be inhuman, oppressive and 
unduly severe.  He wrote of the apparently inexhaustible appetite for penal harshness in 
Britain and USA. 473   Garland also felt that the two countries could be discussed together as 
both now treat imprisonment as a mechanism of exclusion and control. 474  However, the way 
in which the two countries tackle the challenge of imprisoning those offenders who have 
committed the most serious crimes is different in more than one respect.  Because the 
prisoners on whom this study is centred are frequently considered the most dangerous to the 
general public and their management poses challenges to prison authorities, it is of interest to 
examine how the present methods of secure containment have evolved since the abolition of 
the death penalty, and how they differ from regimes operating in the USA. 
 
The system in the USA is based on segregation, typified by the prisons commonly and widely 
termed supermax facilities.   The first supermax is recognised as Marion County Jail in Illinois, 
but as Ward and Werlich point out, the strategy can be dated back to 1829 and a 
Pennsylvanian penitentiary which had an architectural design specifically chosen to ensure 
that no prisoner could have contact with any fellow prisoner. 475  A century later came the 
decision to concentrate the most dangerous and unruly prisoners on Alcatraz Island.  The 
prison established there had many of the features of the modern supermax: segregation and 
isolation used as punishment, with emphasis on containment.  When Alcatraz was closed in 
1963, it was considered a relic of outdated penal philosophy and when Marion was opened in 
the same year social workers, psychologists, educators and counsellors were employed.  
Within a decade things altered and the prison reverted to an institution of maximum security 
with human interaction virtually eliminated.476  The pattern was copied by other states and 34 
states now depend on supermax facilities to detain around 25,000 offenders who are deemed 
the most dangerous.  King points out the supreme irony that despite the nature of the inmates, 
staff find working in these establishments to be relatively stress free because of the ‘lock down’ 
conditions and the high staff ratio.477  Although the staff may be relaxed about life in a 
supermax, academic comment demonstrates concern.  Ward and Werlich argue that when 
governments exercise their maximum coercive authority, as in the supermax system, that is 
when legal, journalistic, legislative and research oversight is needed most. 478  Simon also 
argues that, with the penological shift towards punishment and incarceration, there is an 
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increased need for sources of knowledge of workings of prisons.  However, he notes that 
under these conditions, the social scientist often becomes less rather than more welcome. 479 
 
The supermax philosophy is summed up by Feeley and Simon as being a part of the new 
penology: neither about punishment nor rehabilitation, but about the efficient management of 
unruly groups with the emphasis now purely on incapacitation.  Risk profiles of prisoners 
become more important than crimes committed. 480   England and Wales undoubtedly also 
have unruly groups of prisoners, some of whom may well be serving whole life orders but, as 
King points out, the USA idea of super-maximum security has fallen largely on stony ground in 
England and in Europe as a whole. 481  Ward and Werlich also stress how USA penal policy 
puzzles and disturbs criminologists, academics and prison reform leaders in the UK. 482  This 
is reflected in Coyle’s view that it is reasonable to conclude that prisoners in supermax 
facilities are likely to be damaged by years of near isolation in such an environment.  Coyle 
accepts that every country faces the challenge of dealing with the small group of very violent 
prisoners who refuse to conform to legitimate expectations.  The manner in which these 
societies respond to human beings who have little or no respect for other human beings 
presents a real test of these societies’ own humanity. 483  
 
As early as 1968 in England, some of the criteria for Coyle’s ‘test of humanity’ might have 
been met in the Radzinowicz Report. 484  The report was to lead England’s prison service on a 
different road from the one embarked upon by the USA.  It rejected the findings of the 
Mountbatten Report 485 two years earlier, which stated that England required a new purpose-
built maximum security facility in which to concentrate all prisoners posing a threat to prison 
security and safety.  Radzinowicz rejected the suggestion of concentration, recommending the 
opposite: the dispersal of the most challenging prisoners throughout the prison system.  
Reading the two Reports, the earlier can appear punitive and harsh and the later can appear 
forward thinking and reformative.   Interestingly, King argues that, in retrospect, it is possible to 
see the two reports as not so very different except in regard to the choice of concentration 
versus dispersal.  They certainly did not come from radically different discourses of 
punishment: Radzinowicz recommended observation towers with armed guards while 
Mountbatten advocated a liberal rehabilitative regime within maximum security boundaries. 486 
 
Prisoners who were deemed an escape risk or who had committed the most heinous of crimes 
were, as a result of Radzinowicz, dispersed throughout the system.  Prisoners, as a result of 
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Mountbatten were now categorised.  The four categories - A, B, C, D - remain today.  Price 
has argued that the security categorisation is perhaps the most important internal procedure 
the prison service has:  it structures the use of the prison estate, acting as its first line of 
defence against escapes, determining living conditions and the allocation to prisons of 
prisoners.  Yet, Price maintains, it operates in ‘relative obscurity, opacity and with quiet 
power.’487 488 
 
The dispersal policy, with the use of control units within eight prisons, appeared to create more 
problems than it solved during its first 25 years.  Prison riots and industrial action by prison 
staff led to further changes to the system, but the major stimulus for change was the Woolf 
Committee Report in 1990, set up as a direct result of the Strangeways Riots.489  Woolf argued 
that a challenging, constructive and worthwhile role for the prison service would be to strike a 
balance between three elements of prison - security, control and justice – a balance that would 
mean the end of the over-reliance on security and control.  The prison should be more than 
merely a form of physical containment and should do more than simply try to prevent re-
offending in the future.  Prisoners should be treated with justice, not merely humanity. 490  
Although initially the Report appeared to be well received by the government -  with the 
subsequent White Paper 491 adopting the recommendations, stressing the importance of 
custody, care and justice -  a new Home Secretary changed the dynamics.  The growing gap 
between Lord Woolf’s recommendations and government policy expanded when Michael 
Howard informed the 1993 Conservative Party Conference that prisons should be ‘decent but 
severe.’   Woolf had warned that intolerable conditions, harsh procedures, excessive security 
and antagonistic staff would only fuel the feeling of dissatisfaction, unite prisoners in their 
sense of being oppressed and most likely cause even greater problems of security and control.  
Indeed, it was soon argued that there was mounting research evidence that the best way to 
create legitimacy with inmates, and encourage them to behave better, was to treat prisoners 
justly, respecting their dignity and their rights. 492   
 
An escape from Parkhurst dispersal prison in 1995 led to a further report. 493  Its 
recommendation for a single new maximum-security prison was again rejected, but a new 
system using Close Supervision Centres (CSCs) within prisons was adopted soon after.   Like 
the dispersal policy, the CSCs had a troubled initial period, but changes were made after an 
influential Inspectorate report 494 which reduced the level of imposed segregation and 
recommended that CSCs be used more sparingly.  Security, however, had become of central 
importance to the Prison Service.  Drake writes of the move from an approach where prison 
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governors foregrounded the humane treatment of prisoners to one where the liberal 
discourses gave way to security based ones and where security became dominant.  This 
brought, she argues, a different perception of prisoners. 495  Drake cites Morgan, who argues 
that earlier enquiries had seen prisoners as ‘real people’, but later enquiries such as Learmont 
saw prisoners as ‘dangerous phantoms who must be exiled or controlled.’ 496  This perception 
is restated by Drake, who argues that it appears safer and less emotionally troubling for staff to 
detach themselves from prisoners. 497  Recently, the Prison Ombudsman Nigel Newcomen, 
talking of the increasing number of elderly and dying in prisons, has commented on how 
prisons still struggle to balance security with humane and dignified treatment. 498 
 
If the impression is given that English prisons have undoubtedly become more security 
conscious and more risk averse when dealing with prisoners, it would be difficult not to accept 
that they still differ greatly from those in the USA in their treatment of perceived dangerous 
offenders.   A century ago, in 1910, Winston Churchill had commented that the treatment of 
criminals was one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisation of any country. 499   Perhaps the 
English prison inspectorate and bodies such as the Independent Monitoring Boards (IMBs) are 
aware of this ‘test’ as they play a critical role in ensuring an element of fairness and justice 
exists in prisons.  In the 1990s, Lord Ramsbotham, when HMCIP, had introduced the concept 
of ‘healthy prisons’, where everyone could feel safe and is treated with respect. 500   
 
This is still echoed in a current Prison Service objective: to treat prisoners humanely, decently 
and lawfully.  The Service also has the guidance of the United Nations’ recommendations 
which state that prison authorities should provide life-sentenced prisoners with opportunities 
for communications and social interaction and opportunities for work with remuneration, study 
and religious, cultural, sports and other leisure activities. 501  The Council of Europe has very 
similar recommendations for the conditions for life-sentence prisoners in order to provide 
purposeful use of time. 502  The Council stresses the particular challenges raised by those 
serving life-long sentences:  detention of persons who have no hope of release poses severe 
management problems in terms of creating incentives to cooperate and address disruptive 
behaviour, the delivery of personal development programmes, the organisations of service 
plans and security. 503   The close monitoring by HMIP and IMBs and the awareness of 
guidelines from the UN and the Council of Europe play a protective role in inhibiting the 
development of super-max equivalents in the UK.  
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5.4.2  Imprisonment: increasing numbers and costs 
 
In 1967, during a period of austerity, members of the House of Commons discussed major 
cuts to the prison building programme amidst the background of rising prison numbers, with 
the resultant overcrowding and worsening conditions. 504  Since then, the issues and 
consequences of increasing prison numbers have been of concern, and not only in parliament.   
In 1991, Lord Woolf, examining the state of England’s prisons, commented on the perils of 
overcrowding, and ten years later, delivered a lecture at the Law Society on what had 
happened since his Report.  He was very aware of the relentless increase in prison numbers, 
and felt that overcrowding was the most destructive element to an effective prison, with 
educational and training opportunities hit heavily.  He described overcrowding as an AID’s 
virus:  debilitating the whole system and with any cure dependent upon vast expenditure. 505  
Two years later, in parliamentary debates leading to the CJA 2003, similar prison issues were 
again raised. 506  A decade later, the issues are unchanged.   In 2011, Geoff Dobson of the 
Prison Reform Trust (PRT) wrote that the increase in prison numbers meant that ‘the prison 
estate is becoming human warehouses, with regimes which are hard pressed to offer any 
employment or education’.  507   Later that year in parliament, a Minister of State in the Justice 
Department disclosed that almost 25% of prisoners were held in overcrowded accommodation, 
with 19,268 prisoners doubling up in cells designed for one occupant.  508   
 
The question of increasing prison numbers and the resultant pressure on resources affects all 
prisoners.  It can be argued that it has particular relevance to those whose natural life will be 
spent in prison.   As will be discussed later in this chapter, those with knowledge of prison 
management agree that this group, more than any other, require the amenities of well-
resourced prisons, be it work, social or educational facilities or a sense of dignity gained from 
having a space of their own.  Coyle also argues that, given the length of time that they have to 
spend in prison, long-term prisoners should be given priority for work, education and cultural 
activities when resources are scarce. 509  This group of people includes those on whom this 
study is centred:  those who have committed heinous crimes and who face life-long sentences.  
Thirty years ago, Leon Brittan, when Home Secretary, talked of needing to address the needs 
of ‘very violent prisoners serving life sentences who might take the view that they have nothing  
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to lose by violent and recalcitrant behaviour’. 510  In the CJA 2003 debate Lord Dholakia talked  
of the challenge to prison management of the growing number of prisoners who had been 
deprived of hope and who had nothing to lose. 511  
 
This issue of prisoners who have nothing to lose posing a particular challenge to prison staff, 
was raised by members of the Prison Governors Association ( PGA)  in interview for this study.   
They suggested that such offenders could murder with impunity and probably not even face 
trial.   They stressed the fact that prison officers are unarmed: that their ultimate protection lay 
in outnumbering violent prisoners.   They talked of the concern of being taken hostage by a 
prisoner with a whole life order who had nothing to lose:  ‘You would really be in trouble’.     
This accorded with what a Home Office official said for this study, when she recounted seeing 
staff on duty guarding a notoriously violent prisoner serving a whole life order: although he had 
seven officers guarding him when out of his cell, what struck her was how scared the officers 
looked.  To her it seemed as if it was a question of power:  the prison had the power to dictate 
his daily timetable and his every move, so perhaps his only demonstration of power was to be 
threatening.   
 
The needs and appropriate regime of such prisoners is not straightforward for prison 
authorities to address.   One of Scotland’s most famous convicted murderers, Jimmy Boyle, 
has written of the group, whose crimes range from unacceptable domestic murder to more 
complex sadistic killing, as needing a highly skilled and specialised regime; one that can help 
unravel their deep needs and problems. 512  Another Scottish convicted murderer, Thomas 
Campbell, has also talked of prisoners like himself with very special needs, requiring very 
special facilities and resources. 513   
 
The ‘very special facility’, which both Boyle and Campbell had experienced and benefited from, 
was the Barlinnie Special Unit that had held a small group of Scotland’s most recalcitrant and 
violent offenders from 1973-1995.  The Unit had been a brave and controversial experiment, 
dealing with small numbers of the most difficult prisoners in the system.  It was a relatively 
relaxed and well resourced regime, staffed to a high level with specially selected and trained 
officers to allow more interaction between prisoners and staff, and having access to 
psychiatrists, therapists and educational art specialists.  Perhaps predictably, the Unit attracted 
mixed reactions.  One journalist wrote of it being a target of public hostility, and labelled ‘a soft 
home for hard men generously funded by the tax payer’.  He wrote how the ‘pub talk’ was of 
five star luxury. 514   A parliamentary debate on the Unit in 1980 515 also drew attention to the 
public’s view of the regime as being ‘bizarre’.  Particular elements that attracted attention were 
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the lack of restrictions on mail and phone calls, and freedom to move in and out of cells, each 
decorated and furnished individually.   This was to encourage the concept of prisoners being 
first and foremost human beings, not stripped of humanity on entering prison.  Such ‘new 
fangled ideas,’ one parliamentarian pointed out, seemed always to raise suspicion, ‘particularly 
those that appeared to run counter to the philosophy set out in the Old Testament about crime 
and punishment and such like notions beloved of our Victorian grandparents’. 516 The Barlinnie 
Special Unit was not replicated in England.  The Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, drew attention 
in the debate to the ‘heavy staffing’ commitment required and that the decision not to set up 
additional similar units elsewhere was partly a matter of the costs involved. 517 
 
Brittan used the debate to draw attention to Grendon Prison which had pre-dated the Barlinnie 
Unit and which, he explained, was set up to investigate and treat offenders suffering from 
disorders requiring a psychiatric approach, and to explore the problem of the psychopath.  
Brittan praised the continuing work of Grendon and its important role in treating psychopathic 
offenders who had the motivation and intelligence to benefit from group therapy.  While 
Barlinnie was closed after adverse public opinion, Grendon has continued, although it also has 
faced criticism.  The academic David Wilson, a former governor of Grendon, has talked of how 
the prison has never been without its detractors.  Pointing out that although for most of the 
residents life is harder than being locked up in a cell, ‘to the ‘bang ‘em up brigade’ it sounds 
like a soft touch’. 518   Wilson has also written of the risk that cuts in Grendon’s budget could 
put the prison’s successful psycho-dynamic approach in danger. 519   Such budgetary cuts at 
the prison were referred to in 2010 by Genders and Player, who wrote 520 of revisiting Grendon 
20 years after they had conducted an ethnographic study of the prison.  They found that, 20 
years on, it operated in a very different political, economic and social context.  In contrast to 
many penal regimes, Genders and Player found that inherent optimism, with a strong belief in 
individual change being possible, was still functioning.  They did, however, identify how 
budgetary cuts had undermined important aspects of the regime, with more financial belt-
tightening to come.  
 
Concern over potential cuts does not only affect Grendon.  As seen above, the prison system 
is overcrowded and the increasing numbers of prisoners incur increasing costs.  Anne Owers, 
speaking on her retirement after nine years as Chief Inspector of Prisons,521 stressed how 
frighteningly easy it is to increase the prison population and how much more difficult it is to 
reverse the trend.  She talked of how there were all kinds of levers within government and 
within society that all too swiftly jerk into action, resulting in increasing incarceration.  She 
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highlighted tougher sentencing policy as one of the major factors contributing to overcrowding, 
specifically mentioning the CJA 2003’s starting points for mandatory life.  The increase in 
length of sentences for serious crime as a result of the Act has been examined earlier in the 
study.   Also introduced in the 2003 Act (s224 – 236) was the expansion of indeterminate 
sentences for sexual and violent offenders.  This wider use of life imprisonment with the 
introduction of indeterminate sentences for public protection contributed to increased prison 
numbers.   Her comments echoed the findings of Hough, Jacobson and Millie 522 who found 
that the prison population had grown because of sentencers imposing longer sentences for 
serious crimes and also imposing custodial sentences on offenders who previously would have 
received non-custodial sentences.  Tougher sentencing in turn, they found, came about 
through an increasingly punitive climate of political and media debate, legislative changes with 
new guidelines and sentencers’ perceptions of changes in patterns of offending. Six years 
after these findings, Hough and Jacobson reiterated their belief that the uncontrolled growth of 
the prison population was first and foremost a political problem, with the interaction between 
politicians and the media and the public a critical factor. 523 
 
Both Garland and Simon have explored the changes in use of prisons by governments, 
especially in the USA and Britain, and the part played by public opinion.  Garland argues 524 
that prison has changed from a place of reform and rehabilitation to one of incapacitation and 
punishment, mainly to satisfy popular and political demands for retribution and public safety.   
This is echoed by Simon who writes 525 of prison as a form of exile and ‘a space of pure 
custody, a human warehouse or even a kind of social waste management facility’.  He links 
these changes to societal and political pressures associated with the on-going  ‘war on crime’. 
Faulkner, writing specifically about the situation in Britain, contends that the notion of ‘positive 
custody’ has been left behind and how, especially since the New Labour government of 1997, 
prison services have become ‘an agency of law enforcement whose function is to protect the 
public and secure compliance with orders.’ 526   Lacey points out that an ever-increasing prison 
population has become an almost inevitable feature of our political world. As governments 
struggle to establish their credentials, adopting strong law and order policies, this has led to an 
extreme politicisation of criminal justice policy resulting in soaring prison numbers and 
inadequate prison capacity.  She argues: 
The sad fact, however, is that the size and demographic structure of the prison 
population suggest that the socially exclusionary effects of the ‘tough on crime’ 
part of the criminal policy equation have systematically undermined the 
inclusionary ‘tough on the causes of crime’ aspirations.  The rate of 
imprisonment has continued to rise inexorably even in a world of declining 
crime, increasing by 60% since the inception of the downturn in crime in the 
mid 1990s. 527  
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Although in Britain the ‘tough on crime’ approach may be associated with Blair’s time as prime 
minister, there is no indication that the approach has altered since then.  Two examples 
illustrate this.  In 2011, the Labour Shadow Justice Secretary, Sadiq Khan, wrote an article 
which appeared critical of the ever increasing prison numbers  and questioned the relationship 
between prison population and crime rates.528  Alarm bells appear to have rung when his 
article was presented in the media as an argument for jailing fewer people.  The Shadow 
Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, swiftly made a speech stressing that the Labour Party would 
continue to keep its long-term commitment to be tough on crime and the causes of crime. 529   
Cooper was probably only too aware of the consternation caused when Kenneth Clarke, as 
Justice Secretary in the coalition government, expressed his desire to lower the prison 
population, telling The Times in an interview that it is ‘loopy’ to think you can solve crime by 
locking everyone up.  530  Like Cooper, David Cameron - perhaps having learned of possible 
public reaction from when he was special adviser to Michael Howard when he was Home 
Secretary - moved to reassure the public of the commitment of his party to criminal justice.  
 
More recently, perhaps to reinforce this commitment, the government has reignited the debate 
on size and rationale of prisons.  Chris Grayling, as Justice Secretary, has announced plans to 
close six smaller prisons and build what would be Britain’s largest prison, to hold over 2,000 
prisoners.  David Wilson has suggested that such a project is merely a way for the government 
to appear tough on crime and that it would do nothing to cut crime nor make prisons a safer 
place for either prisoners or staff.   He recalls that four years earlier David Cameron had, in 
fact, criticised the idea of larger prisons and the then Shadow Justice Secretary, Nick Herbert, 
had talked of ‘huge prisoner warehouses’ and had claimed that what was needed were smaller 
local prisons. 531  They had both been responding to the previous government’s positive 
response to Lord Carter’s Report, 532 in which he recommended the building of three so-called 
Titan prisons, each to hold 2,500 prisoners.   The emphasis in both Grayling’s latest proposal 
and in those in the Carter Report appear to have been on the efficient management of 
resources:  on maximum economy rather than maximum security.    After the 2007 Report 
Jack Straw, then Justice Secretary, had confirmed that Lord Carter had been employed to look 
‘at the potential economies and benefits from large prisons.’ 533   The proposals for Titan 
prisons were dropped, and whether Grayling’s plans suffer the same fate remains to be seen.   
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Increasing numbers in prison has, of course, financial implications.  Costs certainly were a 
subject readily discussed by respondents for this study.  When asked if prison works, the 
Director of the Howard League instantly replied ‘Well, it’s expensive.’  The former HMCIP, in 
interview, feared that the improvement in prison care that she had witnessed was endangered 
by overcrowding and associated costs.  An increasing prison population in a non-growing 
resource situation meant there were limits on what could be done to sustain the improvement 
of conditions.  The political rhetoric leading to ratcheting-up of sentences would be hard to 
change and would take brave politicians to do it.  Some countries, like Finland, she felt had 
done it but she did not see it happening in this country.  Cost implications did not end with 
restricting the number of offenders going to prison: non-custodial sentences were also 
expensive. 
 
The former Director General of NOMS, in interview for this study, also raised costs as a crucial 
factor in prison administration.  He felt that the increase in numbers of long-term or life-
sentenced prisoners represented a huge financial burden.  At a cost of £45,000 a year for 
each prisoner and a total prison service cost of £3 billion, the figures were huge, especially in a 
time of economic austerity.  He felt that the interaction of the media and the public and 
politicians was strong, with politicians trying to drive the media agenda but having to live with 
the media trying to set that agenda.   All of this left the media-led public with the belief that 
prisoners were not being dealt with harshly enough.   He felt that perhaps the only thing that 
might change opinions was the sheer pressure of money.   He was not alone in considering 
that the cost of the prison service might eventually have a sobering effect on media and public 
expectations of sentencing.  Even before the current period of austerity started, Lord Phillips in 
2007 raised the question of whether the cost of the consequences of the CJA 2003 had been 
calculated and considered to be value for money.   He suggested that locking one man up for 
30 years meant an investment of £1 million in his punishment.  He pointed out that that sum 
would pay for quite a few surgical operations or for a lot of remedial training in schools. 534  In 
interview for this study, Lord Phillips reiterated this point when he suggested that if the cost of 
prisons was met by a separate tax, it would focus the public’s attention very quickly on the 
actual costs of increasing prison numbers.   He expressed his concern over imprisonment, 
saying that in fifty years time people may well look back and think it was barbaric to lock 
people up, just as we currently look back and think torture and the stocks were barbaric.    
 
Academics make a similar comparison.  Simon argued that David Cameron and Nick Clegg, to 
survive in government, needed to launch a series of budgetary reforms that would leave little 
room for largely symbolic anti-crime and terror measures.  In considering cuts, Simon 
suggested that the expensive prison estate was an obvious place to begin deep cuts, rather 
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than placing the cuts on the backs of Britain’s poor and middle classes.  535  Loader also 
argued 536 that the world-wide financial crisis is an opportunity to rethink and to temper 
enthusiasm for punishment.   He hoped that prisons could come to be seen as an expensive 
public resource that should be used more sparingly.  Success ‘depends on citizens coming to 
the conversation as taxpayers rather then, say, as fearful victims or potential victims.’  Loader 
accepted that it could be a price the public felt must be paid, preferring instead to cut back 
even more on in-prison spending such as education, or making prisons even more austere.  
Lacey argued 537 even more strongly for an increased perception by the public about the 
economic cost of growth in prison numbers.  She pointed out that, as high rates of 
imprisonment make at best a modest difference to crime levels, it is economic irresponsibility 
to invest an ever-growing proportion of GDP in the prison budget.  Given that the government’s 
competence in managing the economy is key to its electability, this gives the opportunity for 
those who wish it to press home the message that increased prison spending is a form of fiscal 
mismanagement.  Lacey accepted that the public debate would have to become more ‘mature’ 
for progress to be made, but does see a glimmer of hope over the beginnings of ‘an escape 
from the cell of penal populism’.  
 
It is not clear whether Lacey’s hopes are utopian or achievable.  In the three years since she 
wrote the article the financial situation has become worse, and perhaps with its mind on other 
matters, there has been less stress on the ‘tough on crime’ approach from the government.   
Whenever a law and order issue has been raised however, be it the London riots of 2011, or 
the Justice Secretary suggesting sending fewer people to prison, or a suspected terrorist 
‘escaping extradition’, or the renewed attention on prisoners’ voting rights, a section of the 
media and the public has been quick to react in a way which suggests punitiveness is more 
important than financial consequences to a large section of the population. 538  
 
However, in the USA the apparently relentless increase of supermax facilities shows signs of 
being affected by the financial climate.  In Mississippi, the state’s supermax prison has been 
closed with estimated savings of $8 million a year, and Illinois has announced its intention to 
follow suit. 539  With inmates of supermax facilities costing between 50% and 300% more to 
supervise than ordinary prisoners and with many States facing financial deficits, it is not 
surprising one commentator has expressed the thought that ‘money not morality, may turn out 
to be the supermax’s Achilles heel’.  540   
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5.4.3     Treatment of prisoners with whole life or very long term sentences  
 
Charles Clarke, when Home Secretary, stressed the need not to consider prisoners with a long 
sentence to be a homogeneous group, drawing attention to their individual needs and 
aspirations. 541  Coyle has stated that the automatic assumption that all long-term prisoners 
are dangerous in prison has not been supported by experience.  They do not present more 
disciplinary problems than any other group. 542  However, Coyle is writing of prisoners who 
have an investment in possible parole.  Prisoners with a whole life order, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter, do not have this incentive to accept the prison regime.  Their reaction to prison 
varies.   Vinter, who is serving a full life sentence, wrote in a letter to the media:  
 
I was involved in a stabbing (not fatal) on the wing.  You see how I can admit in 
a letter to an offence as serious as that.  It’s because the judge when he 
sentenced me to natural life, gave me an invisible licence that said I can 
breach any laws I want, no matter how serious, and the law can’t touch me.  
I’m above the law.  543 
 
In contrast, Vinter’s co-appellant to Strasbourg, Jeremy Bamber, serving the same sentence, 
appears to have been a model prisoner for the duration of his incarceration, 544 concentrating 
on useful prison employment as a braillist, giving basic literacy support to illiterate prisoners 
and preparing his appeals against conviction.  
 
Details of the life of prisoners serving the whole life sentence are hard to obtain.  Even in 
parliamentary written answers, rigorous measures are taken to ensure individuals cannot be 
identified.  There is a perception that the whole life order is shrouded in secrecy.    Erwin 
James, a life-sentenced murderer released on licence, wrote in The Guardian of how a ‘veil of 
mystery shrouds imprisonment in this country which is a major obstacle to progress.  It 
urgently needs to be lifted.’ 545  Jewkes contends that although the sheer number of media 
portrayals of incarceration suggests a public fascination with the inner world of prison, it is a 
world that, for the most part, remains shrouded in mystery and misunderstanding.  546  Crewe 
has written optimistically of prison research in Britain undergoing something of a revival. 547  
Certainly however, as discussed above, access to staff and prisoners was not allowed by 
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In interviews for the study, those with experience of prisons accepted that a sense of secrecy 
could surround prisons.   The former HMCIP, however, argued persuasively against the word 
‘secrecy,’ stressing that there was a need for ‘caution’.  Many of those serving whole life orders 
were the focus of tabloid publicity and so the prison service was reluctant to give details, not 
solely for reasons of security or secrecy but to avoid additional publicity.  Any publicity could 
put more pressure on individual prison staff who had been targeted in the past by the media, 
and also on prison management who were already doing a difficult job.  When it is 
remembered that a tabloid newspaper reporter went to the length of obtaining a job in prison in 
order to gain a photograph of Ian Huntley, the need for ‘caution’ is perhaps justified.548 
 
The respondents were also at pains to say that stereotyping this group of prisoners is 
misleading.  Many non-whole life prisoners are much more dangerous and violent.  Almost all 
of those with knowledge of prisons interviewed agreed that the need for security and safety 
was the main priority in prisons now, with even education and leisure activities being restricted.    
This affects the relationship between staff and inmates, and the time spent out of cells.   
Members of the PGA, in interview, said that the prison regime today is essentially security 
driven, with emphasis on containment to prevent risk to other prisoners as well as to staff.   
One of the lifers interviewed confirmed this view, saying that during his long imprisonment he 
was aware of an increasing emphasis on security and containment.   
 
Both the former HMCIP and Director General of NOMS stressed that there was the potential 
for those serving a whole life to progress from Category A to Categories B and C.   They 
accepted it was less likely, probably unlikely, to progress further because of political concerns.  
Certainly progressing to any form of semi/open prison would be a political risk too far with the 
probability, as one respondent said, of ‘ministers being crucified’ if the public became aware.549  
Members of the PGA also said that they were aware of certain whole life order prisoners who 
could, from a security point of view, be reassessed and placed in a lower category, but political 
reasons stopped this.  
 
This accords with the view of a whole life prisoner who was in personal correspondence for 
this study and whose appeal to ECtHR is central to it.  He said he has been a model prisoner 
for 27 years, yet remains in Category A.    If he had been an ‘ordinary’ offender he could have 
expected to be in Category C or even in an open prison but his whole life tariff appears to have 
stopped that.    If after 27 years this is the case, it does make one speculate that those who 
are now, according to the parliamentary answer, in Categories B and C could be limited to the 
very elderly prisoners who are known to be serving a whole life order.   
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Those involved professionally with prisons frequently stress the need for some form of 
progress or movement in the lives of those who know they will spend decades in prison.  
Jewkes wrote of a prison sentence being a journey.550  Coyle stressed the needs for short term 
goals, with a series of targets achievable in a one or two year period, ideally with individual 
achievements being linked in an integrated manner. 551  The former Director General of NOMS 
argued that stimulation was essential, especially the opportunity to learn, or learn of, 
something new in order to experience a sense of movement and progress.  He made the 
significant point that ‘hope does not need to be release.’  The sense of progress, whether 
physically to a different prison, intellectually through learning something new or mentally by 
adjusting positively to circumstances: all could create hope.   
 
A lifer, released after serving 30 years in prison, who was interviewed for this study, stressed 
the need for some form of stimulation to avoid stagnation or depression.   He made the point 
that this is easier for the more intelligent offender.  He spent his years in prison studying for a 
PhD and campaigning for penal reform.   However, he felt the system of lifer management did 
not make this easy and he had to fight for long-term educational objectives as the system only 
planned ahead on a yearly basis.   Studying did allow him to retain a sense of progress and 
control in a positive way.  He reflected that too often, for offenders, control could only be 
displayed in a negative way through lack of cooperation with the authorities.  This was also 
mentioned by the Home Office official, who in correspondence for the study, wrote that a 
prisoner’s sense of control could be a positive thing (choosing to study or be compliant in order 
to get better prison jobs) or could be negative.   
 
The need for whole life prisoners to be transferred periodically to a different prison is also a 
way for the prison service to fight institutionalisation and ward off stagnation.   Respondents 
stressed the desirability of prisoners facing new situations and new people to maintain this 
important sense of movement.   The same concept was highlighted by the former HMCIP who 
contended that those in prison for decades need ‘milestones’ and ‘horizons’ to give them 
something worth living for.   The question of moving from prison to prison was discussed with 
both the released lifer and the prisoner currently serving a whole life order.   Both could see 
the positive side:  new surroundings, new faces, and new challenges.   The released lifer 
especially also pointed out the negative aspect:  losing your mates; having to rebuild 
relationships with fellow prisoners and staff; and re-establish your reputation and persona.   
Both reflected on the lack of psychological support targeted at long term prisoners.  Both 
benefited from hope to keep them from despair.  One had the hope of eventual release after 
his tariff was served.  The other, the hope that he can finally have his innocence accepted and 
gain release.    Without hope, prisoners could become despondent, depressed or dangerous.  
The Director of the Howard League, in interview for this study, also emphasised that when 
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people have no hope they can behave violently, and underlined the need for support in prisons 
through education, work, contact with families and the community or entertainment.   
However, Kenneth Clarke, when Justice Secretary, drew attention to the fact that increasing 
prison numbers, when the prison service’s budget has been cut, may mean fewer 
opportunities for prisoners to have time out of their cells, participating in activities or work.  
One particular example he cited was the end of farming and agricultural activities.  He 
acknowledged there were exceptions, but accepted that for large numbers of the prison 
population, the regime was one of ‘bored idleness’. 552  This echoes the description of prison 
given by Hassine, serving life without parole in the USA, as ‘crushing boredom, endless 
routine, mindless amusement and occasional gripping fear’.  553   
 
Escalating costs and the growth of prison numbers has made the concept of ‘bored idleness’ 
more likely, as have the changes in staff practice.  The HMIP report Time out of Cell 554 had 
recommended increased time out of cell to counteract institutionalisation, which would benefit 
prisoners through more personal interaction and exercise.  The Report stressed that the lack 
of social interaction and mental stimulation, associated with confinement in cell, could be 
detrimental.  This apparently vital social interaction appears to have become more restricted 
since the Report because of the cuts referred to by the Justice Secretary.  In their study of 
Grendon, Genders and Player commented on the increasingly limited opportunities for peer 
influences and social learning in that prison.  They highlighted as causes, the adoption of a 
‘core day’ regime by the staff; restrictions permitting prisoners only to smoke in their own cells; 
and the introduction of packed cold meals which allowed meals to be eaten in rooms rather 
than communally. 555 
 
Simon Hattenstone, The Guardian journalist, corresponded with three prisoners with whole life 
orders in 2010 and some of their experiences seem to accord with this picture. 556  They write 
of ‘moving along each day completely numb’ and of ‘being warehoused’ and of ‘the consolation 
of being closer to death than birth’.  One of the prisoners, because of his history of serious 
violence in prison, had spent the previous twelve years in a non-contact segregation unit, 
locked up for 23 hours a day.  Progress for him was when only three guards supervised him 
when out of cell rather than the seven previously.  Robert Maudsley, one of Britain’s most 
notorious prisoners, in an interview in The Times, described his life in Wakefield Prison, 
confined 23 hours a day in a small cage enclosed in thick perspex with a slot to allow food to 
be passed through.  The former HMCIP acknowledged in interview that in ‘extreme parts’ of 
the prison population there are dangerous psychopaths who have to be treated differently.  
Their experience was very different from the average prisoner, even the life sentenced 
prisoner, and that their numbers were very, very small.  Coyle also recognises that these  
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prisoners generate the need for special facilities in English and Welsh prisons but contrasts  
them unfavourably with those previously provided in the Barlinnie Special Unit with its freedom 
of movement and regular family visits.   
 
The discussion on suitable prison regimes for those serving extremely long or full term 
sentences is not new.  In 1996, in a House of Lords debate, Lord McIntosh had raised the 
question of possible implementation of recommendations, specifically relating to constructive 
regimes for those serving a whole life, made in a HMIP Report on Durham Prison. 557  Among 
the recommendations was increased autonomy over their lives in prison, as much privacy as 
feasible, work opportunities, improved visiting arrangements and increased access to 
telephones.   In response for the government, Baroness Blatch stressed that as the numbers 
of those serving whole life were so small – she quoted 18 at that time – they could not merit 
any separate regime and that they would be dealt with as other prisoners on the basis of 
assessment of individual needs, grounded in the particular regimes of the prisons in which 
they were held.  Although Lord McIntosh had specifically asked about those serving whole life, 
Baroness Blatch preferred to discuss how the needs of all ageing prisoners were to be met 
and expressed no acknowledgment of any particular needs of those who would never be 
released, instead pointing out that their victims had no chances for any kind of reconsideration 
of their conditions. 558  In response to a plea for her to consider the despair of whole life 
prisoners, she invited consideration to be given instead to ‘the despair of the husbands, wives, 
mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers of the people whose lives have been snuffed out by 
those people.’ 559  There is scant evidence that any of the recommendations from the 1996 
Report on regimes for those serving whole life were ever implemented, and regrettably the 
budget restrictions will mean even less chance of any enhanced provision for the long term or 
whole life sentenced prisoners.   
 
The realistic picture of life in prison for most offenders serving long-term sentences is neither 
Barlinnie nor a supermax.  It is also not what the tabloid media like to present as a home from 
home with all mod cons.  Hassine in his book about his life in prison says ‘prison confines, 
punishes and hopefully deters.  It is neither designed nor inclined to foster or cure’. 560  Those 
who conduct research in prisons also paint a harsh picture, with Jewkes writing of the ‘shock of 
entering an austere and depersonalised environment’. 561  She argues that newspapers rarely 
cover issues such as overcrowding, racism, drug addiction, mental illness and suicide, 
concentrating instead on concepts of pampered prisoners and on the most notorious 
prisoners, notorious either for their heinous crimes or because they were already celebrities.562  
Jewkes was not alone in her criticism.  Twice in 2006, Lord Phillips, then Lord Chief Justice, 
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criticised the media for ‘making light’ of sentences of imprisonment when using expressions 
such as ‘walking free after only five years’.  He detected ‘an incitement to the public to exact 
vengeance from offenders which is not dissimilar from the emotions of those who thronged to 
witness public executions in the 18th century’.  He was particularly critical of an article which 
had appeared in The Times, feeling that it exemplified the low standard of much of the debate 
in the media about the merits of prison, and typified the misconceptions under which so many 
of the public laboured. 563 
 
The depiction of prison depends on who is viewing it.  An interesting juxtaposing of views 
occurred when a relative of someone in a CSC wrote of visiting it, describing no physical 
contact, prison officers listening to every word and visits being monitored by cameras.  She 
maintained the prisoners in the CSC had only caged pens in which to exercise, with no direct 
view of the sky, and were locked up for 23 hours a day. 564  In response, the NOMS Director of 
High Security disputed the depiction and wrote of multidisciplinary teams engaging with the 
prisoners, who had access to a gymnasium, library and educational facilities. 565   Whichever 
picture is accurate, no one with knowledge or experience ever denies prison life is harsh.  One 
academic has written on the concept of ‘time’ in prison:   
 
Time in prison is something which is lived through but not in the real sense 
lived.  Of course days come and go, but they do not pass as they do on the 
outside.  It is not just the division of time which concerns those incarcerated 
but the rate at which time passes.  The experience of waiting gives monotony 
the upper hand, joined by its inevitable constant companion, fatigue. 566 
 
Trying to combat this fatigue and monotony is a particular challenge to prisoners with no hope 
of release.  It also poses serious challenges to the prison service, especially in a time of 
severe financial restraint.  The former HMCIP summed it up by saying that cuts in prison 
budgets can bring demotivated staff, frustrated prisoners and barely usable buildings.   
 
 
5.4.4  Challenges posed by the elderly and the dying in prison 
 
‘Barely useable buildings’ are an especial challenge to a particular group of prisoners.  One 
certainty facing those with a whole life order is that they will grow old in prison.  They are a 
small group of offenders and they are not alone in facing old age in prison.  The age used 
when officially quoting figures for the elderly in prison is 50.  This may seem relatively young to 
be classed as ‘elderly’ but people age early in prison.  At the end of June 2012 there were 
6,460 prisoners in the 50-59 age range.  2,449 prisoners were aged between 60 and 69 and 
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there were 730 aged 70 – 79.   88 were aged over 80, with one of those aged over 90. 567  In 
2011, the fastest growing age sector of the prison population was the 60-69 age bracket.568  
The number of prisoners aged 60 or more when sentenced rose by 119% between 1999 and 
2009.  Harsher sentencing practice contributes to this but so too have advances in DNA 
profiling leading to conviction and imprisonment for crimes committed decades earlier.  Many 
of these offenders will not be given whole life orders but the combination of their age and the 
number of years imposed as a tariff will mean that some will serve time in prison to an 
advanced old age and possibly face death in custody. 
 
A publication by Age UK funded by the Department of Health gave evidence that many 
prisoners in their 50s have a physical health status ten years greater than their contemporaries 
in the community. 569  Obvious reasons include poor diet, lack of exercise, lack of fresh air, 
lack of regular screening and medical attention.  Everyone interviewed with knowledge of 
prisons commented that prison is a hard place to be when growing old.   Physically it is a 
difficult environment, often in old buildings with, for example, many stairs.  It is also noisy.  In 
2004 an HMIP report on the elderly  acknowledged the problem and stated, ‘Prisons are 
primarily designed for and inhabited by young and able bodied people;  in general the needs of 
the old and infirm are not met’. 570  The report made multiple recommendations but, when a 
follow-up report was published four years later, it was found that eight key proposals for 
change had not been implemented by NOMS.   The follow up report stated that there was still 
far too much reliance on the unsupported initiative of particularly committed officers, and too 
great an assumption that the care of elderly prisoners was a matter for the health service not 
for the whole prison. 571   A 2013 report by the Prison Inspectorate indicates that problems still 
exist: two elderly disabled prisoners were found to have been locked in a cell designed for a 
single inmate for almost 24 hours a day.  They had not showered for months and relied on 
fellow inmates to bring them meals.  The report commented on staff efforts being ‘haphazard, 
inconsistent and badly co-ordinated’.  572    This accords with statements made in interview for 
the study by PGA members who talked of ‘patchy’ facilities and of older prisoners often 
depending on the kindness of individual staff members or fellow prisoners.   Jeremy Bamber, 
the whole life order prisoner, wrote vividly of his fear of growing old in prison:   
The prospect of the onset of dementia; having my canteen purchases bullied off 
me ’cos I would be too old to stick up for myself and too forgetful to remember 
that someone has robbed me.  I don’t want to endure really old age in a 
maximum security prison with nobody to help me make my bed or dress me or 
help me eat, and not being able to take care of myself – living many  
harrowing years of shuffling about not even knowing where I am or how I ended 
up in here.  573 
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One of the recommendations (2.11) in the 2008 HMIP follow up report, repeated from the first 
report,  was that NOMS should have a national strategy for older prisoners.   A month after the 
second report was published, the Prison Minister, David Hanson, made a speech stating that 
the older prison population had complex and diverse needs.  He defended NOMS on the basis 
that it addressed the needs of the individual rather than trying to address the needs of a whole 
group.  This is despite the development of actuarial assessment, associated with the new 
penology, concerned with identifying risk potential in specific groups.  The Minister did 
announce that the Department of Health was working with NOMS to develop an end of life 
strategy and that the Department of Health would also initiate and improve services for 
prisoners with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. 574   
 
The lack of a national policy for the elderly prisoner at the time of the Report in 2008 seems 
surprising.   More than a decade before, in a parliamentary debate on the whole life tariff and 
the implications for the prison service for elderly prisoners discussed above, Baroness Blatch 
announced that the Prison Service’s Director of Health Care was compiling a health strategy 
and was particularly identifying the needs of the elderly prisoner.  Baroness Blatch appeared 
confident that the needs of the elderly and of the disabled in prison were being well 
addressed.575   As seen earlier, the Prison Ombudsman has raised concerns over the current 
treatment of the elderly and, especially, those dying in prisons.   He cites the use of restraints 
and includes an example of a prisoner being restrained despite being in a medically induced 
coma, prior to death.   He concluded that the balance between security and decency is not 
being achieved, with frail, immobile and even unconscious prisoners being restrained. 576 
 
Some respondents for the study quoted the view, first expressed almost a century ago that ‘ 
men come to prison as punishment, not for punishment.577  Academics and interest groups 
who have conducted research on the subject have expressed similar concern.  Crawley and 
Sparks found that there was a systemic inability for the elderly in prison to protest and register 
complaint in an effective manner.  The conditions generally fell below the horizon of attention 
of both their custodians and the wider research and policy communities. 578  Skellington argues 
that all services for the elderly in prison fall behind the care of those outside prison.  Being old, 
alone and without care-benefits appears to be part of the punishment. 579  This idea was 
echoed by the Director of the Prison Reform Trust who saw the conditions for the elderly in 
prison as a ‘double punishment’. 580  Crawley lists the needs and predicaments of elderly 
prisoners: the high incidence of ill health, psychiatric morbidity, a fear of dying in prison or of 
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being finally released into insecurity and isolation, and a sense of being irrevocably cut off from 
the past.581   A radio programme on dying in prison582 highlighted examples of older prisoners 
being ‘slapped about’ by younger offenders and having their ‘baccy’ stolen.   Frustrations were 
also featured, such as the prison that provided electric wheel chairs which could not, however, 
be used in the wings because of fire regulations.  
 
However, the number of elderly and dying prisoners in English prisons, although growing, is 
still relatively small, and special facilities and hospices within the prison estate are slowly 
emerging to try to address these needs.583  In the USA this has been an issue for longer and 
now many large high security prisons have hospice facilities.  In 2005 in one prison alone -  
Angola, Louisiana -  of the 5100 prisoners, 3000 were serving life without parole.  One 
hundred and fifty had died in the previous five years and the prison had found it necessary to 
open a second cemetery.  584   
 
The challenge for NOMS and prison staff is not on the scale of that in the USA but it is a 
distinct and acute challenge for the prison service if it is to alleviate the profound sense of 
hopelessness and distress identified by Crawley.  The Lord Chief Justice in 2007 had 
commented that the result of the CJA 2003 would be that in 30 years time prisons would be full 
of ‘geriatric lifers’. 585  It is likely it will not take 30 years for his vision to become reality.  
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6 DEVELOPMENTS    2003 – 2010  
 
 
6.1   The law, politics and the constitution 
 
Given both the size and scope of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 -  ‘339 sections and 38 
schedules and runs to 453 pages.  It is, in pre-metric terms, an inch thick’ 586 -  and the 
extensive parliamentary time devoted to it, it might be thought there would be a period of quiet 
following its passing into law.  This turned out to be far from the case.  Over the following eight 
years significant appeals were made relating to the whole life order, leading to clarification and 
interpretation of that sentence within the Act.  Also, in the remainder of Blair’s premiership, the 
government was active on two fronts:  first, a continuing concern about the balance between 
the rights of offenders and the rights of victims, which challenged the balance between due 
process and crime control; and second, a new concern for constitutional reform.  While neither 
of these impacted directly on the whole life order, it can be argued that they affected the 
climate for sentencing and the relationship between the judiciary and the executive.  Therefore 
these issues warrant examination and provided a focus for questioning during interviews for 
the study.  
 
In July 2004, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, returned to familiar themes in a major speech, 
‘The Five Year Crime Strategy’. 587  The government’s proposed measures included a 
community policy to tackle anti-social behaviour, along with a shift from targeting the offence to 
targeting the offender.   The purpose of these reforms, he said, was to ‘re-balance the system 
radically in favour of the victims.’   Two years later, in a speech made on 23 June 2006, ‘Our 
Nation’s Future,’ 588 Blair struck at the ‘political and legal establishment’ stating that ‘they 
believe we are on a populist bandwagon, the media whips everything up into a frenzy, and if 
only everyone calmed down and behaved properly the issue would go away’.   These 
speeches can be regarded as typical Blair - strong on rhetoric, imprecise on detail and with a 
continuing concern about justice for victims.   
 
Criticism began to be directed towards the government’s criminal justice record from many 
directions.  In 2006, Nick Clegg, the then Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman, blamed 
Tony Blair for the failures of the system: 
 
(He) has presided over a wholesale degeneration in our criminal justice 
system.  We have grotesquely overcrowded prisons, a Probation Service 
demoralised by Government interference, re-offending rates amongst the 
highest in the Western world, and conviction rates for serious crimes, such  
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as rape, as low as 1 per cent.  Who does Mr Blair think he’s kidding when 
he now claims he is the man to restore confidence in our criminal justice 
system, after such a lamentable nine-year record? 589 
The following month in parliament, the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, launched an 
attack on John Reid, the new Home Secretary, pointing out that in his first 40 days in the post: 
‘He’s shelved his own anti-crime campaign at the last minute; he’s misled the public over the 
employment of illegal immigrants in his own Department and he has criticised judges for their 
implementation of New Labour Law.’ 590   When the possibility of more legislation was 
discussed two months later, The Independent focused on the criminal offences created by the 
Blair Government: 3,023 in nine years.  The newspaper itemised a ‘surreal list’ of the new 
offences: these ranged from creating a nuclear explosion, to selling grey squirrels, to 
importing Polish potatoes into England.  In a feature in the same issue, Professor David 
Wilson commented that ‘New Labour’s new 3023 offences demonstrate just how deeply they 
have been seduced by the politics of penal populism. … For what matters most to them is not 
to carefully assess the evidence that they have, but rather to be seen to have “done 
something” - anything - in the face of each new moral panic that bubbles up in the red-top 
papers.’ 591 
 
Some, at least, of the judges were just as critical of the government.  Lord Justice Rose, Vice 
President of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, was a particularly prominent critic, although 
in cases not concerned with whole life orders.  He attacked both the quality and quantity of 
legislation.  In a judgment in the Court of Appeal he complained: ‘It is more than a decade 
since the late Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ called for a reduction in the torrent of legislation 
affecting criminal justice.  Regrettably, that call has gone unheeded by successive 
governments. Indeed the quantity of such legislation has increased and its quality has, if 
anything, diminished.’ 592   In respect of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, he was just as critical.  
In the same case he asserted that it was in the public interest that the criminal law and its 
procedures, so far as possible, be clear and straightforward so that all those directly 
concerned, professional and lay, should be readily able to understand it.  
 
Sadly the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which we have had 
to consider on this appeal, are, as is apparent, conspicuously unclear in 
circumstance where clarity could easily have been achieved.… because 
the Crown have advanced to this Court a construction of the statute which 
is completely contrary to that suggested by the Home Office press release 
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In another case he returned to the same point, arguing that if a history of criminal legislation 
ever came to be written, it was unlikely that 2003 would be identified as a year ‘of exemplary 
skills in the annals of parliamentary drafting’ and that in recent months the courts had been 
taxed with a number of perplexing provisions in the Criminal Justice Act. 594 
 
Although apparently not well received, one focus of the government’s attention continued to 
be the addressing of the perceived problems with criminal justice, especially in light of public 
perception of crime and the need to be seen to be doing something about crime - ‘the 
elephant in the room.’ 595  Another, perhaps less predicted, focus was on constitutional reform.  
As Adrian Turner, consultant editor of Justice of the Peace and co-editor of Stone’s Justices 
Manual, put it:  ‘With its (the government’s) heavy-handed attacks and criticism, aimed solely 
at staying ahead in the game of spin, it has done great harm to its relationship with the 
judiciary.  The Constitutional Reform Act was meant to change that and herald a new era.’ 596 
The introduction of the Constitutional Reform act (CRA), however, was to be anything but 
straightforward for the government.  
 
 
6.2 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
 
The CRA 2005 derived from the announcement in June 2003 - during a Cabinet reshuffle - 
that the office of Lord Chancellor was to be abolished and that a Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom was to be set up.  That announcement took place without any apparent 
understanding of the legal status of the Lord Chancellor and without consultation with the 
judiciary (or anyone else outside government).597  The underlying tension between the 
executive and the judiciary, so apparent in the debates leading to the CJA 2003, obviously 
had not dissipated.   Four years later, in his 2007 Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, the 
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips, was to refer to a ‘prominent Member of the House of Lords 
(who) described the proposed changes ‘as cobbled together on the back of an envelope.’ 598   
After the first unheralded announcement, there followed six months of negotiations between 
Lord Woolf, the then Lord Chief Justice, and Lord Falconer, the Lord Chancellor, which 
resulted in the ‘Concordat’, which formed the basis of the CRA 2005.   
 
An important purpose of this legislation was to clarify and strengthen the separation of 
powers.  As a consequence, the Lord Chief Justice replaced the Lord Chancellor as the head 
of the judiciary, and a United Kingdom Supreme Court was established, replacing the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.  One of the results of this was that Supreme  
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Court Justices did not sit in the House of Lords.  Much of the detail of the Act 599 is not 
pertinent to this study but the main principles are of relevance because of their importance to 
sentencing and their impact on the relationship between the judiciary and the executive.   
Section 1 provides that the Act does not adversely affect the existing constitutional principle of 
the Rule of Law or the Lord Chancellor’s existing constitutional role in relation to that principle.   
Section 3 in its sub-sections, provides that 
 
 (1) The Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the Crown ... must uphold 
the continued independence of the judiciary…. 
 (5) The Lord Chancellor and Ministers of the Crown must not seek to 
 influence particular judicial decisions through any special access to the 
 judiciary. 
 
By implication, therefore, bolstering due process. 
 
The 2007 Report of House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 600 is invaluable in 
giving a detailed account of the introduction of the CRA and of the strength of feelings 
surrounding this.   It is clear on the intention of the Act, stating that ‘The CRA was intended to 
represent a move away from the “fusion” model of the British Constitution’.  The Lord Chief 
Justice had told the Committee:  ‘We, as judges, are now patently freestanding.  The division 
of powers is quite clear.’  The Committee concluded its commentary on the CRA 2005 
presciently:  ‘It would not be unreasonable to expect that such profound structural changes, 
with the judiciary assuming a more distinct identity, would lead to increased tensions between 
these two branches of the state.’ 601 
 
Before considering examples of these ‘increased tensions’, it is appropriate to consider briefly 
the establishment of the Ministry of Justice.  There had been rumours of such a possibility for 
much of Blair’s premiership.  What brought matters to a head was less concern about the 
criminal justice system, rather the (perceived) failures of the Home Office. 602  The new Home 
Secretary, John Reid, famously described his new department as ‘not fit for purpose’.  The 
news of the proposal to establish a separate Ministry of Justice appeared in the Sunday 
Telegraph of 21 January 2007, which was news to both the Lord Chancellor and the Lord 
Chief Justice.603  Once again Blair regarded it, like the proposal to abolish the Lord 
Chancellorship, as a ‘machinery of government change,’ not one with constitutional 
implications.  The Lord Chief Justice went public with his concerns.  There followed  
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negotiations between him and the new Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, which resulted in a 
partnership agreement ‘founded on a firm and shared commitment to the delivery of an 
efficient and effective justice system, and upholding the independence of the judiciary.’ 604  
Language that can be interpreted as supporting both Packer’s crime control and due process.   
 
Both the lead up to the CRA 2005 and the creation of the Ministry of Justice helps validate 
critics of the Blair regime, who regarded it as being obsessed by top-down reform with lack of 
pertinent consultation.605  However tendentious that view might be, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that tensions would continue between the judiciary and the executive.  The 
executive’s concerns over the judiciary’s independence can best be illustrated by its response 
to the courts’ actions in respect of anti-terrorism measures and ‘lenient’ sentences in particular 
cases.  These concerns both reflected, and were reflected by, the attitude of the media, in 
particular the ‘red-top’ papers.  Following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the government 
derogated from Article 5 of the ECHR  to allow the detention of foreign nationals suspected of 
involvement in terrorism.606  Nine foreign nationals challenged their detention, and the Law 
Lords ruled that the Anti-terrorism Act unjustifiably discriminated against foreign nationals on 
the grounds of their nationality.  Lord Hoffman declared: ‘The real threat to the life of the 
nation…comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.  That is the true measure of 
what terrorism may achieve’. 607  The government’s response was the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, giving the Home Secretary power to issue control orders in respect of persons 
suspected of terrorist activities.608  A number of the control orders were challenged and the 
House of Lords held that, in one case, it did deprive the subject of his liberty. 609 
 
The 2007 House of Lords Select Committee Report again gives insight, citing the then Home 
Secretary, Charles Clarke’s response:  ‘More than five years after 9/11, the legal and 
parliamentary circus still moves on.’  He further stated: ‘This is a ludicrous way of proceeding, 
which dangerously undermines confidence in every aspect of the police and criminal justice 
system….You could end up with a state of affairs where we end up leaving the European 
Convention as a result of public pressure.’ 610  Clarke’s main concern, according to the Select 
Committee, was that  ‘The judiciary bears not the slightest responsibility for protecting the 
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Commenting directly on this quotation, Lord Phillips in his Gresham Lecture 2010 said 
‘Charles Clarke failed to appreciate that it is for the judiciary to apply the laws that have been 
enacted in Parliament.’ 612   The previous year, Lord Judge had made the same point: ‘We do 
not apply the Convention on a judicial whim, or to spite those who disagree with its provisions.  
We apply it because Parliament enacted that we should do so.’ 613  Clarke went on to suggest 
a meeting with the Law Lords to discuss the issue and said, ‘The idea that their independence 
would be corrupted by such discussions is risible.’ 614  The judges, however, declined to meet 
him. 615 
 
The Select Committee, in concluding this section of its Report stated: 
 
Whilst we have sympathy with the difficulties experienced by Charles Clarke 
in relation to the Human Rights Act, his call for meetings between the Law 
Lords and the Home Secretary risks an unacceptable breach of the principle 
of judicial independence.  It is essential that the Law Lords, as the court of 
last resort, should not ever be perceived to have prejudged an issue as a 
result of communication with the executive.616 
 
Senior judges, in interviews for this study, were of the same mind.   
 
The change of Home Secretary did not change the Home Office’s attitude.  Reid described the 
European Court’s judgment in Chahal 617 (forbidding the deportation of a foreign national, 
even if he is a security risk, to a country where he stands a real risk of being tortured) as 
‘outrageously disproportionate’, and suggesting that MPs who defended the decision  ‘just 
don’t get it.’ 618  There seems little doubt that the words of government ministers reflected 
genuine resentment at the independence of the judiciary, despite having restated and 
reinforced it in the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005.  There seems equally little doubt that 
the government, as before, was spurred on by the media, especially the ‘red-tops’.  However, 
one case in particular, that of Sweeney, provides an even clearer illustration of the attitude of 
newspapers - and with them, the government - to the sentencing of heinous crimes.  
 
Craig Sweeney in January 2006 had kidnapped a girl from her home in South Wales, 
committed serious sexual offences against her and then was apprehended after a police 
chase.  He had previously been convicted of indecently assaulting a six year old girl. After 
pleading guilty, the judge sentenced him to life imprisonment, with a tariff of 18 years, reduced 
to 12 years in return for pleading guilty.  Sweeney was told he would normally be considered 
for parole after half the term (ie 6 years).  The judge added, that he would only be released 
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when and if there was no risk of him committing a serious offence as per the CJA 2003. 
It should be remembered, in the light of what followed, that the CRA required all ministers to 
uphold the independence of the judiciary.  Lord Falconer explained to the House of Lords 
Select Committee how this duty applied to the question of ministers commenting on individual 
cases: 
If you disagree with a decision, say what you are going to do: if you are 
going to appeal, say you are going to appeal; if you are going to change 
the law, say you will change the law.  If you cannot appeal and cannot 
change the law then my advice would be to keep quiet. 619 
 
Despite the Lord Chancellor’s advice, Reid, as Home Secretary, on 12 June 2006, launched 
an attack on the sentence and asked the Attorney General to examine the case as the tariff 
did not reflect the seriousness of the offence.   The following day, the ‘red-tops’ gave the 
judge’s ruling a hostile reception.   For instance, The Sun criticised  ‘The arrogance of judges 
in their mink-lined ivory towers’ and The Daily Express branded the judiciary as ‘deluded, out-
of-touch and frankly deranged’ and ‘combining arrogance with downright wickedness’.   The 
same day, the Prime Minister’s spokesman and Straw, as Leader of the House, defended 
Reid’s intervention.  On 15 June, the Lord Chancellor, on BBC’s Question Time defended 
Reid, and claimed that he had not attacked the judge.   The following day, Vera Baird QC, a 
Minister in the Department of Constitutional Affairs, appearing on BBC Radio 4’s Any 
Questions, was critical of the judge, claiming he had got the formula wrong.    On 19 June, 
Baird was forced to apologise.  Finally, on 10 July, the Attorney General concluded that the 
sentence was not unduly lenient. 620 
 
The Report of the Select Committee concluded that the Sweeney case had been the first big 
test of whether the new relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary was 
working properly, and it was clear that ‘there was a systemic failure’.   It asserted that ensuring 
that ministers do not impugn individual judges, and restraining and reprimanding those who 
do, was one of the most important duties of the Lord Chancellor.  In this case, ‘Lord Falconer 
did not fulfill this duty in a satisfactory manner.‘ 621 
 
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips, in his High Sherriff of Oxford’s lecture in 2006 said, 
‘Such is the atmosphere that sentencers are criticised (by the media) for failing to lock 
up offenders for longer …. Media pressure such as this cannot fail to have effect on the 
public, on politicians and on judges’.  622    It would seem that ministers were at great 
pains to ensure they appeared in line with public opinion, as characterised by the 
tabloid press.  This was despite the CRA 2005, which had so clearly asserted the  
independence of the judiciary and the duty of the Lord Chancellor, government 
ministers and others to respect and ensure this independence.  
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6.3 The inevitability of tension between the executive and the judiciary  
 
The views expressed by respondents for this study about the tension between the judiciary 
and the executive acknowledged the continuing tension.  Lord Howard, the former Home 
Secretary, expressed the view:  
 
There has, for a long time, been tension between the Judiciary and the 
Executive on many matters, including their role in sentencing for murder.  
Obviously the tension was, to some extent, relieved by the 2003 Act but I think 
the potential for it will always remain.   
 
One ground for this tension was the increasing focus given to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, and on what rightly lay with the executive and legislature and what with the judiciary.  
As was considered earlier, one of the concerns lying behind the CJA 2003 had been that the 
judiciary had been eroding sentences. 623   In interviews for this study Lord Pannick felt that 
perhaps ministers had not trusted the judges.  In interview, David Blunkett said that the whole 
life order provision (rather than a minimum term of, say, fifty years) was to prevent the 
inevitable erosion of the sentence by the judiciary.  He talked of the strength of criticism from 
the judiciary on the 2003 Bill and drew attention to the ‘terrific backing’ that Tony Blair had 
given him.   However, he stated his respect for the judiciary and said he would have welcomed 
dialogue and interchange of views with it at the preparation stage of the Bill.   From a reading 
of Hansard and the debates surrounding the Bill, a perception can be gained of the judiciary, 
or elements of it, being sullen and antagonistic over the Bill but in interview, senior judges said 
they did not recognise this image of themselves either in 2002 or subsequently.   Senior 
judges, perhaps unsurprisingly, were unwilling to comment on the question of continuing 
tension.  They did however, strongly point out that the formal separation of powers precluded 
any ‘dialogue or interchange of views’.   One senior judge, in interview for the study, 
commented on the separation of powers in the past, that in England  ‘We blurred this and it 
worked’.   However, there was little evidence of any current acknowledgment of ‘blurring’ in 
their standard constitutional standpoint of the necessity for the judiciary and the executive to 
remain firmly separate:  with the judiciary ‘doing parliament’s will and using only the discretion 
given to us’ and ‘having always to obey the law’ and  ‘just doing our job according to the law’. 
 
The senior judges were prepared to say that their colleagues found constant change 
unsettling, and that there were complaints about the difficulty in applying complex statutes. 
They also stressed that judicial decisions in England were bound by parliamentary statute and 
by precedent in domestic courts.  Whatever happened as a result of a ECtHR ruling would be 
the government’s responsibility alone.  
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One politician commented, perhaps wryly, about the separation of powers that the judiciary 
supported fully the separation of powers and the necessity for the judiciary to stay out of 
politics yet the irony was that at the time of the passing of the 2003 Act, the House of Lords 
was ‘stuffed full’ with lawyers and judges who felt very free to comment on legal issues in 
debate.   
 
The concerns expressed in the process of passing the CRA and the establishment of the 
Ministry of Justice, together with views expressed in interview for this study support Lord 
McNally’s conclusion in interview that tensions between parliament and judiciary ‘ebb and 
flow’.    This ebb and flow presumably will continue.  
 
 
6.4 Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR 
 
The rights and freedoms embodied in the ECHR ‘are in truth ‘fundamental’ in the sense they 
are guarantees which no one living in a free democratic society such as the UK should be 
required to forego’. 624  It is not surprising that the Convention is both wide ranging, and that its 
Articles are quite general.  There is a logical need, therefore, for a body to determine whether 
human rights guaranteed by the ECHR have been breached:  this body is, of course, the 
ECtHR.  The rights protected range from the right to life ( Article 2), freedom from slavery and 
forced labour (Article 4), respect for private and family life (Article 8) to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Article 9). 
 
While these Articles give an impression of the scope of the ECHR, they do not identify rights 
that are relevant (or are argued to be relevant) to the whole life order.  Some Articles became 
of great importance in cases taken to appeal in domestic courts and, self-evidently, to the 
ECtHR.  Article 3, the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, 
is central to a number cases culminating in Vinter, Bamber and Moore in Strasbourg.  Article 5 
is concerned with the right to liberty and security: 5.1 states that no one shall be derived of 
liberty except in carefully identified circumstances;  5.4 states that the lawfulness of detention 
shall be speedily decided by a court.  Article 6 asserts the right to a fair trial.  Article 7 protects 
against retrospectivity:  no one shall be found guilty of ay criminal offence if it was not an 
offence when it was committed;  and no one shall be punished more severely than the law 
allowed when the offence was committed. 625 
 
It was not until 1966 that UK citizens as individuals had the right to petition the ECtHR.  
However, as the ECHR had not been adopted into domestic law, anyone successfully 
appealing to the ECtHR did not have their rights under the Convention enforced by UK courts.  
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One of the early actions of the New Labour government, in 1997, was a proposal to remedy 
this situation:  Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill. 626   In a lecture in 1996, Blair 
said he believed it made sense to end the cumbersome practice of forcing people to go to 
Strasbourg to hold their government to account.  Some people had said the system took power 
away from Parliament and placed it in the hands of judges but as Britain was already a 
signatory  to the Convention, he felt it merely meant allowing British judges rather than 
European judges to pass judgment.627  Beloff and Mountfield suggest that the judiciary 
engaged in ‘the infusion of the substance of the European Convention into English law’ and 
they talked of the ‘backdoor incorporation of its text’. 628    Certainly changes in UK law had 
been made as a result of the ECtHR rulings. 629  
 
The resulting HRA 1998 incorporated the ECHR into UK Law, stating so far as it is possible to 
do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect to in a way 
which is compatible with Convention rights. 630  If a court is satisfied that a legislative provision 
is not compatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of incompatibility. 631  
Such a declaration does not affect the validity of the provision, 632 nor was it binding on the 
parties to the provision.  There is, however, the question of interpretation of Section 2: ‘A court 
or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must 
take into account:  (a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the ECtHR’.  Klug 
and Wildbore have argued that Section 2 was drafted to avoid the domestic courts from being 
bound by Strasbourg jurisprudence, whilst still requiring them to take it into account. 633  Courts 
must follow existing statutes but an individual can appeal the decision to the ECtHR.  As Lord 
Steyn put it in Anderson, ‘In this way Parliamentary sovereignty was preserved.’ 634  
 
 
6.5   Judicial interpretation of the whole life order 
 
6.5.1    Introduction 
 
The HRA 1998, which took effect in October 2000, and the CJA 2003 had combined to 
change the legal framework within which offenders were sentenced to a whole life term, and in 
particular the grounds for any appeals which might be made.  The court cases considered 
earlier, which culminated in Stafford and Anderson, were concerned with criticism of, and 
appeals against, the power of the Secretary of State to set tariffs for mandatory life sentences.  
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The cases after the Criminal Justice Act 2003 took effect could have been regarded at the 
time as interpreting and clarifying the Act.  In retrospect, it can be argued the pre- and post- 
2003 cases are part of an attempt not simply to constrain the whole life tariff/order, but to get 
rid of it altogether.  If this is so, Vinter, Bamber, and Moore, currently before the European 
Court, 635 can be regarded as the potential culmination of this struggle. That case - which 
could alter the whole life order fundamentally or even end it - will be considered later, along 
with the possible political and media reactions in Britain.  In this chapter, cases in English 
courts which sought to constrain or challenge the whole life order will be considered, cases 
which, through their challenges, served to give legal clarification to this sentence.  
 
 
6.5.2       Relevant cases at the ECtHR  
 
There are four European Court cases that have relevance to whole life orders in England and 
Wales as they were subsequently cited in cases either in the Court of Appeal or the House of 
Lords.  Two, Nivette and Einhorn, while in connection with extradition to the USA, raised 
questions about whether life without parole was an irreducible sentence and, if so, whether it 
breached Article 3.  The other two, Léger and Kafkaris, were focused on whether life 
sentences in national jurisdictions in Europe were irreducible. 
 
Nivette v France  [2001] ECHR 892 
In 2001, Nivette applied to the European Court claiming that his extradition by France to the 
USA to stand trial for the murder of his girl friend in California, would breach Article 3. 636  The 
Court noted that the District Attorney in California had given an undertaking that the State of 
California would not seek the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment without any 
possibility of early release.  This undertaking bound her successors and the State of California. 
 
That being so, the Court considers that the assurances obtained by the 
French Government are such as to avert the danger of the applicant being 
sentenced to life imprisonment without any possibility of early release.  His 
extradition therefore cannot expose him to a serious risk of treatment or 
punishment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. 
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Einhorn v France  [2001] ECHR 893 
Einhorn applied to the European Court claiming similarly that his extradition by France to the 
USA to stand trial for the murder of his girl friend in Pennsylvania would breach Article 3. 637  
The applicant submitted that his extradition had been granted in breach of Article 3 in that 
there were substantial grounds for believing he faced a real risk of being sentenced to death 
‘and hence of being exposed to the “death row phenomenon”, a source of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’.  In any event, he argued that he was ‘likely to have to 
serve a life sentence without any real possibility of remission or parole’.  The Court stated it 
‘does not rule out the possibility that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence may raise an 
issue under Article 3 of the Convention’, therefore the extradition to a state where there is the 
possibility of a life sentence without parole may raise an issue.  It noted, however, that the 
Governor of Pennsylvania may commute a life sentence to another one of a duration that 
affords the possibility of parole.  An attachment from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office 
showed that such commuting was de facto as well as de jure - in the past 25 years 284 
prisoners serving life sentences had their sentences commuted.  The Court similarly declared 
the application inadmissible. 
 
Léger v France   [2006] 638   
Léger had been imprisoned for the abduction and murder of a boy.  Léger sought judgment 
against France arguing that Article 3 of the Convention had been breached, and again the 
issue was whether a life sentence was irreducible.  The applicant had been sentenced to life 
imprisonment with no minimum term set, and he had been released after 41 years in prison.  
The European Court determined: 
 
In the case of adults the Court has not ruled out the possibility that in special 
circumstances an irreducible life sentence might also raise an issue under the 
Convention where there is no hope of entitlement to such a measure as parole. 
 
After spending 15 years in prison, Léger had been able at regular intervals to apply for release 
on licence: 
 
In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant cannot 
maintain he was deprived of all hope of obtaining an adjustment of his 
sentence, which was not irreducible de jure or de facto.  It concludes that his 
continued detention as such, long though it was, did not constitute inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
The application was therefore rejected. 
 
                                                     
637 As in previous footnote:  Article 6, but this will not be considered as the particular aspect of it is not of 
relevance to whole life terms. 
638 Cited by Lord Brown in Wellington.  The decision by Section 2 of the Court does not seem to be 
available, although the decision by the Grand Chamber in 2009 is available where it was decided to 
strike the application following Léger’s death.  The dissenting opinion is more appropriately considered in 
the final chapter of this study. 
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Kafkaris v Cyprus  [2008] ECHR 143 
The three cases at the European Court considered so far have been cited subsequently in the 
English courts, but they have been overshadowed by consideration given to Kafkaris.  In 
making their determination, the European Judges refer extensively to Council of Europe texts, 
which will be noted before turning to the determination in Kafkaris:   
 
1) In Resolution (76) 2 of 17 February 1976,  the Committee of Ministers  
recommended that a review… of the life sentence should take place, if 
not done before, after 8 to 14 years of detention and be repeated at 
regular intervals. 
 
2) The Sub-Committee Responsible for Drafting the Resolution in its 
general report stated:  ‘It is inhuman to imprison a person for life without 
any hope of release….  Nobody should be deprived of the chance of 
possible release.  Just how far this chance can be realised must depend 
on the individual prognosis.’ 
 
3) The European Union’s decision on the European Arrest Warrant stated: 
‘If the offence on the basis of which the European arrest warrant has 
been issued is punishable by custodial life sentence or life-time detention 
order, the execution of the said warrant may be subject to the condition 
that the issuing Member State has provisions in its legal system for a 
review of the penalty or measure imposed, on request or at the latest 
after 20 years, or for the application of measures of clemency to which 
the person is entitled to apply for under the law.’ 639 
 
The Court was asked by Kafkaris to determine, in a case of premeditated murder, whether the 
sentence of life imprisonment in Cyprus (equivalent to a whole life order) in his particular 
circumstances had removed any prospect of his release.  The Court stated that the imposition 
of a sentence of life imprisonment on an adult offender, 
 
Is not in itself prohibited by, or incompatible with, Article 3 or any other 
Article of the Convention….At the same time, however, the Court has also 
held that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence on an adult may 
raise an issue under Article 3.640 
 
It noted from the Court case law that where national law affords the possibility of review of a 
life sentence with a view to its commutation, remission, termination or the conditional release 
of the prisoner, this would be sufficient to satisfy Article 3. 641  The determination then clarified 
what it meant by ‘irreducible’: 
 
A life sentence does not become ‘irreducible’ by the mere fact that in 
practice it may be served in full.  It is enough for the purposes of Article 3 
that a life sentence is de jure and de facto reducible. 642 
 
 
                                                     
639 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA Article 5.2. 
640 para. 97 
641 para 48 
642 para.98 
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The Court noted that in Cyprus the offence of premeditated murder carries a mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment that is ‘tantamount to imprisonment for the rest of the convicted 
person’s life’.643  However, the President of Cyprus, on the recommendation of the Attorney 
General, has the authority under the constitution to ‘suspend, remit or commute any sentence 
passed by a court’.644  The European Court concluded it:  ‘does not find that life sentences in 
Cyprus are irreducible with no possibility of release; on the contrary, it is clear that in Cyprus 
such sentences are both de jure and de facto reducible.’ 645 
 
The Court observed that:  A state’s choice of a specific criminal justice system, including 
sentence review and release arrangements, is in principle outside the supervision the Court 
carries out at European level.646 
 
Furthermore, the Court added that a sentence without a minimum term necessarily entails 
anxiety and uncertainty related to prison life, but this does not ‘warrant a conclusion of 
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3’.647  The Court held by 10 votes to 7 that there 
had been no breach of Article 3 of the Convention.  The dissenting opinions appended to the 
main determination raise issues which will be considered later in this study as they are of 
direct relevance to Vinter, Bamber and Moore.  
 
 
These determinations of the European Court of Human Rights show great concern over 
whether a whole life term was in breach of the Convention or not.  Nivette and Einhorn turned 
on whether there was the possibility of potential sentences being reduced or commuted.  In 
Léger, the French Government was able to show that Léger had been able to apply for release 
on licence at regular intervals.  In Kafkaris, the Court noted the power of the President of 
Cyprus to ‘suspend, remit or commute’ any sentence.  However, Kafkaris lacked clarity, in 
particular in its statement that ‘the imposition of an irreducible life sentence on an adult may 
raise an issue under Article 3’. 648     Lord Phillips supported this view when, in his interview for 
this study, he stated that the Court ‘fudged’ the issue in Kafkaris.  The impact of these 







                                                     
643 para 102 
644 ibid. 
645 para 103 
646 This was to be quoted verbatim in Wellington.  
647 para 107 
648 Emphasis added 
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6.5.3     Appeal cases 
 
The first two cases considered in this section did not involve whole life tariffs but in the 
grounds for appeal they did cite Articles of the ECHR and the determinations were to be 
referred to in later whole life order cases.    The two cases, Offen and Lichniak and Pyrah, 
clarified and redefined the imposition of life sentences in English law before the 2003 Act took 
effect. 
 
 Offen  [2000] EWCA Crim 96  
This case considered the compatibility of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 with the Convention. 
In Offen  the Court of Appeal  considered a number of cases where it was alleged that Section 
2 of the  Crime Sentences  Act  1997 649 was incompatible with Articles 3, 5 and 7 of the 
Convention.  It was argued in respect of Article 7 that following conviction for a first serious 
offence, if a conviction for a second serious offence followed, the imposition of a discretionary 
life sentence breached that part of Article 7 (1) which declared ‘nor shall a heavier penalty be 
imposed than one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed’.  The 
Court of Appeal determined: 
 
The fact that the previous record influenced the court into imposing a life 
sentence would not mean that the offender was being sentenced, or having 
his sentence increased, for the earlier offence.  Here, the first offence and the 
penalty imposed for it remain the same after the coming into force of the 1997 
Act; it is the penalty for the ‘trigger offence’, which Section 2 changes.650 
 
In respect of Articles 3 and 5, the Court considered that Section 2 of the 1997 Act established 
a norm:  ‘That those who commit two serious offences are a danger or risk to the public.’ 651  
The Court concluded: 
 
In our judgment, Section 2 will not contravene Convention rights if courts apply the 
Section so that it does not result in offenders being sentenced to life imprisonment 
when they do not constitute a significant risk to the public. 652  
 
This is relevant to CJA 2003 Schedule 21 (4) where one of the grounds for making a whole life 




                                                     
649 Which provided for an automatic life sentence for a second serious offence.  The Court noted the 
following features of the Crime (Sentences) Act.  It refers to two offences having been committed by the 
offender.  When the second offence is committed, the offender is required to be over 18.  The proviso of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ applies to both offences.  The exceptional circumstances can relate to the 
offences or to the offender, but what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’ is not defined.  All sentences 
identified as serious are offences for which life imprisonment could be imposed.    See Offen para 8 
650 para 101 
651 para 109 
652 para 97 
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Lichniak and Pyrah   [2002]  UKHL  47 
The cases of Lichniak and of Pyrah reached the House of Lords in 2002 as a consolidated 
appeal.  The issue was whether the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 was 
incompatible with Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.  Section 1(1) of the 1965 Act provides 
that adults convicted of murder should receive a mandatory life sentence.  The appellants 
considered that Section 1(1) was arbitrary and disproportionate 653 because it required the 
same life sentence to be passed on all convicted murderers, whatever the facts of the case or 
the circumstances of the offender, and irrespective of whether they are thought to be a danger 
to the public or not.654 
 
In his opinion, Lord Bingham made a statement that judges in some subsequent appeals have 
had to interpret: 
 
If the House had concluded that on imposition of a mandatory life sentence for 
murder, the convicted murderer forfeited his liberty to the state for the rest of 
his days, to remain in custody until (if ever) the Home Secretary concluded 
that the public interest would be better served by his release than by his 
continued detention, I would have little doubt that such a sentence would be 
found to violate Articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
as being arbitrary and disproportionate.655  656  657 
 
Lord Bingham continued that ‘such is not the effect of the sentence’. 658  Counsel for the 
appellants cited Offen (see above), and maintained that convicted murderers should not be 
sentenced to imprisonment for life unless they appeared to be a threat to the public.  Lord 
Bingham rejected these arguments: 
 
First, sitting Judicially, the House is concerned to decide not whether the 
mandatory life sentence is desirable or necessary but whether it is lawful.  
Secondly, the House must note that Section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of 
the Death Penalty) Act 1965 represents the settled will of Parliament.  
Criticism of the sub-section has been raised in many expert and authoritative 
quarters over the years, and there have been numerous occasions on which 
Parliament could have amended it had it wished, but there has never been a 
majority of both Houses in favour of amendment.  The fact that section 1(1) 
represents the settled will of a democratic assembly is not a conclusive 
reason for upholding it, but a degree of deference is due to the judgment of a 
democratic assembly on how a particular social problem is best tackled….  It 
may be accepted that the mandatory life sentence has a denunciatory value, 
expressing society’s view of a crime which has long been regarded with 
particular abhorrence. 659  
 
                                                     
653 Emphasis added 
654 Anderson was being heard at the same time and the Law Lords noted that the nature and operation of 
the mandatory life sentence was described in that judgment.  See above. 
655 Emphasis added 
656 para 8 
657 This was a somewhat belated response to Angela Rumbold’s comment. See above. 
658 This statement has been interpreted as meaning that very few of those convicted of murder will 
remain in prison for the rest of their life, and this is in line with his judgment in Hindley [1998] QB 751 
659 para 14 
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Finally, Lord Bingham noted that the European Court, in V v United Kingdom, held that 
detention of juveniles during Her Majesty’s Pleasure was not incompatible with Articles 3 and 
5 of the Convention and that this sentence was ‘almost indistinguishable in substance from 
the mandatory life sentence for murder by adults.660 
 
The appeals were unanimously rejected. 
 
The decisions in these two cases were important as they established that the mandatory life 
sentence for murder was not arbitrary and disproportionate, nor should it only be imposed if 




Sullivan  [2004] EWCA Crim 1762  
After these cases, following the implementation of the relevant parts of the CJA 2003, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the Lord Chief Justice saw a need to provide ‘general assistance 
as to the approach that courts should adopt’ when applying the provisions of the Act in respect 
of life sentences for murder, especially in the transitional arrangements.661  The ‘general 
assistance’ was provided in this case by a strengthened bench consisting of the Lord Chief 
Justice and three other justices, and took into account the 2004 Practice Direction.662 
 
The judgment restated the decision of the House of Lords in Anderson that the involvement of 
the Secretary of State in determining the minimum period to be served by those sentenced to 
a mandatory life sentence contravened Article 6 of the European Convention, in that 
determining a minimum term was indistinguishable from that of determining a sentence.  Both 
tasks had to be performed by a judge.  The 2003 Act transferred the role of the Secretary of 
State in determining the minimum term to the trial judge. 
 
The Lord Chief Justice remarked that, in the period before Anderson, lord chief justices had 
provided general guidance to judges to assist in making recommendations to the Home 
Secretary and to encourage greater consistency.  The 2003 Act, for the first time in an Act of 
Parliament, included guidance in the form of general sentencing principles.   
 
In considering the sentencing provisions in determining a minimum term in respect of a 
mandatory life sentence, the Lord Chief Justice noted the discretion given to trial judges.  Of 
particular relevance to this study is s 269(4) of the Act: 
 
 
                                                     
660 para 17 
661 para 1 of Sullivan 
662 See Appendix D 
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If the offender was 21 or over when he committed the offence and the court 
is of the opinion 663 that, because of the seriousness of the offence no 
order should  be made under subsection (2), the court must order that the 
early release provisions are not to apply to the offender. This results in the 
offender serving a whole life term. 
 
Attention is drawn to the point that the judge complies with s 269 if he has ‘regard’ to the 
principles set out in the schedule:  ‘As long as he bears them in mind he is not bound to follow 
them.  However if he does not follow the principles he should explain why he has not done 
so.’664 
 
The Lord Chief Justice then turned to consider Schedule 21: 
 
The Schedule sets out a well-established approach to sentencing.  It makes 
clear (in paragraph 9) that despite the starting points the judge has a 
discretion to determine any term of any length as being appropriate because 
of the particular aggravating and mitigating circumstances that exist in that 
case.  The discretion must, however, be exercised lawfully and this requires 
the judge to have regard to the guidance set out in Schedule 21, though he is 
free not to follow the guidance if in his opinion this will not result in an 
appropriate term for reasons he identifies.  His decision is subject to appeal by 
either the offender or on Attorney General’s Reference.665 
 
The Lord Chief Justice then turned to consider Schedule 22 of the Act that provided for 
transition arrangements.  These were necessary to avoid breaching ECHR Article 5 - the right 
to liberty and the security of the person - and Article 7.1 - prohibiting the imposition of a 
heavier penalty than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was 
committed.  Three situations had to be catered for: 
 
1) existing prisoners who in respect of a life sentence, had, prior to 18 December 2003  
      (ie when the Act took effect) been informed by the Secretary of State of the  
      minimum term they were to serve; 
2) existing prisoners who on that date had not been informed of their minimum term; 
3) offenders (for offences committed before 18 December 2003) who had not been 
sentenced before 18 December 2003. 
 
For prisoners in the first situation, they could apply to the High Court for review of the minimum 
term notified by the Secretary of State or his decision they should never be released.666  For 
the second group of prisoners, the Secretary of State must refer the case to the High Court for 
an order to be made under sub-section (2) (early release provisions) or sub-section (4) (early 
release provisions should not apply) of s 269 of the Act.  In both circumstances appeals from 
High Court decisions could be made to the Court of Appeal. 
                                                     
663 Emphasis added by the Lord Chief Justice 
664 para. 12 
665 para. 16 
666 Schedule 22 paras 2-4 
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In all three situations there was the need to be compliant with ECHR Article 7 (1).   Schedule 
22 para 10 stated with reference to potential whole life terms: 
 
The Court…may not make an order under subsection (4) of Section 269 unless 
the court is of the opinion that, under the practice followed by the Secretary of 
State before December 2002, the Secretary of State would have been likely to 
give the prisoner a notification falling within paragraph 2(b)  (ie  a whole life term) 
 
But, as the Lord Chief Justice rhetorically asked: 
 
What was the practice of Home Secretaries prior to (December 2002)?  
Neither the recommendations made by the judiciary nor the determination of 
the Secretary of State were usually made public.  The Secretary of State 
took into account information that was not made available to the public or the 
judiciary….  The best guide to what would have been the practice of the 
Secretary of State is the Practice Directions…. This is because it can 
reasonably be assumed that the judiciary and in particular the Chief Justice 
will have applied the relevant Practice Direction while it was in force and in a 
high percentage of the cases it was their recommendations that the 
Secretary of State followed.667 
 
This would be defensible if the small number of cases where the decision of the Secretary of 
State differed were spread evenly across the range of mandatory life sentences.  But this was 
not the case:  ‘As has been made clear by the Secretary of State, in the most serious cases he 
tended to select a higher figure than that indicated by the judiciary.’ 668 
 
Later, in 2010, detail in respect of some of these ‘most serious’ cases was to be given in 
Coonan at the High Court.  The court was provided by the Home Office with a schedule of 28 
offenders ‘for most of whom a whole life tariff had been set between 1966 and 2002.’  In the 
case of 19 still alive (in  2010) a whole life tariff  ‘was undoubtedly set’.  In three cases the 
Home Secretary set a whole life tariff despite both the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice 
recommending a finite term; in nine cases the Home Secretary set a whole life tariff when 
either the trial judge or the Lord Chief Justice recommended a finite term; and in only seven 
cases the Home Secretary set a whole life tariff when recommended by both the trial judge 
and the Lord Chief Justice.669 
 
 
Jones [2005] EWCA Crim 3115 
The ‘general assistance’ provided in Sullivan was complemented later by what the Lord Chief 
Justice said in respect of the appeal by Hobson,670  but cited as Jones.  In this judgment Lord 
Phillips stated that a whole life order was not to be made lightly, or when there was a doubt in 
the mind of the trial judge.  He wrote: 
                                                     
667 para 26 
668 para 27 
669 [2010] EWHC 1741 (QB) para 25 
670 Details below  
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Often, perhaps usually, where such a (whole life) order is called for the case 
will not be on the borderline.  The facts of the case, considered as a whole, 
will leave the judge in no doubt that the offender must be kept in prison for the 
rest of his or her life.  Indeed if the judge is in doubt this may well be an 
indication that a finite minimum term which leaves open the possibility that the 
offender may be released for the final years of his or her life is the appropriate 
disposal. 
 
The ‘general assistance’ these cases provided may have been designed to be of use to trial 
judges, but it was also helpful for this study.   The key relevant points made were: 
 
• The difficulty in discovering, because of the secrecy of the Home Office, why Home 
Secretaries acted as they did;  
• The lack of congruence between advice of Lord Chief Justices and trial judges and 
tariffs set by the Home Secretary;  
• Schedule 21 figures were starting points and trial judges were only to be guided by 
them in determining sentences; 
• Jones taken with Sullivan  expressed concern that Schedule 21’s effect could be an 
undue ratcheting-up of sentences for murder that should be restrained. 
 
The cases to be considered next clarified and interpreted the CJA 2003 in respect of whole life 
orders.  Three cases turned on the compatibility of the whole life order with the Convention, 
especially Article 3:  Bieber, Wellington and Hutchinson.  Other cases were concerned with 
the interpretation of Schedule 22 (transitional arrangements) and the need to take account of 
the Secretary of State’s policy: Pitchfork, Coonan and Sweeney.  
 
The next two cases set some parameters to the whole life order:  whether or not a guilty plea 
was a mitigating factor and what counted as a crime of exceptionally high seriousness.    
 
 
Hobson    [2005] EWCA Crim 3115    
In 2005 Mark Hobson sought leave to appeal in respect of the imposition of a whole life order.  
He had pleaded guilty to the murders of his girlfriend, her sister (involving acts of a sexual and 
sadistic nature), and an elderly couple killed in the course of a burglary.  Hobson had made it 
clear at the earliest opportunity that he would plead guilty.  His QC argued he should be given 
credit for this and should not have had an order for a whole life term imposed.  The Lord Chief 
Justice, giving the Court’s decision, was clear and emphatic: ‘The facts of these four murders 
are so horrific that a whole life order was inevitable, guilty plea or no’.671  Earlier he had noted 
that the Guidelines state expressly that:  ‘Where a Court determines that there should be a 
                                                     
671 para 76 
 150 
whole life minimum term, there will be no reduction for a guilty plea.’ 672   This was to be 
restated in the Sentencing Guidelines Council Revised ‘Reduction in Sentences for Guilty 
Pleas’ Definitive Guidelines 2007.   
 
The application for leave to appeal was refused. 
 
 
Randall  [2007] EWCA  Crim  2257    
In 2007 the Court of Appeal heard the case of Andrew Randall, who had received a whole life 
order for the murder of his baby daughter.  In the judgment, Lord Chief Justice Phillips’ 
statement in Jones 673 was quoted.  All three judges felt considerable unease about the trial 
judge’s conclusion that the case warranted a whole life order.  Lord Justice Gage continued 
‘As Jones makes clear, the imposition of such a sentence (ie a whole life order) should be 
reserved for those cases where the need for it is clear cut’.674   The Court substituted a 
minimum term of 30 years for the whole life order. 
 
 
Bieber   [2008] EWCA  Crim 1601     
This case was concerned with the legitimacy of the whole life order.   Beiber had been tried for 
the murder of one police officer, and the attempted murder of two other officers by shooting 
and it raised two issues: the first, whether a whole life order was appropriate; and the second, 
whether the whole life order infringed Article 3 of the European Convention.  Bieber had been 
found guilty at Newcastle Crown Court in 2004, and in 2006 the Court of Appeal rejected his 
appeal against conviction. 
 
In considering whether a whole life order was lawful in domestic law and whether it breached 
Article 3 of the Convention, the QC for the appellant submitted that the decision of the 
European Court in Kafkaris strongly supported this ground for appeal.  For the Crown it was 
argued that a whole life order had been held to be lawful by the House of Lords; that the 
European Court had held only that a whole life order ‘may’ raise an issue under Article 3;  and 
finally, that a whole life order was not irreducible since the prisoner might be released under 
Section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.675 
 
The Appeal Court in its decision cited the precedent in the Divisional Court of Hindley [1998] 
QB 751, where the appellant had argued that to impose a whole life tariff was unlawful.  Lord 
Chief Justice, Lord Bingham had observed: 
 
                                                     
672 para 13 
673 See above 
674 para 27 
675 See Appendix I 
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One can readily accept that in requiring a sentence of imprisonment for life 
on those convicted of murder, Parliament did not intend the sentence to 
mean what it said in all, or even in a majority, of cases, but there is nothing 
to suggest that Parliament intended that it should never (even leaving risk 
calculations aside) mean what it said.676 
 
This decision was appealed unsuccessfully by Hindley to the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords.677  Citing this as precedent, the Court of Appeal in Bieber reaffirmed that the whole life 
order was a lawful sentence in English law. 
 
The Court then turned to issues in European and other jurisprudence.  The appellant’s 
counsel drew attention to a decision of the German Constitutional Court: at issue was whether 
the imposition of life imprisonment breached Article 1.1 of the Basic Law, which requires the 
State to ‘respect and protect human dignity’.  The Constitutional Court stated that ‘a humane 
execution of lifetime imprisonment can only be assured if the sentenced criminal has a 
concrete and principally attainable possibility to regain freedom at a later point in time.’ 678 
 
A similar conclusion was quoted from a judgment in the Supreme Court of Namibia, where the 
Chief Justice had stated that a life sentence ‘cannot be justified if it locks the gates of the 
prison irreversibly for the offender.’ 679 
 
Just as the European Court in Kafkaris quoted from the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, so too did the appellant’s counsel in this case: 
 
In order to reduce the harmful effects of imprisonment and to promote the 
resettlement of prisoners under conditions that seek to guarantee safety of the 
outside community, the law should make conditional release available to all 
sentenced prisoners, including life sentence prisoners.680 
 
He also cited from the Framework Document of the European Arrest Warrant.681 
 
The Appeal Court commented that the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
appeared to proceed on the basis that, however heinous the crime, an offender should not be 
denied the prospect of conditional release.  However, the court inferred from the Framework 
document that sentences for life or for very lengthy periods do not, of themselves, amount to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: ‘were that not so, an embargo on such 
punishment would surely be a mandatory, rather than an optional, condition of extradition.’682 
 
                                                     
676 para 37 
677 The detail of this was discussed above. 
678 quoted in para 17.  See Chapter 5 for more detail. 
679 State v Tcoeib (1997) quoted in para 19    A fuller consideration of this case is given in Chapter 5.   
680 Recommendation  2003: 22 
681 Quoted above  under Kafkaris 
682 para 23 
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The Court then turned to consider relevant determinations of the European Court in Nivette, 
Einhorn and especially Kafkaris.683  It was confident that: 
 
• The imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment will not involve a violation of 
Article 3 if the sentence is reducible; 
• The fact that the offender may be detained for the whole of his life does not 
involve a violation of Article 3; 
• The imposition of a life sentence that is irreducible may raise an issue under 
Article 3.684 
 
The focus was on the third of these.  The issue, it was thought, would be raised if the offender 
were ‘detained beyond the term dictated by the legitimate purposes of punishment.’ 685  The 
determination continued that the essential requirement appeared to be the possibility of a 
review that would determine whether imprisonment remained justified. 686   However, the Court 
went on: 
 
We do not consider that it follows from the decision of the majority of the 
Grand Chamber (of the European Court in Kafkaris) that an irreducible life 
sentence, imposed by a judge to reflect the appropriate  punishment and 
deterrence 687 for a very serious offence is in potential conflict with Article 3.688 
 
The Court then answered a question it itself had posed:  Is it the sentence or the consequent 
detention that is capable of being in breach of Article 3?  ‘We believe it is the latter.’ 689  
Attention was turned to what counted as a reducible sentence, the division within the Grand 
Chamber was noted, as was the authority of the President of Cyprus to order an early release. 
 
The Court drew together these reasonings.  The mandatory life sentence was not normally 
irreducible.  When a whole life term was ordered it was because the judge considered that for 
punishment and deterrence the offender must remain in prison for the whole of his or her life.  
The European Court had not ruled that an irreducible life sentence, deliberately imposed by a 
judge in particular circumstances, would result in a breach of Article 3.   Prior to the 2003 Act, 
the Secretary of State reviewed all prisoners serving a whole life tariff after they had served 25 
years.  At the time of this appeal  (ie in 2008), the Secretary of State had limited powers to 
release a life prisoner under Section 30 of the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997 on compassionate 
grounds.  But, perhaps surprisingly, the judgment continued: 
 
                                                     
683 See above  
684 para 37 
685 Emphasis added 
686 para 39 
687 Emphasis added 
688 para 42 
689 para 43 
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If, however, the position is reached where the continued imprisonment of a 
prisoner is held to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, we can see no 
reason why, having particular regard to the requirement to comply with the 
Convention, the Secretary of State should not use his statutory power to 
release the prisoner.690  691 
 
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal, applying the European Court’s determination in Kafkaris, 
did not consider that a whole life term should be regarded as a sentence that is irreducible.  
Any Article 3 challenge should be made not when the sentence is imposed, but when the 
prisoner can bring evidence to bear that any further detention will constitute degrading or 
inhuman treatment. 
 
The question of Bieber’s whole life order was quickly dealt with:  ‘There is a degree of 
illogicality 692 in having concluded that the appellant’s offences made it appropriate to take 30 
years as the starting point for the minimum term then to conclude that, after weighing the 
aggravating features, a whole life order should be imposed.’ 693 
 
Furthermore, the Court reiterated its view previously in Jones that a whole life term should only 
be given in cases which fell well within the guidelines given in Schedule 21 of the 2003 Act. 
 
The Court, therefore, set aside the whole life order and set the starting point at 30 years for 
two reasons: the murder of a police officer in the course of his duty, and the use of a firearm.  
When added to this the attempted murder of two other police officers, the Court concluded 
that a minimum sentence of 37 years was appropriate. 
 
This judgment made a number of key points: 
 
• The whole life order should not be regarded as irreducible, given the powers of the 
Home Secretary to release prisoners. 
• The powers of the Home Secretary were not confined to releasing prisoners at death’s 
door. 
• It was not the sentence itself, but continued detention that may occasion a breach of 
Article 3. 
• The trial judge should not impose a whole life order unless the crime was well within 
Schedule 21 (4).  
                                                     
690 para 48  This paragraph was to be cited by the government in its submission to the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber in Vinter, Bamber and Moore in 2012.  
691 Under the Humans Rights Act, government ministers were bound to act in accordance with the 
ECHR.   Therefore the Home Secretary was bound to release a prisoner if continued detention was not 
penologically justified. 
692 The illogicality is not spelt out.  However, if a crime is not of exceptionally high seriousness the trial 
judge should therefore take as his starting point 30 years (as he did), but the aggravating factors do not 
make the crime one of ‘exceptionally high seriousness’ and therefore the sentence should be less than 
whole life.   
693 para 52 
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Hutchinson 2008 694   
In 1984 Hutchinson was found guilty of murdering three members of a family and raping the 
daughter.  At the trial the judge recommended a minimum term of 18 years but added ‘it was a 
genuine life case’.  This recommendation was disregarded by the Secretary of State, who set a 
whole life tariff.  The case was reviewed in 2008 in the High Court (in accordance with the 
2003 Act Schedule 22), where it was argued that a whole life term violated his human rights 
and that the trial judge’s recommendation of an 18 year minimum term was the correct 
sentence.  The reviewing judge concluded ‘there is no reason at all for departing from the 
decision of the Home Secretary’.  Later in 2008, the Court of Appeal heard an application for 
leave to appeal the sentence, Lord Justice Dyson said it was a truly shocking case and there 
was no substance in his application: ‘In our judgment Mr Justice Tugendhat was plainly correct 
in saying that this applicant should spend the rest of his life in custody without the prospect of 
release’.    From the sketchy details available, it is not possible to be certain what the 
challenge in terms of the European Convention was.  
 
 
Wellington   [2008]  UKHL 72 
Late in the same year, The House of Lords heard the appeal of Wellington from a decision to 
extradite him to the USA to stand trial in Missouri on a charge of first degree murder.  There 
the prescribed penalties are death or life imprisonment without parole or release, except by the 
act of the Governor.  The ground of appeal was that the Home Secretary’s decision to allow 
the extradition would breach Wellington’s Convention Rights under Article 3. 
 
Lord Hoffman began by considering the argument put forward by Lord Justice Laws in the 
Divisional Court that life imprisonment without parole is inhuman and degrading.  He quoted 
the Lord Justice that the abolition of the death penalty must have been founded at least on the 
premise that the life of every person, however depraved, has an inalienable value.  Lord 
Hoffman disputed this, saying that opposition to the death penalty may be based on the 
grounds that it is irreversible when justice has miscarried and that there was little evidence of 
its deterrent effect.  He rejected Lord Justice Laws’ view that the whole life tariff was arbitrary - 
that it could be measured in days or decades depending on how long the prisoner lived - and 
therefore was liable to be disproportionate.  He ended the consideration of this point by 
quoting Lord Bingham’s statement in Lichniak and Pyrah that the mandatory life sentence 
represented the settled will of Parliament.695  Turning to the law, Lord Hoffman discussed 
Kafkaris, drawing attention to the majority decision that in Cyprus the sentence of life 
imprisonment was not irreducible.  This led to Bieber in the Court of Appeal, and Lord Hoffman 
agreed with the Lord Chief Justice’s view in that case. 
 
                                                     
694 The information regarding the case is taken from accounts on the BBC News website of 16 May and 6 
October 2008.  No record of the case exists on the BAILLI website. 
695 See above  
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Lord Scott, in his concurring opinion, went further, stating that the mandatory nature of an 
irreducible full life sentence would be inhuman and degrading ‘if the sentence were to appear 
so grossly disproportionate 696 to the circumstances of the crime as to offend ordinary notions 
of fairness and justice.’ 697  He continued: 
 
It has been suggested, also, that an irreducible life sentence is ‘inhuman and 
degrading’ for Article 3 purposes because it denies the prisoner the possibility of 
atonement and redemption …. If a whole life sentence of imprisonment without 
parole is a just punishment 698 for the crime, the prisoner atones by serving his 
sentence.  Redemption, a matter between him and his Maker, may well be 
achieved during the currency of the sentence, but I do not follow why it is said to 
require a reduction of the length of the just punishment sentence.699 
 
Lord Carswell agreed that a whole life sentence was not a breach of Article 3 in every case.   
As authorities for his view, in addition to Kafkaris, he cited Nivette, Einhorn and Léger in the 
European Court. 700  He went on that continued detention may infringe Article 3 but this could 
not be determined at the sentencing stage. 
 
Lord Brown also cited Nivette, Einhorn and Léger in brief and considered Kafkaris in more 
detail.  He thought: 
It is apparent that widely differing views are held by the judges in Strasbourg 
as to whether mandatory life sentences (and perhaps even discretionary life 
sentences) are compatible with Article 3.  The judgment of the majority 
appears to consider life sentences as a category and to ask whether 
generically they are ‘de facto and de jure’ reducible, only regarding them as 
irreducible if the law precludes all possibility of release or the facts 
demonstrate that no one ever is released.  And even if the sentence is to be 
regarded as irreducible, the majority appears to conclude no more than that it 
may raise an issue under Article 3 (not that it should be held ‘in principle’ 
inconsistent with Article 3).701 
 
Lord Brown went on to consider whether the whole life term in England was irreducible.  He 
noted the Court of Appeal’s reliance in Bieber on the powers of the Secretary of State to order 
release on compassionate grounds,702 but thought this power was used only sparingly.  More 
compellingly, he thought that the whole life term should not be regarded as irreducible ‘or at 
any rate not objectionably so’ since: 
 
when originally the whole life term was fixed, the prisoner’s individual 
circumstances (including naturally the circumstances of his particular 
offending) will have been considered and will have been thought by the judge 
(or the Court of Appeal) to merit that degree of punishment, draconian though 
that undoubtedly is.703 
                                                     
696 Emphasis added 
697 para 45 
698 Emphasis added 
699 para 46 
700 See above  
701 para 72 
702 See above  
703 para 78 
 156 
To stress the point - and this was to be of significance in Vinter, Bamber and Moore at 
the ECtHR 704 -  he later defined an irreducible life sentence, based on the Kafkaris 
ruling to mean : 
 
a mandatory life sentence to be served in full without there ever being proper 
consideration of the individual circumstances of the defendant’s case.705 
 
Further, in agreement with Lord Phillips in Bieber,706 he believed any violation of Article 3 
would only occur when further imprisonment could not be justified on any ground. 
 
The Lords of Appeal did not allow Wellington’s appeal, despite concern about whether there 
was a realistic likelihood of parole or commutation by the Governor of Missouri.  More relevant 
to this study is the position taken by the House of Lords in relation to whether the whole life 
order breached Article 3.  The decision of the Court of Appeal in Bieber was confirmed, 
including the argument that the whole life order was reducible - a majority of the Law Lords 
saying that it was the Secretary of State’s powers under statute to exercise clemency that 
made it so; while Lord Brown’s opinion was that the sentencing judge taking individual 
circumstances into account made it so. 
 
The judgment determined: 
 
• The mandatory life sentence was reducible and the Lords of Appeal regarded it as a 
class of sentence, while the whole life order was tailored to the circumstances of the 
crime and of the offender.  
• The whole life order was reducible due to the Home Secretary’s power to exercise 
clemency. 
• The whole life order could be considered a just punishment:  it was proportionate to a 
particular heinous offence. 
• The position in Bieber was confirmed that any Article 3 breach occurs not when the 
sentence is imposed but only (possibly) in the course of imprisonment.  
 
 
Pitchfork   [2009]  EWCA Crim  963 
In 1988 Pitchfork pleaded guilty to the rape and murder of two young girls, conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice and two further offences of indecent assault.  He was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for the murders.  The Secretary of State set the tariff at 30 years.  After the 
2003 Act came into force, Pitchfork sought a review of the minimum term.  In 2008 the  
 
 
                                                     
704 See Chapter 7 
705 para 81 
706 See above  
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reviewing judge specified a minimum term of 30 years.  It was noted the case raised issues 
which were also considered in Bamber, and which had been fully discussed in that case.707 
 
The sentencing judge in 1988 stated to the Home Secretary that the offender ‘should only be 
released when the authorities are satisfied that he is no longer a danger to women.  In any 
event, in view of all the serious, callous and cunning conduct the actual length should not be 
less than 20 years.’   Lord Chief Justice Lane said ‘25 years minimum, but from the point of 
view of the safety of the public I doubt if he should ever be released.’  The Secretary of State 
determined that ‘the heinous nature of the offences warranted a significantly higher tariff than 
that which had been recommended by the judiciary.’  The tariff was set at 30 years.  In 2001 
the Secretary of State reconsidered the tariff but left it at 30 years.708 
 
After the 2003 Act took effect, Pitchfork applied for a judicial review of the tariff.  The reviewing 
judge concluded that the trial judge had meant a whole life sentence.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected this, saying that if the trial judge or the Lord Chief Justice had intended a whole life 
order, this would have been clearly stated.709 
 
As a result, the Court of Appeal conducted its own review and assessed the minimum term in 
the light of the 2003 Act Schedule 21.  The applicant’s QC submitted that this action 
constituted a breach of Articles 6 and 7(1) of the Convention, and the starting point should be 
the recommendation made by the Lord Chief Justice.  The Court disagreed: 
 
This (the legislation) requires the judge conducting the review to have regard 
to the recommendations of the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice and to 
the considerations contained in Schedule 21 of the 2003 Act.  In reaching his 
conclusion he must also have regard to the order made by the Secretary of 
State, not as a consideration influencing his decision on the review, but for the 
purpose of ensuring that the result of the review will not produce any increase 
in the length of the prisoner’s incarceration beyond the period already fixed by 
the Secretary of State’s order.710 
 
This last point was designed to avoid the imposition of a retrospective sentence, deemed to 
breach Article 7 (1) of the Convention. 
 
In the light of Schedule 21, the applicant’s counsel accepted that the murder fell into the 
exceptionally high category of seriousness for which, post 2003, the starting point would be the 
whole life term.  However, this was not the statutory test, so the Court of Appeal decided that 
the sentence could not be higher than 30 years, and that it should be 30 years. 
 
 
                                                     
707 See below  
708 paras 14-18 
709 para 20 
710 para 24 
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The Court then turned to whether progress made in prison - in terms of addressing the 
reasons for his past behaviour, education to degree level and a specialism in translating music 
into Braille - was exceptional, and should result in a reduction in the sentence.  The Court 
over-ruled the reviewing judge and reduced the sentence by two years. 
 
Although not a case involving a whole life order, Pitchfork clarified a number of points relevant 
to the whole life order: 
 
• Reports made by judges to the Secretary of State prior to the 2003 Act had to have 
been unequivocal in recommending a whole life tariff; 
• Reviews undertaken as part of the transitional arrangements following the 2003 Act 
were determined neither by the original recommendations nor by Schedule 21.  
‘Neither original judicial recommendations nor the Schedule enjoys some kind of 
hidden primacy.’711 
• Review decisions were, bound by Article 7 (1) of the Convention, not to exceed the 
tariff ordered by the Secretary of State; 
• Where the term was finite, allowance could and should be made for exceptional 
progress in prison.   The two cases that follow consider this point in respect of whole 
life orders.   
 
 
Hardy   [2010]  EWHC  1064 QB    
Hardy had been sentenced in November 2003  (ie before the 2003 Act had received the royal 
assent) for the murder of three women.  Hardy had pleaded guilty on the day of the trial.  The 
defence had asserted that the only defence would be diminished responsibility.  Psychiatric 
reports revealed a personality disorder.  ‘However, by his pleas of guilty, Hardy accepted that 
his abnormality of mind had not been such as to impair substantially his mental responsibility 
for what he had done.’712  The judge noted that cases which normally fall within those for which 
the appropriate starting point is a whole life order includes the murder of two or more persons, 
where each murder involves a sexual or sadistic conduct: 
 
This is undoubtedly such a case.  Indeed, this case is one of the utmost 
gravity, in which exceptionally Hardy’s early acceptance of responsibility for 
his victims’ death, his personality disorder at the time, his eventual pleas of 
guilty and such remorse as he expressed through his Counsel carry little 
weight.713 
 
Accordingly, a whole life order was made. 
 
 
                                                     
711 para 27 
712 para 10 
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This judgment showed that if offences fall well within the range of those for which a whole life 
order is recommended, then pleas of personal mitigation will have little effect, ie the position 
for whole life order prisoners is different to the opinion in Pitchfork. 
 
 
Coonan  [2010] EWHC Crim 1741 (QB);   [2011] EWCA Crim 5     
On trial in 1981 for 13 murders, Sutcliffe (as he was then known) claimed that his responsibility 
was diminished by mental abnormality.  The jury, by its verdict, rejected the account given by 
psychiatrists and found him guilty of the 13 murders.  The sentencing judge said he did not 
believe he had the power to recommend a whole life tariff to the Secretary of State.  He 
recommended a tariff of 30 years.  In 1997 in a letter to Lord Chief Justice Lord Bingham, he 
said: 
 
I now think that it would have been better to have made no minimum 
recommendation….I have no doubt  that this is one of the rare cases where 
the offences were so heinous and the perpetrator so dangerous that life 
should mean life.714 
 
Lord Bingham recommended 35 years to the Secretary of State, but no tariff was set.   
 
In due course, the case was referred to the High Court.  It was suggested for Coonan that 
greater regard should be given to the recommendations of the trial judge and the Lord Chief 
Justice than should be given to the practice of the Secretary of State before the 2003 Act.  The 
judge disagreed, citing as precedent Pitchfork in particular paragraph 24.715  He also rejected 
counsel’s argument that the starting point was 30 years: the number of victims and intended 
victims took it beyond the 30 years starting point, as did the brutality and gravity of the 
offences, the fact that the crimes were pre-planned, with evidence of sexual or sadistic 
conduct. 
 
The judge rejected Coonan’s argument that the report of the psychiatrists should be used as a 
mitigating factor: 
 
As a matter of principle, it is for the jury and not the judge to decide whether 
a person’s responsibility for killing is diminished by reason of mental 
abnormality.  The burden of proof is on the defendant.  It is not, in my 
opinion, open to a judge, setting a minimum term to go behind the jury.716 
 
The judge considered whether the effective treatment of Coonan’s mental abnormality and 
good behaviour in detention should result in his serving less than a whole life term.  He 
thought not, as: 
 
                                                     
714 QB para 9 
715 See above  
716 para 18 It should be noted that this does not distinguish responsibility from culpability. 
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• It did not meet the high threshold explained in Caines 717 
• It is ‘in any event impossible rationally in the case of a prisoner for whom otherwise a 
whole life term is appropriate…an order cannot be made for ‘whole life less one 
year.’718   This makes explicit the difference between the whole life order and 
imprisonment for a minimum term which was alluded to in Pitchfork.   
 
He directed that the early release provisions were not to apply to Coonan.  That is, he would 
serve a whole life sentence.  This judgment draws attention to the significance of the Court of 
Appeal ruling in Pitchfork: that a reviewing judge should take into account both the original 
judicial recommendations and Schedule 21 of the Act, but neither had primacy.  The judgment 
clearly states that Coonan’s crimes fell within those for which the starting point was the whole 
life order; and that it was for the jury to decide whether or not to accept a plea of diminished 
responsibility.  The judge finally drew attention to problems in considering a remission of 
sentence in cases where a whole life order had been made.   
 
Late in 2010 Coonan sought leave to appeal.  In the Court of Appeal, the Lord Chief Justice 
stressed that this application: 
 
Is not and never could constitute an appeal in which the verdict of the jury 
might be called into question….  Its (the verdict’s) correctness was not and is 
not open to argument.  Judges making the assessments under Schedule 22 of 
the 2003 Act cannot impose a sentence which would reflect a defence which 
was not established when, as a matter of law, it should have been established 
by the defendant, or superimpose their own judgments on issues of 
provocation or self defence, contrary to the verdicts of the jury.719 
 
In conclusion, Lord Judge stated: 
Even accepting that an element of mental disturbance was intrinsic to the 
commission of these crimes, the interests of justice require nothing less than a 




The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.  Nothing in the Court of Appeal’s analysis 
and determination impugned the decision of the reviewing judge.  There is no reference in the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Pitchfork, of which such extensive use was made by the 
reviewing judge and it can therefore be assumed that his application of the judgment was 
accepted by the Court of Appeal.  Similarly, the Court acknowledged that it was the 
responsibility of the trial jury to accept or not the evidence led by the defence to support 
diminished responsibility.   
                                                     
717 Caines [2008] EWCA Crim 2915  quoted in Appendix E 
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720 Emphasis added 
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6.5.4    Crimes with the potential to attract a whole life order 
 
Before ending this section on court cases that clarified the sentencing of those found guilty of 
the most heinous of murders, it is thought that brief mention should be made of five cases 
illustrating differing aspects of sentencing in respect of potential whole life orders. 
 
Sawoniuk   [2000]  EWCA Crim 9;  [ 2001] ECHR 895  
Sawoniuk, a naturalized British citizen, was charged with murder under the 1991 War Crimes 
Act, apparently the only person to be charged under the Act.   The Act gave jurisdiction to 
British courts for alleged war crimes committed in Nazi Germany or its occupied territories by 
residents now in Britain.  He was found guilty in 1999 of murder on two counts that were 
‘violations of the laws and customs of war’ and received the mandatory life sentence.  The trial 
judge recommended that ‘the offender should never see the light of day’.   Lord Chief Justice 
Bingham recommended five years.   Sawoniuk challenged the convictions with leave granted 
by the Court of Appeal.  There were eight grounds in the appeal, all critical of the trial judge.  In 
its determination, the Court of Appeal considered all grounds in great detail, quoting the trial 
judge in his instructions to the jury and in his summing up.  All eight grounds were rejected. 
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was rejected.  
 
An application was made to the European Court, where it was noted that the Secretary of 
State had yet to make a decision on the tariff.  The application alleged breaches of Article 3, 5 
and 6.   In respect of Article 6, it was maintained in particular that the time between the 
committing of the alleged offences and the trial meant that he would not receive a fair hearing.  
The European Court rejected this.   In respect of Article 5, it was argued that bail was 
arbitrarily revoked and reinstated.  Again this was rejected, because the complaint had not 
been made within the time allowed.  In respect of Articles 3 and 5 it was alleged that the 
mandatory life sentence was arbitrary and disproportionate and that his advanced years and 
medical conditions meant that detention caused exceptional hardship.   The Court noted there 
was nothing in the Convention against imprisonment at an advanced age, but there was a duty 
to provide medical care.  Moreover, as he had not exhausted domestic remedies, a question of 
a breach of Article 3 could not be considered.  Further, ‘given the seriousness of the offences, 
a sentence of life imprisonment (cannot) be regarded as arbitrary or disproportionate  722 in the 
context of Article 5 (1)’.  In respect of the setting of a tariff any decision could be subject to a 
judicial review, and release on compassionate grounds was possible.  Therefore, the 
European Court determined that the application was inadmissible.  There is no evidence as to 
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In declaring the application inadmissible, the ECtHR made a number of significant points: 
 
• A mandatory life sentence was not intrinsically arbitrary or disproportionate. 
• Old age or ill health while imprisoned did not constitute a breach of Article 3 providing 
the prisoner’s needs were met.  
• The time elapsed between the crimes and the trials did not breach the ECHR.  
• Any tariff set could be subject to judicial review and compassionate release was 
possible.  
 
The next two cases are those where it might have been expected that a whole life order would 
be made in view of the number of victims and the sadistic nature of the crimes, but the orders 
were not made on the grounds of mitigating factors.  
 
 
Copeland   [2007] EWHC 368 (QB) 
In 2000 Copeland, ‘the London nail bomber’, had been convicted of three counts of murder 
and three counts of causing explosions to endanger life.  The jury had rejected a plea of 
diminished responsibility.   He was sentenced to life imprisonment on each of the counts.  The 
Recorder reported that his avowed aim with the first two explosions was to kill, maim and 
terrorise people in the Black and Asian community.  The third bomb was targeted at the 
homosexual community.  The Recorder concluded there were no mitigating factors; 
aggravating factors comprised his aim, motivated by hatred, to kill, maim and terrorise, and 
the making and planting of explosives showed premeditation.  Such a crime, if committed after 
2003, would have fallen well within Schedule 21 (4).  The trial judge and the Lord Chief 
Justice both recommended 30 years, but the Secretary of State did not consider the case, 
hence the referral to the High Court. 
 
The reviewing judge regarded it as a case of exceptional gravity on the grounds of what the 
trial judge had written to the Secretary of State.  He had no doubt that the appropriate starting 
point would be a whole life order.  However, as this was part of the transitional arrangements 
of the 2003 Act, he had first to consider what sentence the Secretary of State was likely to 
have imposed, and not to exceed that figure (to avoid any breach of Article 7 (1) of the 
Convention).723  He noted the advice in Sullivan that the best guide to what would have been 
the practice of the Secretary of State was the Practice Directions.724  He, however, also 
quoted Lord Chief Justice Woolf’s observation:  ‘As has been made clear by the Secretary of 
State, in the most serious cases he tended to select a higher figure than that indicated by the 
judiciary.’ 725 
                                                     
723 This view is in contrast to earlier judgements when prisoners, if informed of their tariff, could not have 
them subsequently increased to avoid a breach of Article 7 (1) .  
724 See Appendix D 
725 Sullivan para 27, quoted in para 13 
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He had no difficulty in applying Schedule 22 to this case, concluding, that in the light of these 
precedents, he was able to take as the starting point a whole life order.  He regarded 
Copeland’s age (22) as a mitigating factor, but did not refer to the aggravating factors given to 
the Home Secretary.  Instead of a whole life order, he imposed a minimum term of 50 years. 
 
In this case the prisoner’s age when the offences were committed was regarded as a factor in 
the selection of the ‘starting point’.  This is in contrast to the decision in Coonan, that a whole 
life order could not be reduced to take account of exceptional behaviour in prison.   
 
 
Allitt  [2007]  EWHC 2845 (QB) 
The same judge, Mr Justice Burnton, who had set Copeland’s term at 50 years, conducted the 
review of  Allitt .  Allitt had been convicted in 1993 of the murder of four children, the 
attempted murder of three others and grievous bodily harm with intent of six other children in 
the hospital where she was a nurse.  She received life sentences on all counts, but the 
Secretary of State had not set the tariff before the 2003 Act took effect. 
 
Allitt at her trial had pleaded not guilty, and so the defence of diminished responsibility was not 
practicable.  The reviewing judge, however, having considered all the medical evidence 
provided for the trial and subsequently (which included evidence of a sadistic nature), was 
satisfied that Allitt was suffering from an abnormality of mind at the time the crimes were 
committed.   In contrast to Coonan, he thought it right not to consider a whole life order that 
would otherwise be appropriate.  
 
Controversially, he continued  ‘Since the Home Secretary, having had a lengthy opportunity to 
do so, did not determine that Ms Allitt should have a whole life tariff, for the purposes of 
paragraph 8(b) of Schedule 22 I find it impossible to arrive at the position he would have been 
likely to do so.’ 726   This is an unusual, if not unique, interpretation of that part of the statute.  
As has been seen, the High Court in 2010 did, in fact, impose a whole life order for 
Coonan/Sutcliffe despite his conviction being in 1981 and despite the fact that the Secretary of 
State had not then set a tariff. 727   
 
The Practice Directions 728 are then referred to, including Lord Woolf’s observation that the 
Secretary of State in the most serious cases had, on a number of occasions, set a higher tariff 
than that recommended by the judiciary.   Mr Justice Burnton considered that if the Home 
Secretary had made a determination it would have been 40 years.  He rejected that to 
increase the term beyond the 30 years recommended by the trial judge and the Lord Chief 
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Justice would breach Article 7(1).   He said that the progress made by the offender since her 
imprisonment was not exceptional, and therefore the term could not be reduced on that 
ground.  In the end, he accepted the submission made for Allitt that it would be wrong to 
increase the recommendation of the ‘experienced trial judge who heard the evidence in the 
case and was in the best position to assess the seriousness of her offences and that of the 
eminent Lord Chief Justice.’ 729   
 
Therefore he ordered that the early release provisions were to apply after 30 years.   
 
 
Ayre  2010 730 
There is no record of this case on the database.  The information is derived from his QC’s 
Chambers’ website.  
 
In 2006, Ayre pleaded guilty to serious sexual offences against a 10 year old boy.  At the time 
he had been released on licence, following a mandatory life sentence for a murder in 1985.  
The judge sentenced him to a discretionary life sentence and declined to set a minimum term.  
This meant, of course, that there would be no Parole Board review and that he would serve a 
whole life term. 
 
The Court of Appeal quashed the sentence on the grounds that it had been imposed not only 
for punishment and deterrence but also because of the risk he posed.  The assessment of risk, 
of course, is the responsibility of the Parole Board.  The Court of Appeal substituted a 
discretionary life sentence with a minimum term of 10 years. 
 
Ayre was the only prisoner at that time serving a whole life order upon a discretionary life 
sentence.  Ayre’s QC commented on his Chambers’ website  ‘it will be more difficult in the 
future for judges to pass whole life tariffs in discretionary cases’. 731 
 
Certainly, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial judge’s refusal to set a minimum term 
was wrong in that he had taken risk and dangerousness into account,  However, the decision 
also reinforced the position that whole life orders were only to be made in regard of crimes of 
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6.6        Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with a consideration of the political context in which judges were applying 
those sections and schedules of the CJA 2003 concerned with the whole life order.  It 
illustrated how the flood of legislation concerning criminal justice, which created a large 
number of new offences, did not abate.  Nor did Blair’s criticism of the criminal justice system.  
It was suggested that the CRA 2005 and the creation of the Ministry of Justice were examples 
of the prime minister’s obsession with top down reform.  Certainly, it was clear that the 
judiciary were not involved in the early stages of either change.  However, most commentaries 
regard the HRA 1998 and the CRA 2005 as significant, positive developments.  
 
The executive’s concern with the attitude of the media continued and led, for instance, to 
clashes with the judiciary over comments on the judge in Sweeney, despite the Constitutional 
Reform Act.  More significant was the long running disquiet between the government and the 
judiciary concerning anti-terrorism legislation, with the judiciary upholding due process.  This 
resulted in even greater tension between the judiciary and the executive.  However, judicial 
concerns about losing discretion in respect of sentencing must have been allayed by the Lord 
Chief Justice’s statements that Schedule 21’s Guidelines were exactly that: guidelines.   Their 
concerns were probably further allayed by Mr Justice Burnton’s sentencing decisions. 
 
It was in this context that cases concerned with the compatibility of the whole life order with 
both the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 and the ECHR, especially Article 3, 
but also Articles 5 and 7, were decided.  By 2010 there was considerable clarity.  In a series of 
appeals, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had rejected claims that the whole life 
order breached the European Convention.  They reiterated that they did not like the mandatory 
life sentence for murder; but that it was not an irreducible life sentence.  Further, they upheld 
the view that for the most heinous of crimes a whole life order (ie a sentence with no minimum 
term) could be justified on the grounds of punishment and deterrence. 
 
The cases illustrate the care which judges, especially at appeal, considered the degree of 
seriousness in cases.  For a whole life order, the offence had to be of ‘exceptionally high 
seriousness,’ 732 There was a care, therefore, that there should be proportionality in setting the 
minimum term of imprisonment, following the imposition of a mandatory life sentence, and that 
disproportionality must be avoided.733 
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In 2010, there was a widespread belief that the whole life order was facing its final challenge.  
Since 2003, a series of cases had clarified the terms of the sentence and a series of 
challenges had been seen off.  It was evident by 2010 that the only recourse for those with 
whole life orders was application to the ECtHR with a view to the Court determining that a 
whole life order breached Article 3 of the ECHR.  This chapter is concerned with the key 
application of Vinter, Bamber and Moore to the ECtHR and with a significant domestic case, 
Oakes.734  If the Strasbourg ruling requires a review mechanism, then the form of that 
mechanism will be of concern.  Any review mechanism will raise, among other issues, how to 
predict, with any confidence, the risk posed to the public by any released offender.  This issue 
will also be examined.  
 
The attitude to the ECtHR and ECHR of the judiciary, politicians, the media and the public will 
also be explored as this would affect the context of any government action necessitated by an 
unfavourable determination in Vinter, Bamber and Moore.  Respondents’ views on the 
sentence are considered, views which raise the question of the understanding and 
acceptability of the whole life order’s sentencing purposes: retribution and deterrence.  
 
 
7.2 Vinter, Bamber and Moore trials in the domestic courts 
 
These three men were tried, sentenced and had their sentences considered by the Court of 
Appeal for separate crimes; then all three applied to Strasbourg.    The ECtHR accepted and 
conjoined their applications.   It, therefore, seems appropriate to treat the domestic cases 
together.   
 
 
Vinter [2009] EWCA Crim 1399 
 
Douglas Vinter was tried in 2008 for the murder of his wife, and found guilty.  There was no 
submission in mitigation and the trial judge imposed the mandatory life sentence.  He 
concluded that a whole life order was appropriate as Vinter had been found guilty of a murder 
                                                     
734 [2012] EWCA Crim 2435  
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in 1996 and had served nine years of a life sentence.  The Court of Appeal noted the evidence 
of premeditation, kidnapping and the intention to cause death, and dismissed the appeal.  
 
 
Bamber [2008] EWHC 862 (QB) and [2009] EWCA Crim 962 
 
Jeremy Bamber is probably the best known of the three men and not simply because of his 
conviction in 1986 for the killing, for financial gain, of five members of his family, including two 
small boys.  Uniquely among those serving a whole life order, he has continued to maintain his 
innocence, building a wide network of support.  His case has been kept before the public by 
his application to ECtHR over access to the media and by his three applications to the Criminal 
Case Review Commission.   
 
In 1988, the Home Secretary set a whole life tariff, after the trial judge had recommended a 25 
year minimum and the LCJ had said he would never release him.   In 2008, Bamber sought 
judicial review of his tariff.  The judge noted the recommendations made to the Home 
Secretary and Schedule 21 (4)’s lists of crimes of exceptionally high seriousness, and imposed 
a whole life order.     
 
The first ground of appeal was the interpretation of the LCJ’s recommendation.  The Court of 
Appeal determined that the LCJ had indeed recommended a whole life tariff.  The second 
ground of appeal was that the imposition of a whole life order breached rights under ECHR 
Article 3, in that no court had the power to review a whole life sentence and, therefore, it was 
reducible neither de jure nor de facto.  It was maintained that the power of compassionate 
release of the Secretary of State under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 section 30 was 
extremely limited, and that no prisoner with a whole life tariff had been released under this 
power.  Kafkaris was cited by the applicant, but the court asserted that in Cyprus the 
mandatory order (of life imprisonment) was not subject to any form of judicial discretion and 
the sentences did not, and could not, reflect the differing levels of culpability of those convicted 
of murder and the varying levels of gravity of all such cases.735   In other words, the Court of 
Appeal was drawing attention to the potential lack of proportionality in such sentences in 
Cyprus. 
 
The court considered that a whole life order was ‘not the consequences of an inexorable 
statute but a judicial decision, subject to review in this court, that the circumstances in a 
particular case are so grave that a whole life order should be imposed’.736  It went on to quote 
Lord Phillips in Bieber.  In respect of Wellington, attention was drawn to the opinion of the Law 
Lords that an irreducible life sentence, imposed to reflect the requirements of punishment and 
                                                     
735 para 29 
736 para 32 
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deterrence for a particularly heinous crime, did not conflict with Article 3.  It was asserted 
‘These decisions bind us.  The Grand Chamber does not.’ 737  Therefore, the appeal, on the 
grounds of infringement of Article 3, was rejected. 
 
Finally, it was contended for Bamber that the review procedure created by the CJA 2003 
constituted a breach of his rights under Article 7 (prohibiting retrospectivity).  This ground of 
appeal was rejected, as the Act explicitly prohibited the review process from increasing the 
sentence. 738  The judgment, therefore, concluded that punishment and retribution in the form 
of a whole life order was fully justified.739   The court did not consider a point of law of general 
public importance was involved and application to the House of Lords was refused.740  
 
 
Moore  [2008] EWHC 1163 (QB) 
 
In 2002, the Home Secretary set a whole life tariff for Peter Moore, who had been convicted of 
four murders in 1996.   Moore applied for judicial review in the terms of Schedule 22.  The 
applicant’s arguments that Article 7’s principle of non- retrospectivity had been breached was 
rejected, as this was prohibited in Schedule 22; and the claim under Article 6, that the Home 
Secretary lacked independence, was rejected as the current hearing was to determine whether 
the early release provision would apply.  The challenge in respect of Article 3 and/or 5 on 
grounds of arbitrariness and disproportionality was rejected:  the tariff could be increased or 
decreased having regard to the aggravating or mitigating features in the case.  The judge 
imposed a whole life order.  Moore appealed the judgment, which was dismissed by the Court 
of Appeal, and so no application to the House of Lords on a point of law could be made. 741   
 
 
7.3 Minority opinions at the ECtHR 
 
Earlier in this study, it was noted that there were minority opinions in Kafkaris and Léger.   In 
Kafkaris, the minority asserted:  
 
It is commonly accepted nowadays … that beside the punitive purpose of 
sentences, they must also encourage the social reintegration of prisoners …. 
Most legal systems provide for the possibility of reviewing life sentences and of 
granting release after a certain number of years.  742   
 
                                                     
737 para 31 
738 para 37 
739 para 40 
740 [2012] ECHR 61 para 21   In interview, Edward Fitzgerald drew attention to the Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division’s reluctance to grant such certificates and as a result, the only recourse was to apply to 
the ECtHR. 
741 This information is derived from ECtHR judgment [2012] ECHR 61 paras 27-28 and appears to be the 
only record of the case.   
742 This minority opinion regretted the lack of references to comparative law.  Chapter 5.2 of this study 
considered the position in other jurisdictions.  
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Clearly, this opinion raises the question, if only by implication, whether imprisonment for the 
whole of life is a legitimate sentence.  In a concurring opinion, the British judge wrote that he 
considered that the time had come for the court to affirm clearly that the imposition of an 
irreducible life sentence, even on an adult offender, is in principle inconsistent with Article 3 of 
the Convention.    
 
In the opinion dissenting from the striking out of Léger’s application to the Grand Chamber 
following his death, the minority highlighted what they felt was a missed opportunity to 
consider, under Article 5, the difficult question of the lawfulness of the applicant’s continued 




7.4 Vinter, Bamber and Moore at the ECtHR 
 
7.4.1 The Sectional Chamber:    
 [2011] ECHR 324 (Statement of Facts);   [2012] ECHR  61 (Judgment)  
 
The applications of Vinter, Bamber and Moore were conjoined and the parties were asked a 
series of questions: 744 
 
Article 3 
• Does the imposition of an irreducible life sentence violate Article 3 or does any 
violation only occur later? 
• Is a whole life order an irreducible life sentence within the meaning of Kafkaris? 
• Does de facto reducibility require the possibility of both compassionate and 
conditional release?  
Article 5 (4) 
• Is the possibility of release for a prisoner with a whole life order only at the discretion 
of the Secretary of State compatible with this Article? 
Article 7 
• In respect of Bamber and Moore, did the making of whole life orders by the High 
Court violate the principle of non-retrospectivity protected by this Article? 
 
The judgment of the Chamber recounted the trials and appeals in English courts of the three 
men; the law in England; decisions in English courts relevant to the application; and then 
considered the situation in other jurisdictions with a special focus on proportionality. 745  In the 
judgment, the question of whether a whole life order breaches Article 3 is central to this study.  
                                                     
743 19324/02 para 7 
744 Listed at conclusion of [2011] ECHR 324 
745 Information on five cases, mentioned by ECtHR but not previously considered in this study, is given in 
Appendix F 
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The ECtHR found the complaints in terms of Articles 5(4), 6 and 7 ‘manifestly ill-founded’.746  
They did, however, consider whether a whole life order breached Article 3.  Having paid 
particular attention to Bieber and Wellington, the Chamber considered whether a grossly 
disproportionate sentence would violate Article 3, and at what point an Article 3 breach might 
arise.  The Chamber accepted that, in principle, matters of appropriate sentencing largely fell 
outside the scope of the ECtHR, but a grossly disproportionate sentence could breach Article 3 
when it was imposed.  It considered, however, that following the comparative materials, gross 
disproportionality was a strict test.   
 
On the second issue, the Chamber distinguished three types of sentence:  first, in terms of a 
life sentence with eligibility for release after a minimum term, it considered that such a 
sentence was reducible and so no issue arose under Article 3;   second, a mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; 747  third, a discretionary 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole.    The Chamber considered an Article 3 issue 
could not arise when this third sentence is imposed, and agreed with Bieber and Wellington 
that an Article 3 issue will only arise when it can be shown:  
 
 i) that the applicant’s continued imprisonment can no longer be justified on any  
  legitimate penological grounds (such as punishment, deterrence, public  
  protection or rehabilitation); and  
 ii) as the Grand Chamber stated in Kafkaris …the sentence is irreducible de facto and 
  de jure. 
 
Discretionary whole life orders, the Chamber noted, were not subject to later review: release 
could only be obtained on compassionate grounds.  The Secretary of State’s power on 
compassionate release was narrower than that available in Cyprus, and could conceivably 
mean that a prisoner could be kept in prison even if it could not be justified on any legitimate 
penological grounds.  It was noted that the earlier practice of review after 25 years was not 
included in the CJA 2003.  Such a review would enable the Secretary of State to satisfy 
himself whether imprisonment continued to be justified on legitimate penological grounds.  
Finally, the Chamber doubted whether compassionate release close to death could be 
considered release at all. 
 
Turning to de facto reducibility, the Chamber believed the issue did not arise in these cases:   
‘The Court notes that the applicants have not sought to argue that their whole life orders were 
disproportionate in their case.  Given the gravity of the murders for which they were convicted, 
the Court does not find they were’. 748  
 
                                                     
746The reasoning of this is discussed in Appendix G 
747 This sentence does not exist in England. 
748 para 95 
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The judgment in respect of Article 3 was a majority one: 4 to 3.  The point at issue for the 
minority was whether the need for a possibility of revisiting a whole life order required that 
there should be in place a ‘suitable mechanism …so as to lend credence to the existence of 
such a possibility, and thus offer a measure of hope to the convicted person’. 749  The minority 
disagreed with the determinations in Bieber and Wellington that an irreducible life sentence 
can be upheld as compatible with Article 3.  They were, therefore, unable to accept that ‘the 
absence of an Article 3 problem’ justified the lack of a release mechanism. They continued: 
 
The Article 3 problem does not consist merely in keeping the prisoner in 
detention longer than would be justified … Kafkaris shows that it consists, 
equally importantly, of depriving him of any hope for the future, however 
tenuous that hope may be. 
 
The minority found that Article 3 had been breached.   
 
Perhaps the most striking part of the determination was the concurring opinion of Judge de 
Gaetano, who expressed surprise that the government had not relied on the Royal 
Prerogative of Mercy.  He referred to Shields and the Report of the Ministry of Justice,750 and 
thought that the residual Prerogative Power of Mercy, ‘much wider and more flexible than the 
Presidential power … of the Constitution of Cyprus,’ was applicable.  ‘That being so … one 
cannot speak of an irreducible life sentence or a life sentence without any prospect of release 
as understood in Kafkaris.’  
 
In essence, the disagreement within the Chamber comes down to this question: are there 
some crimes that are of such a high degree of seriousness that the only just sentence is 
imprisonment for the whole of life, or should everyone, no matter what they have done, have 
the hope that at some time in the future they may be released?  This is clearly a vital question 
in the interpretation of the ECHR and it is therefore not surprising that the decision was then 
subject to an appeal to the Grand Chamber.  
 
 
7.4.2 Appeal to the Grand Chamber  
 
In April 2012, lawyers for the applicants applied for the case to be referred to the Grand 





                                                     
749 The dissenting opinion is not paragraphed numerically. 
750 See Appendix H 
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• there was a need for a mechanism for review of sentences in place at the time of the 
imposition of sentences; 
• the availability of a mechanism to determine the continuing proportionality of detention 
was necessary to render the sentence reducible; 
• the UK (sic) position was out of step with Europe.  751 
 
The application was granted and in a letter of August 2012 752 the parties were asked to 
address the questions: 
 




• Was the Chamber correct to distinguish a life sentence with eligibility for release, a 
discretionary sentence of life imprisonment and mandatory life sentence without 
parole? 
• Whether an issue cannot arise when such a sentence is imposed but only when 
continued imprisonment cannot be justified on any legitimate penological grounds 
(such as punishment, deterrence, public protection or rehabilitation); and the sentence 
is irreducible de facto and de jure. 753 
 
 
7.5 Oakes  [2012]  EWCA Crim 2435 
 
Although the Strasbourg decision is expected to be critical to the future of the whole life order, 
unexpectedly, a domestic appeal, heard in December 2012, proved to be extremely germane 
to the European appeal.    
 
This case consisted of appeals by five men given life sentences on conviction.  Four of the 
appellants had mandatory or discretionary life sentences with whole life orders.  The fifth had 
been sentenced to mandatory life with a minimum term of 30 years.  Clearly, it is unusual for 
appeals from five men for different offences to be heard together.   Equally unusual was the 
composition of the Bench: the Lord Chief Justice;  Lady Justice Hallett, Vice President of the 
Queen’s Bench Division;  Lord Justice Hughes, Vice President of the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division;  Lord Justice Leveson; and Lady Justice Rafferty.   The determination noted that this 
                                                     
751 Letter from solicitors to ECtHR 12 April 2012 
752 Letter from ECtHR 7 August 2012  
753 Some of the issues raised in answer to these questions are considered later in this chapter 7.9 
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was a ‘special constitution’ of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. 754  There was, however, 
no explanation for this.  Legal reporters in the media expressed the view that the grouping of 
these cases, and the bench of five senior judges, was intended to ‘signal to Europe that this 
country’s courts are satisfied with the validity of “life-means-life” terms’ 755 and ‘to clarify the 
sentencing of the most serious criminals before Strasbourg examined the issue’.756   Edward 
Fitzgerald, who represented one of the applicants, said in interview for the study that he 
thought the judges wanted an opportunity to give a definitive ruling made by senior judges so 
that Strasbourg would understand the reasoning.   
 
Three of the appellants had been convicted of murder and two of multiple rapes and 
associated crimes.  The court emphasized that each man was dangerous, and likely to remain 
so for the indefinite future, but that the appeals were concerned solely with the judicial 
assessment of the minimum term to be served as ‘punishment and retribution’.   
  
On behalf of one of the appellants, it was argued that, despite previous determinations, his 
whole life order breached Article 3.  The court asserted that every civilised country accepted 
just and proportionate punishment and continued: ‘The assessment of what should be deemed 
to constitute just punishment or inhuman or degrading punishment in a particular circumstance 
can legitimately produce different answers in different countries’. 757   The court noted that, 
however judicial views differed, the whole life minimum term was incorporated ‘in express 
legislative terms in the 2003 Act.  This statutory provision reflects the settled will of 
Parliament.’ 758 
 
The court then considered the judgment in two cases in Strasbourg:  Harkins and Edwards 759 
and Babar Ahmed .760   Strasbourg had accepted in principle that matters of appropriate 
sentencing largely fell outside the scope of the Convention, but that a grossly disproportionate 
sentence could amount to ill treatment contrary to Article 3 at the moment of its imposition.   
However, gross disproportionality would only be met on ‘rare and unique occasions’.  
 
From this examination of case law, the Court of Appeal concluded that:  
 
The whole life order, the product of primary legislation, is reserved for the few 
exceptionally serious offences in which, after reflecting on all the features of 
aggravation and mitigation, the judge is satisfied that the element of just 
punishment and retribution requires the imposition of a whole life order.  If that 
conclusion is justified, the whole life order is appropriate: but only then.  It is not a 
mandatory or automatic or minimum sentence. 761 
                                                     
754 para 1 
755 The Independent  22 November 2012 
756 BBC Online 21 November 2012 
757 para 6 
758 para 12 
759 Application number 9146/07  
760 Application number 32650/07 
761 para 29 
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The individual appeals can be considered more briefly.   
 
David Oakes had been found guilty of the torture and murder of his former partner, and the 
murder of his daughter after she had been forced to watch the torturing of her mother.  The 
trial judge, in terms of Schedule 21(4), made a whole life order.  The appeal was dismissed. 
 
 Kieran Mark Stapleton had been found guilty of the murder of a total stranger on a public 
street.  The trial judge imposed a 30 year minimum sentence.  Stapelton’s  lawyer criticised the 
judge for taking account of aggravating factors - that the killing took place in a public place and 
an element of planning was involved - and of failing to take account of mitigating factors of 
youth and a psychological condition.  The appeal was dismissed.   
 
Danilo Restivo was found guilty of murder and given a whole life order.  Leave to appeal 
against conviction was refused.  He had been found guilty of murdering a neighbour, then 
mutilating her body, knowing that her teenage children would find her.  Restivo had been found 
guilty, in his absence, of a murder of a girl in Italy, with similar mutilation.  The trial judge took 
this into account when making a whole life order.  The Court of Appleal did not regard trial in 
absentia as equivalent to trial and conviction by a jury.  The trial judge should, therefore, not 
have taken into account the Italian trial.  Restivo had to be sentenced in accordance with the 
transitional arrangements of Schedule 22.  The court took account of the same aggravating 
factors as the trial judge and substituted a minimum term of 40 years for the whole life order.   
 
Michael John Roberts had many previous convictions before he was found guilty of burglary, 
rape and grievous bodily harm in respect of three elderly women.  He was given a 
discretionary life sentence and a whole life order made.  The crown accepted that a whole life 
order was inappropriate. The court substituted a minimum term of 25 years.  
 
David Martin Simmons had been found guilty of rape and false imprisonment, after earlier 
convictions for indecent assault and robbery.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but the 
judge did not specify any minimum term.  The crown agreed that a whole life order was 
inappropriate.  A minimum term of 10 years was substituted.  This judgment concluded, as 
with previous ones, ’we suspect that his release is most unlikely’.762  
 
The determination also reaffirmed: 
The whole life order is reserved for the most exceptional cases.  Without 
suggesting that the court is prohibited from making a whole life order unless 
the defendant is convicted of at least one murder, such an order will, 
inevitably, be a very rare event indeed.763 
 
                                                     
762 para 112 
763 para 102 
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The Court of Appeal accepted that a whole life order could be made following a discretionary 
sentence of life imprisonment but, not only did they say that such a sentence would be a very 
rare event indeed, in Oakes they quashed the whole life orders on the two men given 
discretionary life.  Earlier, Ayre had had his whole life order on his discretionary life sentence 
similarly quashed. 764  These would appear to be the only instances of discretionary life 
sentences with a whole life order taken to the Court of Appeal.   
 
As has been seen, the Court of Appeal paid considerable attention to the appropriateness of 
whole life orders before considering the five appeals.  All five men were regarded as 
dangerous, and their release could not be contemplated unless and until they were assessed 
as posing no serious risk to the public.  Such a determination was not for the judiciary.  The 
Appeal Court’s task was focused on whether the sentences imposed by the trial judges were 
proportionate (or at least not grossly disproportionate) to the crimes committed, and whether 
they were in accord with the principles of Schedule 21 of the Act.  Once again, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed that a whole life order was only appropriate in the very rare cases identified in 
Schedule 21 (4).  
 
One newspaper interpreted the determination as a message to the European Court: ‘Butt out 
of our business; if we want to bang people up for life, that's our choice.’ 765   Whatever the 
accuracy of this interpretation, the Court of Appeal used Oakes to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the whole life order and to ensure that the order would be applied only in the very few cases 




7.6 Awaiting the Vinter, Bamber and Moore ruling:  public attitudes  
 
If any successful challenge puts the future legitimacy of the whole life order in serious doubt, it 
will be up to politicians to decide on the way forward to meet Strasbourg’s requirements.  They 
will do this whilst being very aware of the need to reassure a public considered fearful of crime.  
Academics have discussed the concept of contemporary public anxiety.  Hutton uses the 
expression ‘narrative of insecurity’, whereby people talking of street crime, being anxious over 
drug use or the risk of random violence by strangers, create the feeling that crime is a 
problem.  As a result, they want law, order and security as a necessary part of their culture. 766  
King and Maruna have studied social aspects that affect public punitive attitudes and the 
implications of wider insecurities about a nation’s future.  Their findings bolster social research 
that associates punitiveness with reactions to social change. 767    Faulkner writes of the fear,  
                                                     
764 See above Chapter 6.5.4 
765 The Guardian 5 December 2012 Hattenstone and Allison  
766 Hutton (2005):250  
767 King & Maruna (2009):65 
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and sometimes anger, often focused on crime, felt by the British public, and reflecting a society 
that has become less tolerant of risk and more suspicious of difference. 768   
 
Several respondents for the study, unprompted, raised this issue.  The former Director General 
of NOMS believes that Britain no longer feels cohesive and safe.  He sees the country as 
urban and very mixed and, having lost faith in religion, citizens turn instead to tough criminal 
justice decisions to keep them safe.  He contrasted Britain with France and Italy, which he 
feels still retain social cohesion.  The Chief Executive of the Howard League, contrasted 
Britain with Norway, especially how Norwegians and their media cope better with high profile 
killers, citing the example of Anders Breivik and of an earlier killing by two young boys that 
closely resembled the killing of James Bulger.  In both cases, in Norway there was neither 
public frenzy nor media demands for vengeance.   Coincidentally, members of the Prison 
Governors’ Association also contrasted Britain with Norway, saying that, unlike the civilised 
way in which Brevik’s murderous episode was treated in the media and by the public, in Britain 
you would have had hysteria in the media and demands for the death penalty by the public.    
The only respondents for the present study who were specifically asked about how secure the 
public feel, were the group of retired police detectives, because of their regular interaction with 
the public.   A minority, less than a third, thought the public felt more secure and had more 
faith in the criminal justice system because of, they believed, improved forensic technology 
and because of increased transparency in the system.  The large majority thought that the 
public felt less secure and had less confidence in the criminal justice system.  They gave 
examples of the public claiming that the EU had eroded English laws;  the HRA seeming to 
favour the offender not the victim; the judiciary being too soft;  and crime always increasing.   
These respondents felt the public were ill informed, and many mentioned the part played by 
the media’s inaccurate reporting of crime rates in encouraging fear.    
 
This view of the media’s influence echoes Snacken, who wrote 769 of how criminological 
literature over the previous decade has drawn attention to increased or new punitiveness in 
western countries during the past 20 or 30 years, with many examples of increasing 
imprisonment rates, harsher sentencing and expressive forms of punishment.  She 
acknowledges the link between increased levels of punitiveness and an increased influence of 
tabloid views and public emotion. The reporting of homicide in the media and its effect on the 
public has been well documented.770   Earlier in this study it was seen how reaction to the 
Bulger murder demonstrated the interaction of the media, the public and politicians.  Little 
appears to have changed, as an examination of more recent events shows.  Such an 
examination helps to predict how the public and media would react to any attempt to ‘soften’ 
the whole life order.   
                                                     
768 Faulkner (2007):136 
769 Snacken (2010):273-4 
770 For example, Peelo et al (2002); Peelo et al  (2004);  Reiner (2007)  
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When Venables, convicted of child murder, breached his parole in 2010 and was returned to 
prison, fevered speculation in the media about his whereabouts risked his safety and his 
anonymity.  The Director of the Prison Reform Trust talked of shrill headlines and the whipping 
up of public fear over mere presumptions.  She claimed these benefited no one: neither the 
victims, the offenders nor those working in criminal justice. 771  The media and public uproar 
was very similar to the original reaction when Venables was on trial.   
 
The media coverage of the riots in English cities in summer 2011 can also be seen as an 
example where apparent lack of social cohesion and civil unrest can increase public anxieties.  
Again, striking visual images in the media played their part.  Just as the images of a blond 
Myra Hindley or a young James Bulger being led to his death became icons of evil, the image 
of a woman having to jump for survival from a building set alight deliberately in the riots was 
used by the media to project an image of social disorder and peril.  The Guardian worked with 
researchers from the LSE to analyse the sentences imposed on the rioters.772  The Report 
raised concerns about the harshness of sentencing, which had been lauded in many tabloids.   
Later research by Roberts and Hough 773 found that the public had a perhaps surprisingly 
mixed reaction to the sentencing.  In the case of non-violent offending during the riots, for 
example, they found the courts were much more punitive than the public would have been.  In 
some cases, the respondents had viewed non-custodial sentences as appropriate, when the 
courts had imposed custodial sentences.   Politicians however, appeared to feel the need to 
reassure the public, with Eric Pickles, the Communities Secretary, saying that tougher 
sentences deservedly showed that there are consequences to disorder.  He felt that the public 
would be alarmed if rioters got off with ‘just a slap on the wrist’. 774  The MP Gavin Barwell also 
defended the sentences, saying that he was sure his constituents wanted courts to ‘get tough 
on rioters’.775 
 
Some members of the judiciary appeared to confirm that harsher than usual sentences would 
prevail, with Judge Gilbert stating that such outbursts of criminal behaviour must be met with 
sentences longer than they would have been in a non-rioting situation. 776   Six months after 
the riots, the Chairman of the Sentencing Council for England and Wales told the House of 
Commons Justice Committee that judges were fully within their rights to impose tough 
punishment on rioters.  He acknowledged that judges might have been influenced by TV 
footage of the riots. 777   Unusually, the attitudes of the press and the judiciary appeared to 
coincide. 
                                                     
771 Reported in The Independent 6 March 2010 under the headline ‘Media gets blame for Venables 
‘witch-hunt’’.  
772 Reading the Riots Supported by Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Open Society Foundations .  It 
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774 In interview on Radio 4’s Today Programme 17 August 2011 
775 Reported in The Guardian 30 January 2012 
776 ‘While sitting in Manchester Crown Court.’  Reported in The Guardian 30 January 2011 
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The two examples - the August 2011 street riots and the recall to prison of John Venables - 
demonstrate that the pattern of the past appears still to exist, with media headlines and 
emotive images seeking to influence the public.   Reiner cites Simon Lee, who argued that ‘the 
media are no longer, if ever they were, observers of the scene, they are players in the 
game’.778   Reiner argues that media representation exaggerates the threat of crime and 
promotes policing and punishment as the antidote. 779   Tonry has blamed the Labour 
Government led by Tony Blair for having encouraged this, accusing them of playing a 
dangerous game by increasing public anxieties and fears through repeatedly talking of crime 
levels requiring radical responses even when, in reality, crime rates were falling.780  As this 
present study has shown, this approach did not start with New Labour, as previous 
Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s had prioritised law and order issues, but it 
cannot be denied that New Labour’s series of criminal justice Acts and its stress on the right of 
victims’ justice over offenders’ justice, raised the emphasis on law and order issues to a new 
height.781     
 
Certainly, the results appeared to be an increasing wariness of crime and a hostility to 
anything that appeared to be a weakening of approach to offenders.  An additional interesting 
example of this relates to an Irish-English comparison.  Griffin and O’Donnell, while examining 
life sentences and parole in the Republic of Ireland, comment that the popular punitiveness 
that characterises politics and media in the UK is largely absent from the politico-media in 
Ireland.782  This is echoed by O’Donnell and Jewkes, who contrast the reaction in Irish media 
with that in the UK over the temporary release of prisoners during the Christmas period.  They 
find that Irish reporting is sympathetic to the interests of the prisoners whilst in Britain, the 
media concentrate on the risk of recidivism by pampered prisoners, and promote notions of 
victims and offenders: the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ citizens. 783 
 
The examples of media coverage point to the likelihood of a negative reaction to an ECtHR 
ruling that the whole life order breaches the human rights of those serving the sentence.  It 
takes little effort to imagine headlines of ‘Mass murderers to walk free’ or ‘Europe unlocks 
prison doors for child murderers.’    
 
Gauging potential public reaction to any indication of a perceived weakening of sentencing in 
the case of the whole life order is also helped by examining formal surveys of public opinion.  
Over the past two decades, surveys 784 have found the public to be both critical of sentencing 
and ill informed on sentencing policy, sometimes as a result of being misinformed by the 
media.  When the public is more knowledgeable of the process, opinions are more nuanced 
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784 See for example,  Hough (1996); Roberts & Hough (2005); Roberts et al (2009) 
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and less punitive in nature.  Most surveys over the period have concluded that the public 
deserves to be given access to more accurate information about sentencing.  Indermaur et al, 
however, found that any change in public opinion as a result of additional information was 
short lived. 785  There is evidence, nevertheless, that the public, even  with misconceptions of 
sentencing, differentiate between crimes of varying seriousness and decide what constitute the 
‘worst’ crimes. 786  
 
A recent study sought to ascertain whether the public was opposed to any alternative to the 
mandatory life sentence for murder and, specifically, if the public accurately understood its 
operation.787   The findings echoed those of previous surveys:  a large majority erroneously 
believed that the murder rate had risen in recent years; perceptions were systematically biased 
towards seeing sentencing practice as more lenient than it is;  and there existed a lack of 
accurate and detailed knowledge of release mechanisms for convicted murderers.  The 
conclusion was that the public’s misunderstanding and lack of knowledge about murder and 
the mandatory life sentence were significant.  However, of specific relevance to this study was 
the finding that the public differentiated between degrees of seriousness of murder. 788  When 
presented with nine different murder scenarios, the public was offered five sentencing options, 
including imprisonment for the offender’s natural life.  The authors of the research found it 
significant that in eight of the nine scenarios approximately only one third of the respondents 
believed that a natural life sentence was appropriate.   For this current study on the whole life 
order, the statistics should be considered differently.  In one scenario, just over half of the 
respondents felt a natural life sentence was appropriate and in four other scenarios 
approximately a third felt it appropriate.  In three further scenarios, between 14 % and 24% felt 
it an appropriate sentence.    It is striking, therefore, that in the eight scenarios, significant 
numbers (14% to 52%) of the respondents judged that a sentence with no release nor review 
was appropriate, yet, on examination of the scenarios, none of the crimes outlined would be 
given a whole life order if taken to court.  Under Schedule 21’s guidelines the most likely terms 
would have starting points of 15 or 30 years.  This provides further evidence that, for what are 
deemed heinous crimes, the public, although more nuanced than commonly thought, still 
prefers harsh punishments and feels that the whole life order is not only acceptable, but 
appropriate.  When the crime is even more heinous than those used as scenarios in the 
above-mentioned research, the public’s reaction is even stronger.  For example, in a YouGov 
survey following the trial of Ian Huntley, found guilty of murdering two schoolgirls in Soham,  
91% of respondents expressed the view he should receive a whole life order and never be 
released. 789 
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The conclusion can surely be drawn that, in general, the media and the public would be 
suspicious and probably hostile to the idea of offenders with whole life orders being successful 
in any appeal against the sentence on human rights grounds.  Some of the respondents for 
this study commented on likely public reaction.  A part time judge thought the ‘public outrage 
would be huge’.  Michael Howard, the former Home Secretary, echoed this and said there 
would be ‘outrage at such a European intervention’.  The current Home Secretary said there 
would be a ‘public outcry’ and David Blunkett, the former Home Secretary, felt there would be 
a ‘major reaction.’  Lord Pannick felt it would lead to ‘a major row.’   Simon Hughes agreed that 
there would be strong resistance to Europe interfering, and that elements of the media would 
predictably ‘shout’ but predicted that parliamentary reaction would be tempered, and with 
sensible advice from Law Officers and parliamentary committees, the issue could be resolved 
well.   Lord McNally, speaking as a Justice Minister, said that  the official position was that the 
government would ‘argue strongly and fight vigorously,’ and in due time would make a decision 
about action.   
 
 
7.7 Attitudes to Europe 
 
The Vinter, Bamber and Moore appeal against the whole life order has an additional 
dimension which might well prove significant when assessing the likely public, media and 
political reaction to a successful appeal:  the decision will be made by a European Court.  The 
hostility to ‘Europe,’ evinced by elements of political parties, the media and the public, is 
reflected in reactions to court interpretations of the ECHR that they regard as inimical to their 
perception of UK interest. 
 
In 2005, the ECtHR ruled that the disenfranchisement of prisoners breached ECHR Article 3 of 
Protocol No 1.  Recognising, but also stimulating, public reaction, the Labour government set 
up a public consultation exercise that seems to have been a delaying tactic.  No action was 
taken before the 2010 General Election, and David Cameron, now prime minister, expressed 
hostility to the court decision and said it made him ‘physically ill to contemplate giving the vote 
to anyone in prison,’ but pointed out that if the law was not changed prisoners could seek 
compensation.790  In November 2012, it was announced that the government would put 
forward options for scrutiny by a committee of both Houses.  The three options were a ban on 
voting:  for prisoners serving a sentence of four years or more; for prisoners sentenced to 
more than six months imprisonment; for all convicted prisoners.  The last is a restatement of 
the existing ban.  The government will consider the recommendations and introduce a Bill as 
soon as possible thereafter. 791  Appeals by prisoners are pending in both domestic courts and 
at the ECtHR. 792  
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When the prime minister commented on the ‘strange decisions’ and ‘very odd and perverse 
judgments handed down by Strasbourg’ 793 and restated his determination not to succumb to 
the ‘dictat’ of the ECtHR, 794 this was greeted with delight by the Daily Mail, which claimed his 
approach would work wonders to restore his battered fortunes.795  The newspaper had earlier 
called for MPs to regain control of ‘OUR laws’, 796 and The Sun expressed constitutional 
concern about ‘barmy human rights laws and rulings from unaccountable judges at ECtHR’.797  
       
In 2010, the UK Supreme Court determined that the human rights of convicted sex offenders 
were breached if their names were kept on the Sex Offenders Register without the possibility 
of review. 798  The government moved to modify the procedure, despite the uproar of the ‘red 
top’ papers, with, for example, The Sun using the headline ‘Perverts’ Charter,’ and quoting the 
Home Secretary’s comment during an emergency debate that the decision ‘places the rights of 
sex offenders above the rights of the public to be protected’. 799   
 
The Economist in the same month cited the Daily Mail’s usage of ‘unelected judges from small 
countries’ to describe those making decisions in Europe, and said that the problem facing the 
government was that ‘the tiger of anti-European populism has been well and truly unleashed 
and may prove hard to re-tether’. 800  Certainly, similar issues have emerged with other ECtHR 
decisions.  In January 2012, the Court ruled that the radical Islamic cleric Abu Qatada should 
not be deported by Britain to his native Jordan. 801  The Daily Express published an article 
headlined ‘Ignore European Court and Deport Abu Qatada Now,’ which stated, ‘The only 
people who want Abu Qatada belong to a court outside this country whose wonky judgment 
should make us wonder whether they are any more desirable than the terrorists to whom they 
give hope’.802  
 
Perhaps in response to the anti-European feelings,803 the government raised the possibility of 
a British Bill of Rights, and repealing or amending the HRA which enshrines ECHR in domestic 
law.  The Commission on the Bill of Rights was set up in 2011 to consider this. 804  When the 
Commission reported in December 2012, two members wanted withdrawal from the 
Convention; two wanted the status quo; the remaining five members wanted change but came 
to no agreement on the form it would take.  It was decided unanimously that any decisions 
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should be postponed until after the Scottish referendum on independence in September 
2014.805  In the House of Commons, when discussing the Commission’s Report, Chris 
Grayling, Justice Secretary, said that although the original Convention was laudable, the 
ECtHR had ‘moved further and further away from the goals of its creators’. 806  He believed this 
was an issue which had to be addressed.  In reply to a question over the government’s 
commitment to ‘defending the House from the creeping usurpation of the democratic power by 
the Strasbourg Court,’ Grayling responded he could give ‘an absolute commitment.’ 807 
 
Although anti-European feeling in Britain is not new,808 the polarisation of opinion on the 
question of the HRA and ECHR has deepened with, for example, the Deputy Prime Minister 
saying that the HRA ‘in words of one syllable is here to stay,’ and the Home Secretary having 
said she wanted it to go. 809  However, in interview for this study, her concern was about the 
respect for the sovereignty of parliament, and with the way, in her view, some judicial 
decisions appeared effectively to make law, and not simply interpret it.   In the light of 
increasingly hostile comments by Conservative MPs and the attitude of the ‘populist press’ and 
‘the angry popular reaction to rulings of ECtHR’, 810 it is perhaps not too surprising that the 
British president of the ECtHR very unusually wrote an article publicly defending the Court and 
the ECHR. 811   
 
The attitude to Europe, expressed in relation to the terms of the ECHR and the ECtHR, of 
members of the legal profession and of those in the government with legal responsibilities has 
been in the main much more tempered than that of elements of the media and backbench 
Conservative MPs.   The attitude of the Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, at least in his 
address to Lincoln’s Inn on 24 October 2011, 812 was more positive.  He asserted that there is 
no question of the UK withdrawing from the Convention: ‘The United Kingdom was the first 
country to ratify the Convention …. The United Kingdom will not be the first country to leave 
the Convention’.  He then referred to the first of the terms of reference of the Commission, and 
continued that the government was not intending to limit or erode the application of any of the 
rights or freedoms in the ECHR, including the right of respect for family life.   He continued, 
however, that the Home Secretary had pointed out that Article 8 is not an absolute right.  This, 
he said, was the classic balancing exercise inherent in many of the Articles in the ECHR.  
Drawing attention to the language of HRA Section 2, he stated that the British courts must 
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‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; they are not bound by it. 813  He quoted 
with approval the evidence of the LCJ to the House of Lords Constitutional Committee: ‘I 
myself think it at least arguable that, having taken account of the decisions of the court in 
Strasbourg, our courts are not bound by them. … In most cases we would follow them, but not, 
I think, necessarily’.   
 
Prior to the establishment of the Commission on the Bill of Rights, judges were expressing 
views on the ECHR and ECtHR to colleagues in the legal profession.  The most outspoken 
criticism was Lord Hoffman’s lecture to the Judicial Studies Board in 2009.814  He thought that 
at the level of abstraction, human rights might be universal, but at the level of application, 
these rights are national.  Their application, he felt, required trade-offs and compromises, 
exercises of judgment that could only be made in the context of a given society and its legal 
system.    It seemed to him ‘perfectly acceptable’ to adopt the text of the ECHR as a UK 
constitutional instrument.  However, he attacked the ECtHR with its right of individual petition 
and did not believe that the margin of appreciation went far enough.    In contrast, Lady Justice 
Arden, in her address to Lincoln’s Inn the same year, took a more measured approach. 815  
She asserted that a European court was needed, with ultimate authority to interpret ECHR, 
and this had considerable advantages for UK as it subjected the institutions of the state to 
outside scrutiny.  This was particularly important because of the strong doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.   There was a problem, however, in the way the HRA Section 2, 
with its obligation to ‘take into account’ the ECtHR jurisprudence, had been interpreted.  She 
believed that English courts should not in any event be expected to apply jurisprudence from 
another source without having investigated its reasoning.  There was an opinion, she thought, 
that the majority of courts in the other contracting states did not take the view that they were 
effectively bound by Strasbourg jurisprudence.   
 
In evidence to the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights on 15 November 2011, the 
then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, along with the LCJ, responded to a 
question whether UK courts had been too strict in following ECtHR case law.   Lord Phillips 
expressed the view that the courts had been too strict and Lord Judge agreed vehemently. 816  
The latter continued that most of the decisions of the ECtHR dealt not with principles, but with 
facts, and he regarded that as not a precedent for anything.  As a means of reducing the 
number of applications to the ECtHR they both thought that the Court should only deal with 
points of broad principle, and that individuals should require permission to make an 
application. 817 
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In general, then, among the legal profession there is little criticism of the ECHR, but the ECtHR 
has received criticism.  Some of this, as has been seen, is of a technical/administrative nature 
but there are concerns about the reach of the court, and a view that the principles of 
subsidiarity and margin of appreciation should be extended. 818 
 
However, it is hard to come to any view other than that, as far as the general public and many 
politicians are concerned - certainly when examining the more recent cases, such as those 
relating to Abu Qatada and prisoners’ votes -  The Economist’s  ‘tiger of anti-European 
populism’ has existed for some time and remains un-tethered.  Any successful appeal against 
the UK government, relating to the whole life order would, almost certainly, be greeted with 
outrage by a large section of the media and the public.     
 
 
7.8 Respondents’ comments on the whole life order 
 
One area of inquiry was felt to be central to the study, so was discussed at most interviews: 
the acceptability and the justification of the whole life order.  As detailed in Chapter 1, the 
respondents fell into distinct groups: prisoners and those with professional knowledge of 
prisons; the police; members of the judiciary and lawyers; and politicians.   Because a 
sentence with no hope of release for the remainder of life can be considered to have moral or 
ethical implications, views were also sought from faith groups and the Humanist Society. 
 
Of those with knowledge of prisons, the former Chief Inspector of Prisons acknowledged that 
sentencing was all about punishment, but argued strongly that hope should not be removed.  
She accepted, however, that the question of public protection meant that certain offenders 
would remain in prison indefinitely, until death if necessary.  The former Director General of 
NOMS, felt the ‘rightness’ of the sentence was a moral question and not one for prison 
authorities to address: prisons cannot refuse admission to anyone.  He did feel that, to some 
extent, a whole life sentence was little different from a sentence of 30, 40 or 50 years: no one, 
in or out of prison, can think or plan that far ahead.   He thought it was possible to judge when 
a prisoner was no longer a risk to society and so safe to be released, but that it was an issue 
influenced by the public and politicians.  Two members of the Prison Governors’ Association 
agreed with this view.  They felt that politicians wanted the public to know they took society’s 
abhorrence of certain crimes seriously.  The whole life order itself might not be necessary, with 
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A released lifer argued against the whole life order on the basis of the unfairness of a sentence 
meaning very different things to a 25 year old and to someone many decades older.   He 
accepted that some prisoners would have to remain in prison because of their dangerousness 
and the risk to public safety, but thought that they were a very small group and most offenders 
could, in fact, be contained safely in the community.   Jeremy Bamber, who is serving a whole 
life sentence, was opposed to the sentence’s retributive justification (‘revenge justice is never 
good justice’), but acknowledged that continuing dangerousness could mean some offenders 
would remain in prison for the rest of their lives.  He stressed that hope should never be 
removed, as it is an essential dimension of human dignity and underpins the protection of 
human rights.  Removing hope could lead to despair and depression.   Frances Crook, Chief 
Executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform, also argued strongly for compassion to be 
shown, especially at the end of life, but did accept that on the grounds of dangerousness a few 
people would have to spend ‘pretty much’ the rest of their life in custody in order to protect the 
public.   
 
As seen, most of this group stressed the importance and need for all prisoners to retain a 
sense of hope of release.  All these respondents talked of dangerousness and the need for 
continuing detention, until death if necessary, for prisoners who posed a danger to the public.  
No one differentiated a retributive justification from that of public protection.    
 
A group of almost 50 retired police detective officers answered written questions on the whole 
life order.  All but one felt the sentence was a legitimate and acceptable sentence.  The one 
who disagreed did so because the sentence could cause security issues for prison authorities.  
When asked about the justification, many gave multiple answers, citing retribution, deterrence 
and public safety.  Of those who only gave one justification: public abhorrence was given by 
one; retribution by four; and public safety by twenty-two.  Two senior members of the 
Metropolitan Police were interviewed.  Both supported the whole life order, but from different 
perspectives.   The Deputy Assistant Commissioner supported it on retributive grounds.  The 
nature of the crime and the nature of the offender were sufficient to justify imprisonment for 
life.  Rehabilitation was important but, for some, this would have to be within prison.  She 
added that most of this group of offenders were not just bad, but also dangerous, and she 
would not like public safety to be at risk.  Her colleague, a Commander, supported the 
sentence on the grounds of public protection.  Although retribution for crime was obviously 
needed, life-long detention could only be justified by a continuing risk to public safety.   
Periodic review might be possible, but any continued dangerousness ruled out release.  
 
All but one of the 50 retired detective officers, and both the serving officers, agreed on the 
need for the whole life order.  The Deputy Assistant Commissioner was clear in supporting a 
retributive justification for the sentence but, like all the other officers, felt public protection was 
vital.  Almost all of the others felt public protection was the major justification.  
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A part time judge defended the whole life order for some offenders, on the grounds not only of 
retribution, but also public safety.  He accepted that there was undoubtedly an issue about the 
difference in time served by a 25 year old and a 55 year old who received the sentence, but 
felt that, primarily, the evil nature of the crime had to be addressed.  The senior judges 
interviewed, understandably, acknowledged the statutory justification of retribution and 
deterrence.  All judges were ‘comfortable’ imposing the sentence as long as the crime fell 
clearly within the guidelines.  They accepted there was statutory legitimacy for the whole life 
order, and the judicial role was to apply it.  Lord Phillips felt that judges were the right people to 
decide on retributive sentences because of their experience, knowledge and objectivity.  
Certain crimes of extreme wickedness justified the whole life order, as long as the crimes were 
not on the margins of the guidelines, but were crimes where no one could consider anything 
but a ‘sledgehammer’ sentence.     
 
A group of three lawyers, interviewed together, thought that public safety was the justification 
for retaining people in prison with no hope of release.  In their view, this was the main 
justification, more so than punishment or deterrence.  This was despite the respondents 
acknowledging that these two elements are the only statutory justification.  Two QCs, with 
extensive experience of cases involving whole life sentences, both disapproved of such 
sentences.  Lord Pannick felt there has to be an acceptance that people can change, even 
those who commit ‘grisly’ murders.  He saw no justification in a whole life order.  He admitted 
that occasionally there is a case where it is difficult to think that release would ever be 
possible, but for the sake of fairness and justice, everyone should have the right to a review 
after a period of time.  He was aware at times of public confusion over sentencing, but felt the 
public could be far more flexible on sentencing than politicians gave them credit for.   Edward 
Fitzgerald also disagreed with whole life orders.  He felt strongly that there must be an 
allowance for the fact that people can change over a period of imprisonment.  The prospect of 
a review would act as motivation for prisoners to reform and to make exceptional progress in 
prison.  He returned to this later in the interview, when he stressed that character can change 
over time and such a change was more likely to occur in those convicted of politically 
motivated crimes.  He argued that the whole life order was not illogical or immoral; rather it 
was a humanitarian issue.   
 
Although the groups related to prisons and the police appeared on the whole to have similar 
views to each other, the judges and the lawyers differed significantly.   There was no indication 
that the judges were critical of the whole life order, either on legal or other grounds.  On the 
other hand, all the lawyers were much less comfortable with the sentence while accepting that 
there would be some people who, on public protection grounds, would never be released.  The 




So far, the respondents whose views have been considered are from groups with a 
professional or direct concern with criminal justice.  It might be expected any opposition to the 
whole life order would have its core in ethical or faith groups, because of their belief in the 
powers of remorse and redemption.  The Church of England’s Bishop for Prisons accepted 
that a penalty had to be paid as punishment for crime, but that evidence of remorse, 
redemption and repentance must be rewarded with release, unless there was an element of 
public endangerment.  The leader of the Catholic Church in England, through his spokesman, 
said that for the common good, legitimate proportionate punishment was acceptable. 
Punishment could have a successful ‘medicinal effect’ and the offender could be ‘corrected’.   
If, however, the crime was so grave that it warranted whole life detention and, importantly, if 
society could only be protected by this sentence, then a whole life order was acceptable. The 
Hindu Forum felt that any form of punishment or imprisonment was a form of reformation, but 
also stated that, as long as a person constituted a risk of serious harm to others, it was in 
society’s interest to continue to confine them.  The spokesman for the Humanist Society 
justified any punishment only on the basis of deterrence.  No hope of release, as in a whole life 
order, was felt to be retributive and should be suppressed.  Offenders convicted of heinous 
crimes, however, if not mentally ill, should be confined to protect the public and only 
considered for release when no longer dangerous.    
 
All faith groups stressed the need to encourage rehabilitation and redemption, but as with the 
prison and police groups, the respondents stressed the importance of the need for public 
protection as a justification for the need for any continued incarceration.   It is perhaps 
surprising that the faith groups did not oppose the whole life order more forcefully on ethical 
grounds.    
 
In the main, politicians supported the whole life order.  Not unexpectedly, the current Home 
Secretary, Theresa May; Lord McNally, a Minister for Justice; and the Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve, all accepted the sentence as a legitimate penalty on the basis of retribution 
and deterrence.    Lord McNally had full confidence that the judiciary would ensure the right 
people would be given a whole life order.  He was aware of the importance of the sentence’s 
role in promoting deterrence and retribution, but in addition felt it should also aim to achieve 
public protection and public reassurance.  The public had to have confidence in the criminal 
justice system and so certain offenders needed to be kept incarcerated.  The current Home 
Secretary also stressed the retributive nature of the sentence but, like Lord McNally, said that 
the public deserved to feel safe, and that was an important role for the government.  The 
former Home Secretary, David Blunkett, felt strongly that the vast majority of offenders 
deserved a second chance, but for those committing the most heinous crimes a whole life 
sentence was justified on the grounds of retribution.  He felt the sentence was necessary in 
order to provide clear, logical and consistent penalties.  It was important for democracy that  
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those who were elected should be allowed to decide sensitive issues like the whole life order.  
He saw it as part of a pact with the public that strong law and order provision would safeguard 
their security.  Like Lord McNally, Simon Hughes expressed confidence in the judiciary in their 
sentencing of crimes of high seriousness.  He stressed the need for due process and 
objectivity and the need for tabloid pressure to be ignored.  He accepted that there would be a 
small number of cases - perhaps ten to twenty - when crimes were so horrible there could be 
no mitigation, and these offenders should remain in prison for life on the grounds of retribution 
and deterrence.  They had to be, for him, the exceptions.   
 
The group of politicians interviewed, in contrast to the other groups, indicated support for the 
whole life order on the grounds of retribution and deterrence.  The politicians acknowledged 
the need for public confidence in the criminal justice system, so argued that there should be a 
clear, enforceable, judicially-led system that the public could have faith in.   
 
All respondents, across the groups, accepted that a very few offenders would never be 
released.  The politicians and the judiciary were firm in their acceptance of the whole life 
order’s justification in terms of retribution and deterrence.   Both groups recognised the 
importance of maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system.  From the context in 
which these remarks were made, it seems that the whole life order was regarded as a 
necessary element in retaining public confidence.   All other respondents were less supportive 
of the sentence.  They acknowledged that some people would undoubtedly remain in prison 
for the remainder of their lives.  This was, however, justified primarily on the grounds of public 
safety.   Indeed, all groups emphasised the importance of public protection, whether 
expressed in these terms or in terms of public confidence in the criminal justice system.  The 
unexpected response was the frequent stress on dangerousness and the need to keep 
prisoners who were a continued risk to the public incapacitated, if necessary for the rest of 
their lives.  
 
 
7.9   Legal options 
 
In interview for this study in February 2013, a QC with extensive experience of ECtHR 
believed that the decision of the ECtHR Grand Chamber on Vinter, Bamber and Moore’s 
appeal would not be imminent because of the importance and sensitivity of the subject.   
Moreover, he felt that if the Grand Chamber was going to overturn the Sectional Court’s 
decision, the interval between the oral hearing (November 2012) and the decision could be a 
year or more.   
 
It must be presumed that the Grand Chamber will determine whether or not the whole life 
order is a legitimate sentence in relation to the ECHR.  Predictions are varied.  All politicians 
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interviewed for this study appeared optimistic about the result.  The lawyers and judges 
interviewed were more cautious about the outcome. A leading QC, for example, thought the 
Grand Chamber would agree with the previous minority opinion.  The group of three lawyers 
believed the lack of review would ‘probably kill the sentence,’ while senior judges would be 
‘slightly surprised’ if Vinter, Bamber and Moore won.     
 
It is possible to regard the Grand Chamber as having in essence two options:  first, to rule that 
the whole life order, as it currently stands, does not breach Article 3;  and second, that on the 
grounds that hope should not be denied to any prisoner, a sentence of imprisonment for the 
whole of life with no review breaches the Article.   The position could be complicated if the 
decision is not clear-cut.  Kafkaris, for example, has been described by Lord Phillips, in 
interview for the study,  as a ‘fudge’ and he regarded the issue as having been dodged.   As a 
result, Kafkaris, when it has been deployed in appeal cases in England, has caused 
difficulties for the judges, as has been seen earlier in this study.   If the final judgment is 
heavily qualified, there is a real possibility of further court cases.   
 
Another uncertainly is that there is a ‘margin of appreciation’ in the application of the ECHR:  
It is to a certain extent for the states to determine which measures they take to 
make sure that the convention rights are respected.  If different rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR collide, the member states have a degree of 
discretion when deciding which of the rights they prioritize.  This margin is given 
both to the domestic legislator and to the bodies, judicial amongst others that 
are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force.  The margin of 
appreciation doctrine does not, however, give states free hand to do as they 
please.  The European Court of Human Rights scrutinizes whether they have 
exceeded the limits of their discretion and whether it is still ensured that the 
rights enshrined in the Convention are protected effectively.819 
There is also the principle of subsidiarity: that national authorities of member states have the 
principle responsibility for guaranteeing and protecting human rights at a national level.   
 
It would seem that in Oakes, the statement ‘what constitutes just punishment or inhuman or 
degrading punishment in a particular circumstance can legitimately produce different answers 
in different countries’ 820 is an assertion that the whole life order is, or should be, regarded as 
within the margin of appreciation.  This interpretation gathers credence from the case made 
by the government to the Grand Chamber: 
 
The domestic courts have consistently held that the provisions in relation to 
whole life orders are compatible with the Convention and the Court’s case law.  
It is submitted that this is an area of penal policy which justifies a margin of 
appreciation. 821 
 
                                                     
819 ECHR Introduction Section 2       www.echr-online.com 
820 [2012] EWCA Crim 2435 para 6 
821 para 59 
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A clear-cut opinion favouring the government would mean there is no need for legislation.  It 
might not, however, resolve the issue in the long term.  The ECHR is regarded as ‘a living 
instrument’: ‘The rights enshrined in the Convention have to be interpreted in the light of 
present day conditions so as to be practical and effective.  Sociological, technological and 
scientific changes, evolving standards in the field of human rights and altering views on 
morals and ethics have to be considered when applying the Convention.’ 822  The effect of this 
on the ECtHR can be seen in the judgment in Stafford, which overturned the Wynne823 
judgment :  ‘While the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is 
in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not 
depart, without cogent reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases.’ 824   A clear 
statement from the court, favouring the government, might not, therefore, bring the 
controversy of whole life sentences to a final conclusion.   
 
If the Grand Chamber’s decision is against the government, it may well be based on the 
position adopted by the minority in the Sectional Chamber.  That is, that all prisoners should 
have hope, however tenuous, that they might in the future be released.  If they are to have 
hope, it follows there must be a mechanism to consider their possible release.  It is of interest 
to consider what form this could take and what measures the government would adopt to 
comply with the ruling.  
 
The question of who should consider release can be approached under two heads: as a 
function of the executive or as a function of the judiciary.  In respect of the former, the 
Secretary of State for Justice has powers to release a prisoner on compassionate grounds. 825  
This has been narrowly interpreted. 826   The second executive power that would enable 
release of a prisoner is the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.  As has been seen in the 
consideration of the Sectional Chamber’s findings, one judge expressed surprise at the lack of 
reliance of the government on this power.  As Appendix H shows, there is both still a residual 
power and a court case that exemplifies it.  Despite the positive view expressed by this judge, 
the government made no reference to the power in the submission to the Grand Chamber.  
The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that the Law Officers have no intention of 
making further use of it. 
 
In interview, Lord Phillips did not believe that either the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 Section 
30 or the Royal Prerogative provided a long term solution to the issue of a review mechanism, 
not only because they are executive powers, but also because their application is too narrow. 
However, in Bieber 827 he had argued that, since the Secretary of State, as a government 
                                                     
822 ECHR Introduction Section 4   www.echr-online.com 
823 [1994] ECHR 24 
824 [2002] ECHR 470 para 68 
825 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 Section 30 (1)   See Appendix I 
826 Prison Service Order 4,700 
827 [2008] EWCA  Crim 1601 
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minister, was required to comply with the Convention, there was nothing to prevent a prisoner 
from seeking judicial review if he considered that the Secretary of State had not used his 
power to release if continued imprisonment constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.  While 
there is no known application of this point, the government, in its observations to the Grand 
Chamber, drew attention repeatedly to this in order to argue that the whole life order is 
reducible:   
 
As a matter of English law, when exercising his power, the Secretary of State 
must act compatibly with the Convention.  As the Court of Appeal observed in 
Bieber, if continued detention is held to amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment, there is no reason why the Secretary of State should not exercise 
his power to release the prisoner.   Moreover, the decision of the Secretary of 
State may be challenged by way of judicial review and on Convention 
grounds. 828 
 
There is no reference here to the power of the Secretary of State being circumscribed by the 
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 Section 30.  Instead, the government asserts that, under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the Secretary of State must act in accordance with the Convention.   
If, therefore, the Grand Chamber were to accept the government’s argument, it might, of 
course, provide a long-term solution. 
 
The second approach to the question of who should consider the release of prisoners is that it 
is akin to a sentencing role and therefore should be carried out by a ‘tribunal’ 829 which could 
be judicial or quasi-judicial (the Parole Board), but independent from the executive.   For the 
minority in the Chamber, the prisoner should always have hope of release.  This position, as 
has been seen earlier, is a requirement in jurisdictions as widespread as Germany and 
Namibia.  The minority gave no indication of what criteria should be used to assess whether 
hope of release could be realised.  However, in Oakes, the determination noted that the 
Sectional Chamber, when considering a discretionary life sentence without parole, had stated 
that an Article 3 issue would only arise when continued imprisonment could no longer be 
justified ‘on any penological grounds (such as punishment, deterrence, public protection or 
rehabilitation).’ 830   
 
These grounds, however, raise further questions for any review system. 831  The whole life 
order is seen as just punishment in terms of retribution and deterrence for crimes of 
exceptionally high seriousness. The task of the trial judge is to assess the relative seriousness 
of the offence.  The youth, if relevant, of the offender is taken into account in the selection of a 
starting point. 832  However, the likely life expectancy of the offender is not regarded as a 
                                                     
828 para 68   Also referred to in paras 6, 35 and 66 
829 ECHR Article 5(4) 
830 [2012] EWCA Crim 2435 para 16 
831 But it may be recalled that the German criminal justice system does provide for such wide ranging 
reviews.  
832 CJA 2003 Schedule 21  
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relevant consideration.  There is no reference to this factor in either the Act or in any of the 
guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council.   As a senior judge put it, when asked in 
interview, if there was a problem in sentencing a 30 year old to a whole order compared to a 
60 year old, ‘No, it is the characteristics of the crime that matter and these are permanent’.   It 
has been argued in the papers submitted to the Grand Chamber for Vinter, Bamber and 
Moore that: 
 
If it be the case that a whole life sentence can be appropriate for 
retribution and deterrence because of the seriousness of the offending, it 
is difficult to see how the element for retribution could change. 
It is the balance of penological justifications for and against continued 
detention which must be in issue.   Other issues of deterrence, public 
protection and rehabilitation are prone to change and may ultimately 
outweigh the original retributive tariff.  833 
 
It follows from this argument that if the balance of penological justifications may change over 
time leading to possible gross disproportionality, there is therefore a need for some form of 
review.  However, in the government’s paper to the Grand Chamber, it was asserted that 
reviews were discontinued in the 2003 Act, as one of its objectives was to ‘judicialise decisions 
on appropriate terms of imprisonment.  The decision is made by the judge at the time of 
sentencing’. 834 
 
Life-long imprisonment, on the basis of retribution and deterrence alone, has been criticised 
by academics. Van Zyl Smit has argued that, in Europe, irreducible life sentences are 
unacceptable because they deny the possibility of prisoners to reform sufficiently to enable 
them to become responsible members of society.  He refers to an emerging European 
consensus that the human rights of individuals sentenced to life imprisonment require that 
they, too, be prepared for release.  The rules governing release should, he thinks, be 
sufficiently flexible to allow release on the grounds that the offender is now ‘demonstrably 
capable of living in a free society without posing a danger to others’.835   Hodgkinson noted 
that neither the Council of Europe nor the United Nations conceded the possibility of whole 
life sentences, but they agreed that ‘some life sentenced prisoners may never be deemed 
safe for release’.836    
 
While the whole life order as established in the 2003 Act remains, the question of risk to 
public safety is not an issue: with the sentence having no review or release, no assessment of 
future risk is required.  If changes to the sentence are proposed, for whatever reason, then  
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835 van Zyl Smit (2010):46  
836 Hodgkinson, Gyllensten and Peel (2010)   
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the issue of possible future offending will have to be faced. :837  The concern for public 
protection was reflected in s225 in CJA 2003 when sentences of Imprisonment for Public 
Protection (IPP) were introduced.838   Although IPPs are not in themselves within the scope of 
this study, the practical, ethical and political issues relating to them, and to the assessment of 
future risk, would be relevant if assessment of dangerousness becomes an aspect of any 
replacement for, or amendment to,  the whole life order.  It has long been a controversial 
subject.  One contentious aspect is the extent to which accurate, reliable assessments of 
future dangerousness can be achieved.  The other main contentious aspect is whether it is 
morally or ethically right to incarcerate on the basis of predicted possible future crimes.   
 
The broad categories of assessment used – clinical and actuarial – have come under scrutiny.    
Jacobson and Hough state that actuarial methods are proven to be superior to clinical 
methods of risk assessment, although there are various well documented shortcomings related 
to the former.839  Ansbro, while concluding that actuarial outperforms clinical assessment, also 
states that there are caveats.  Actuarial tools can be transparent, consistent and unbiased but 
are not sensitive to the infinite range of individual idiosyncrasies, and do not identify the rarer, 
but often graver, risks.  Clinical assessment, he argues, can use knowledge, skill and wisdom 
but can also be biased and prejudiced. 840   Lippke acknowledges the increasing accuracy of 
actuarial assessment, but argues its limitation on the basis of the focus on historical or 
sociological characteristics of offenders, and that it does not consider offenders’ moral 
capacities or their action when faced with specific choice. 841   
 
Von Hirsch, over the years, has modified his views on predictive assessment.  He accepts that 
methods of assessing future risk have become more accurate and reliable, but still argues that 
whereas earlier predictive studies showed rates of eight false positives for every true one, later 
studies still show two false positives for every true one. 842  Other academics accept the two in 
three chance of false positives but argue, as Morris does, that it is still ethically and socially 
desirable to take such predictions into consideration in judicial and legislative decisions, as 
long as clinical predictions have actuarial back up. 843  Although optimism does appear to exist 
over the increasing accuracy of predictive assessment of dangerousness, risk assessment 
might never be more than a ‘judgment of probabilities,’ 844 and concerns expressed over 30 
                                                     
837 This has a long history: The Prevention of Crime Act 1908 (based largely on the Gladstone 
Committee’s finding) introduced a term of up to ten years to be added to the imposed sentence on the 
grounds of preventing future reoffending.  This was replaced in the Criminal Justice Act 1948 by an 
extended – rather than an additional – term as a form of preventative detention.  Later legislation, 
Criminal Justice Act 1967, allowed the judiciary to extend a sentence in view of an offender’s record. 
838 The provisions were amended in S13-18 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and finally 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 declared that IPPs could only be 
imposed on offenders convicted before 3 December 2012.  
839 Jacobson & Hough (2010) 
840 Ansbro  (2010):253f  
841 Lippke  (2008)   
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843 Morris (1998)  
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years ago in the Floud Report 845 remain relevant.   Among the concerns raised was the 
difficulty in defining dangerousness and the problems of the accuracy of instruments by which 
future dangerousness could be assessed.  It also raised the issue of the political notion of 
public alarm and the political identification of certain kinds of actions as being dangerous.  
 
Holmes and Soothill argue that, despite the Floud Report raising doubts, these issues were not 
resolved in CJA 1991, which permitted preventative sentences in certain cases.846  Ashworth 
and von Hirsch, in their criticism of the sections of the Act relating to dangerousness, argue 
that proportionality is at risk, as proportionate sentences are designed to reflect the offender’s 
blameworthiness, whereas sentences based on prediction have no such foundation.  They feel 
that only within tightly circumscribed limits could prescriptive restraint be considered fair, and 
they discuss Bottoms and Brownsword’s concept of ‘vivid danger’ as a basis of such 
restraint.847  They believe that the degree of seriousness of any potential crime has to be taken 
into consideration, along with its potential frequency and immediacy.  Of importance is also the 
certainty that such crimes might take place.    
 
In addition to all the concerns expressed about assessment instruments, an additional problem 
when dealing with those with a whole life order is the very small number involved.  Jacobson 
and Hough point out: ‘The application of group level data to individuals - especially when the 
group data relate to very rare occurrences, such as incidents of serious violence - necessarily 
gives rise to errors including both false negatives and false positives.’   Few groups of 
dangerous offenders are likely to be as small in number as those who have attracted a whole 
life order.  
 
While many of these issues relate to the sentencing stage, they also have a relevance to the 
Parole Board’s role.   A panel of the Parole Board, in addition to risk assessments, have 
available to them detailed reports from prison staff and in-depth assessments of responses to 
offender behaviour programmes.  The ECtHR, in reviewing case law in England, noted that in 
Jones the Court of Appeal had stated that it was the task of the Parole Board to ensure that 
the offender was not released after serving the minimum term  ‘unless this presented no 
danger to the public’.848  The Parole Board has to assess ‘whether the lifer’s level of risk to life 
and limb is considered to be more than minimal’. 849  The number of prisoners sentenced to a 
whole life order because they had been convicted of a previous murder conviction 850 raises 
questions about the accuracy of the Parole Board’s assessments, which would be of greater 
significance if it was given responsibility for conducting reviews of notorious whole life order  
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848 [2012] ECHR 61 para 42 
849 Directions to the Parole Board under Section 32(6) of the CJA 1991  Introduction (4)  
850 See Chapter 5 
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prisoners.   Sir David Latham, the then chairman of the Parole Board, in an interview with the 
Guardian 851 on the eve of Jon Venables’ hearing in 2010, said: 
 
Society needs to realise that we can’t create a world that is free of risk.  What 
society has to determine, is what level it is prepared to accept.  I’m concerned that 
the society we’re presently living in, is becoming too risk averse. 
 
The interview concluded by Sir David saying that if Parole Board members felt they were being 
pilloried if they made a mistake, their decision making was bound to change.   Whether in the 
light of these views, it would be acceptable to the public, sections of the media, and politicians 
for the Parole Board to be given the task of conducting reviews of whole life order prisoners is 
a moot point. 
 
Of possible future concern, with regard to ECHR Article 5, is whether the Parole Board is an  
‘independent tribunal’.  Technically it is an Executive Non Departmental Public Body, but it is 
not immune from government influence.  Under section 32(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, 
the Secretary of State has the power to issue Directions to the Board.  In 2006 John Reid, then 
Home Secretary, addressed the Parole Board.   Frances Crook of the Howard League was 
present, and in her blog was scathing about his attitude.852   In interview, she said she believed 
this was responsible for the drop in the percentage of prisoners getting parole. Latham, in The 
Guardian interview, also confirmed that Reid’s 2006 intervention had a significant effect on 
release rates.   However, the issue of whether the Parole Board is an ‘independent tribunal’ 
was raised in Brooke.853  The judgment declared that the ‘present (organisational) 
arrangements…do not demonstrate its objective independence of the Secretary of State as 
required both by both English common law and Article 5(4) ECHR’. 854  The Court of Appeal 
dismissed an appeal by the Secretary of State.  The government response was to set out a 
consultation document 855 to consider how best to meet the criticism in the judgment.  The 
Parole Board called for it to remain an independent body, but with sponsorship transferred to 
HM Courts Service.  Following the 2010 General Election, Kenneth Clarke, as Justice 
Secretary, said that any decision on the Board’s future would not be taken in isolation, but 
would be ‘in the broader context of the sentencing review.’ 856   
 
In light of the potential problems with these mechanisms of review, an alternative approach to 
the whole life order would be to give judges power to set minimum terms to reflect the 
seriousness of the crime, with no upper limit.   Kenneth Clarke, while Secretary State for 
Justice, introduced a Green Paper in which he regarded the provision of Schedule 21 as being 
                                                     
851 Reported 31 March 2010 
852 ‘Most open ended sentences in Europe’ March 12 2009  Available: 
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Annual Report 2010-11 
856 Parole Board Report 2011-12   The government’s proposals following the review are still awaited.  
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unnecessarily prescriptive.857  858  There is, however, no indication of what he, or his 
successor, would propose.  Even within the provisions of Schedule 21, judges have been able 
to impose extremely long minimum terms: for instance Restivo’s whole life order was replaced 
on appeal by a minimum term of 40 years, and Copeland received 50 years rather than a 
whole life order because of his youth.859  Such judicial discretion, with no upper limit, if 
formalised, would bring England into line with Scotland where, as discussed earlier, it was 
declared that not only could a minimum term in excess of 30 years be imposed if justifiable, 
but also that there was no bar to setting a minimum term in excess of the offender’s life 
expectancy.  Such a change would enable judges to focus on the circumstances of the crime 
and the offender, including his age.  This would preclude appeals on the grounds of gross 
disproportionality of continuing imprisonment after many years. 
 
Vinter, Bamber and Moore, as this chapter has shown, highlights issues regarding the 
justification for the punishment of crimes of exceptionally high seriousness, and the 
pressures the government will be under from the public, the media and groups of their own 
members of parliament in the event of an unfavorable decision by the ECtHR.  The case at 
the Grand Chamber will not lead to any automatic unlocking of the prison doors for Vinter, 
Bamber and Moore, even if the decision favours them. 860  Indeed, it may be some time 
before questions over the whole life order are fully resolved.    
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The research questions for this study seemed straightforward: the whole life order’s genesis; 
the challenges its application both faced and posed; and whether the sentence has a future.  
Much of the data collection involved analysis of parliamentary debate, examination of court 
cases both domestic and in Strasbourg, sentencing guidelines, sentencing practice in other 
jurisdictions, and prison policies.  These are familiar territory for research but for this study 
they were examined with particular focus on the whole life order.  What became apparent very 
quickly was that, although the core focus was narrow and specific, the scope of inquiry was 
wide, as the whole life order’s genesis and subsequent application not only, unsurprisingly, 
touched on different political, legal and societal issues but was fundamentally affected by 
these issues.     
 
This concluding chapter will not revisit the examination of the crucial appeal of Oakes, where 
the determination expressed with the greatest clarity, the domestic interpretation of the 
legitimacy and the appropriateness of the whole life order.  The crucial Vinter, Bamber and 
Moore appeal, awaiting judgment at Strasbourg, will take a view on the legitimacy of the 
sentence in terms of the ECHR.  The implications of this were dealt with in the previous 
chapter.   
 
Instead, the conclusion will summarise the political-societal and judicial-executive context 
awaiting this ECtHR decision, before turning to key issues that have emerged from the study.  
The whole life order sentence is examined in the light of penological justifications.   A 
consideration of the extent to which the sentence is a sentence apart is followed by the 
discussion of issues that arise from the serving of a life-long sentence.  The scrutiny, or lack of 
scrutiny, of these issues by politicians and by academics is reflected on.    
 
Most discussion of respondents’ views has been incorporated in earlier chapters, however in 
view of David Blunkett’s role as the architect of the CJA 2003, it was felt appropriate to give 
further attention to his views in the conclusion. 
 
The chapter ends with an examination of a 2012 parliamentary debate in which most of the 
core issues in this study were raised.   
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8.2 The changing criminal justice context  
 
 
I believe there is a great danger at the present time that we show too much 
concern for criminals and too little concern for the victims and too little care 
for the protection of society. 861 
 
Why we should not allow the judges (in sentencing those convicted of 
murder) to exercise discretion and mercy which they do in all other cases I 
find difficult to understand. 862 
 
I hope that for murders ... we shall move to a position in which a review body 
of some sort or another deals with all life sentences of, say, more than ten 
years. 863 
 
If it is necessary for the security of society to keep a man there (in prison) for 
the rest of his life, he will have… to be there for the rest of his life. 864 
 
Even with the worst type of prisoner, I would always be loath…. wholly to 
extinguish all hope in the mind of any human being that he would ever be 
allowed to walk outside the prison walls …  I would try to replace the loss of 
that hope by at least the hope that he would have inside the prison confines 
such amenities, activities and human contacts as would make his life a 
civilised one and enable him to endure the penalty which, unfortunately, the 
interests of the community require that he undergo. 865 
 
The arguments over the stress on victims’, as opposed to offenders’ rights; judicial discretion; 
the possibility of review for all serving long sentences for murder; the need for public safety; 
the question of hope and of appropriate prison regimes relating to those serving a whole of life 
sentence:  all are issues discussed in the debates leading to the CJA 2003. Yet these 
statements were all made almost fifty years ago, during the parliamentary debates leading to 
the abolition of the death penalty.  Indeed, all remain issues in 2013. 
 
As shown earlier in the study, the decision to suspend capital punishment in 1965 was made 
against allegedly hostile public opinion.  However, there had been scenes of sympathetic 
support for Ruth Ellis, outside the prison where she was to be hanged, and there was a 
coherent liberal elite in favour of abolition.   The liberal views were based not only on the 
inalienable value of life, but also on the irreversibility of miscarriages of justice, a lack of 
evidence of a deterrent effect and the ‘ghastly ceremony of execution’. 866   Members in the 
parliamentary debates, talked of their duty to vote with their consciences on the principle of 
abolition, and to act as representatives not delegates.   The decision was accepted with no 
significant outpouring of public dissent, and, although initially the abolition was limited to a five 
year trial period, the sentence was permanently abolished before the five years had passed 
and with limited resistance. 
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Given the effectiveness of moral arguments in the campaign to abolish capital punishment, it 
might have been expected that campaigns in favour of supporting the human rights of those 
serving a whole life sentence would adopt similar moral arguments.   While organisations like 
Liberty, the Howard League and Justice have sought to develop such arguments, they have 
not resonated with the public.  The Human Rights Act and the ECHR have not succeeded in 
making human rights a major moral issue in the punishment of such offenders.  Conversely, in 
fact, these measures and the court cases resulting from them, as seen in the study, have 
resulted in outspoken criticism of human rights by much of the media, by sections of the public 
and by some politicians. 
 
By the time the whole life order was introduced, with limited debate on the issues it raised, it 
was within a very different criminal justice landscape from that of 1965.  Greater importance 
was attached to the maintenance of public confidence and the need to take account of public 
opinion.  There was more societal insecurity and fear of crime, driven to an extent by 
sensational reporting of crime in sections of the media, which, since the 1980s, led to political 
parties vying to be seen as the party of law and order.  With this has come the tendency for 
politicians increasingly to take account of victims’ interests and give priority to public protection 
and retribution in penal policy.  This move has brought its own unease, with disquiet expressed 
that the ‘sanctification’ of the victims also tends to nullify the concern for the offenders. 867  All 
these changes have obviously been a gradual process, but to the extent there was a critical 
watershed, it could be argued that it was the murder of James Bulger in 1993 and the reaction 
to it by politicians.   All the elements which had changed in the previous decade are apparent: 
the sensational and relentless reporting of the murder in the media; the public’s desire for 
‘revenge’ even although the offenders themselves were children; the public’s increased 
fearfulness over risk of crime;  and politicians use of the murder stridently, and competitively, 
to present their case for increased crime control. 
 
In the 20 years since James Bulger’s murder, the media and the public’s reaction to any 
perceived government weakness on law and order issues has not lessened. David Blunkett, 
the architect of the 2003 Act, was vividly aware of public feeling and considered a clear 
message had to be sent that the government was taking criminal justice seriously.  In his 
interview he stated,  
 
You don’t whip up emotional popular feeling but you hear it when it occurs 
and listen to it in a rational reasonable fashion and then cool and dampen 
the most heated cries for action and do something sensible.   
 
The ‘something sensible’ in 2003 was to let criminals know they would be dealt with harshly 
and to let the public know they were being listened to.   The whole life order was striking in its 
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simplicity and it satisfied Blunkett’s desire for robustness and reassurance.  It would send the 
message that when the crime was serious enough, a sentence was available whereby the 
offender would have no possibility of release.   
 
The change that occurred in the decades leading to the 2003 Act accords with the views of 
academics such as David Garland and Jonathan Simon.  They have persuasively argued that 
fundamental social, cultural and economic changes in the second half of the twentieth century 
made a significant impact on criminal justice issues.  The societal changes for a time brought 
increased crime levels and a resultant fear of crime.  A pervasive culture of crime control 
emerged, with governments increasingly aware of the electoral importance of acknowledging 
and addressing the public’s fears of victimisation.   One example of this commitment was Jack 
Straw’s statement in 1998 that the government’s priority had to be protecting the public by 
‘assessing risk, reducing risk and managing risk’.868    Both Garland and Simon comment on 
how, in the USA and Britain, levels of public fear do not accurately reflect the actual incidence 
of crime, but still result in an angry public, tired of living in fear and demanding strong punitive 
and protective measures. 869     
 
In 2002, when the Criminal Justice Bill was progressing through parliament, the reaction in the 
media and the public to Ian Huntley, after he was convicted of the murder of two schoolgirls in 
Soham, illustrated the abhorrence felt by sections of society towards certain murderers.  In this 
climate, it would be surprising if any judgment, made by a European court, upholding the rights 
of a small group of prisoners convicted of the most heinous crimes would be met with anything 
other than fierce resistance.  This, significantly, is the context in which possible legislative 




8.3 The continuing judicial-executive context 
 
In interview, Lord McNally spoke of how the tension between the judiciary and the executive 
would always ‘ebb and flow’, and this has been highlighted in the study.  David Blunkett, also 
in interview, provided a further example of such tension.  He explained the need for the CJA 
2003 to set sentences for murder ‘to put back sentencing to where it should be’.   He felt ‘the 
minute you pull back from life meaning life, the judiciary starts to reduce the sentences’.  One 
of his predecessors, Michael Howard, had similar views and hence introduced what became 
the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.  The judicial response was uncompromising.  Lord Chief 
Justice, Lord Taylor who in Cunningham 870  had ‘reinterpreted’ the CJA 1991, then attacked  
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the Criminal Justice Bill 1997:  ‘The criminal law should not be subject to arbitrary change by 
the powers that be, or the vagaries of fashion’. 871   Despite this opposition, Howard persisted 
with the Bill. 
 
In 2002, during debates in the House of Lords on the Criminal Justice Bill, this tension was 
illustrated when sentencing for murder was being discussed.  Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, 
was critical of the restrictions on judicial discretion, and the consequent escalation in the length 
of sentences.  Lord Ackner supported him in his views.  Lord Donaldson went further, and 
asserted that the Home Secretary appeared to assume that parliament was omnipotent and 
could dictate to the judges how, in detail, they should perform their duties.  This tension 
continued in respect of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the establishment of the 
Ministry of Justice.    The politicians in this period believed that the judges were under-
sentencing and the most public expression of this was in the Sweeney affair, discussed earlier.  
More serious, were the conflicts after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, when state control 
versus due process was clearly highlighted in respect of government legislation, struck down 
by the courts. 872 
 
This then, is the background to the court cases in the study.  Those considered before 2003 
are concerned with the legitimacy of the Home Secretary’s powers to set a tariff. The judiciary 
asserted that setting a tariff was a sentencing exercise and therefore a judicial not an 
executive function.  If this was so, the setting of tariffs by the executive infringed the separation 
of powers.  Lord Pannick, in interview, suggested this series of cases exhibited clever tactics, 
with one after another of the Home Secretary’s powers in turn being attacked. 
 
Post-2003, defence counsel sought to set limits on the whole life order, mostly without 
success, and in the end moved from questioning its scope to questioning its legitimacy.  There 
has been no judicial criticism, however, of the principle of the whole life order.  Senior judges, 
in interview, asserted their task was to apply the law as established by parliament..  Certainly, 
the law in s269 and Schedule 21 is unambiguous and it is, of course, primary legislation.  
Presumably, pre-2003 the judiciary regarded as legitimate the criticism of executive action 
undertaken, not as a result of primary legislation, but under delegated discretionary powers. 
 
Whether judicial criticism of explicit statutory provision is appropriate, or even whether it is 
constitutionally legitimate, is a question of importance.  So too, is the question whether the 
judiciary should play a role in examining the principles of the whole life order.  Historically, it 
has been accepted that parliament is sovereign. This principle has been reasserted as recently 
as 2011 by Lord Bingham 873 when he dismissed the view that the sovereignty of parliament 
was a common law construct that was thereby liable to be defined by judges.   However, the  
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Judicial Studies Project 874 asserted in its introduction that Britain’s constitution is changing: ‘It 
is evolving from a political constitution 875 towards a legal constitution.’ 876   
 
Lord Phillips, in a lecture in 2011, 877 quoted Michael Howard’s remarks made in a radio 
programme:  
 
The power of the judges, as opposed to the power of elected politicians 
has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. 
 
Howard had continued that more and more decisions were being made by unelected, 
unaccountable judges, instead of accountable, elected Members of Parliament, who had to 
answer to the electorate for what had happened.  Lord Phillips also quoted Kenneth Clarke’s 
astonishment at the way judicial review sits over every decision that anyone in government 
and the administration makes.   In his speech, Lord Phillips both rejected Howard’s remarks 
and defended the expansion of judicial review.   
 
The recent development of judicial review has, however,  been criticised by the Supreme Court 
Justices, Lord Sumption and Lord Neuberger. The former has asserted that too often judicial 
reviews deal with matters that in a democracy are the proper function of parliament. 878  Lord 
Neuberger asserted that it was not for UK courts to take a policy decision. 879  This suggests 
that while judicial review could be used, for instance, to challenge the continuing detention of 
particular prisoners, (as Lord Phillips argued in Bieber), it could not be used to challenge the 
legitimacy of the primary legislation concerned, ie s269 and Schedule 21 of the CJA 2003. 
 
The drafting of the Human Rights Act, as has been seen, whilst incorporating the ECHR into 
English law, preserved the principle of the sovereignty of parliament.  If such care has been 
taken to preserve parliamentary sovereignty, any questioning by the judiciary of the sentencing 
principles enshrined in the whole life order, could be perceived as unconstitutional.    
Parliament enacted that the whole life order be imposed for the penologically justifiable 
purposes of retribution and deterrence:  for cases of exceptionally high seriousness, it is the 
just and legitimate punishment.  This is not to argue that the whole life order cannot be 
questioned on the grounds of principle; but that the bench, when judges are dealing with 
particular cases, may not be the place to voice such questioning. 
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8.4 Penological justification of imprisonment for the whole life order 
 
Both the Court of Appeal in Oakes and the ECtHR Chamber in Vinter, Bamber and Moore 
noted the four penological justifications for imprisonment:  retribution, deterrence, public safety 
and rehabilitation.    As was stressed in Oakes, the CJA 2003 stated that the whole life order 
should be imposed as retribution and deterrence for a crime, or crimes, of exceptionally high 
seriousness.  Public safety and rehabilitation are not mentioned.  All the judicial respondents 
declared they were comfortable with this.  If retribution is accepted as penological justification 
for an imprisonment for the whole of life, then it is difficult to argue the need for a review 
mechanism since the trial judge assesses the seriousness of the crime that has been 
committed.   Many respondents were less comfortable with these justifications.  Frances Crook 
of the Howard League admitted that the whole life order had not been raised as an issue at the 
League, but she personally was hostile to retribution, thinking it was too close to vengeance, 
and, on reflection, could not accept a whole life order based on retribution and deterrence.   
 
Other respondents, while well aware of the penological justification in the Act for the whole life 
order, did not support it in these terms.  The police, for example, accepted the whole life order, 
but most argued it was justified by the protection it provided to the public; that is, on grounds of 
incapacitation.   Faith groups, unsurprisingly, believed that imprisonment for even the most 
heinous crimes, should allow for rehabilitation and redemption, and hope should never be 
extinguished.  They accepted, however, that some people would have to be kept in prison for 
the rest of their lives because of the risk they posed to the public.  A group of lawyers 
interviewed, also said they felt public safety should be the main justification for the sentence.  
Indeed, for a surprising number of respondents in this survey, the whole life order was justified 
on the grounds of dangerousness and public safety.  Ironically, David Blunkett also seemed, in 
parliament, to acknowledge this, even as he introduced the sentence justified on the grounds 
of retribution and deterrence alone.  In answer to a question about the need to consider a 
review to address possible redemption or repentance he said: 
 
The kind of multiple and sadistic murders that warrant a life sentence, meaning 
life, are such that we could not have confidence whatever the psychiatric 
appraisal may be, that those people would be safe in the community or safe to 
the community. 880 
 
Perhaps this emphasis on dangerousness and public safety helps explain the general lack of 
emotional reaction to the whole life order.  If it is thought of in terms of keeping dangerous 
offenders away from the public, it is ‘easier’ to accept that these offenders should not have the 
hope or expectation of release.   David Blunkett and many other respondents appeared to 
believe that past actions could display a level of dangerousness that means that a whole life 
order is justified for public safety.   
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This position is difficult to sustain as dangerousness may well be considered to be open to 
change over time.  The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights noted: 
 
Life-life sentences negate the human principle that people can change….Court 
decisions assuming that someone constitutes a permanent threat to society are 
therefore misplaced.  The vision of rehabilitation should be protected, not 
undermined.  881   
 
If there was to be any question of rehabilitation or question of assessing dangerousness, then  
a need for a system of review becomes inescapable.  What is not self-evident, however, are 
the grounds for any review.  There is the well-established review mechanism of the Parole 
Board, which considers whether or not to order the release of a prisoner sentenced to 
mandatory life after the minimum term has expired.  The grounds for release are assessed 
purely in terms of the risk of future offending the prisoner poses if released.  If a review body 
was required to consider not solely risk but the broader justifications identified by the Court of 
Appeal and the ECtHR in respect of continued imprisonment - retribution, deterrence, public 
safety and rehabilitation - it is probable that a new, fully judicial, body would be required.  This 
could be based on the German model, where after fifteen years of a life sentence, cases are 
reviewed: considering the seriousness of the crime and public security as well as re-
socialisation. 882   The lawyers for Vinter, Bamber and Moore have argued in papers to the 
Grand Chamber that the balance of penological justifications can change over time. 883  So, for 
instance, rehabilitation may become more salient than retribution. 884  
 
Another argument for the need for a review mechanism is the concern expressed over 
proportionality in whole life orders.  The overarching aspect of the principle is clear.  As Lord 
Phillips said in interview, judges have a duty in common law to be proportionate in their 
sentencing.   Attention has been drawn to Lord Chief Justice Woolf relying in Offen (2) on 
Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR ‘to establish a ‘constitutional’ requirement that sentences must 
not be disproportionate’. 885   The CJA 2003 requires that sentences for murder should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence.  The general duty is clear, but there are 
aspects that are not self-evident.  For example, whether a whole life order imposed on, say, a 
25 year old is, or becomes with the passage of time, disproportionate compared to the same 
sentence imposed on a 55 year old.   It follows from this that it is legitimate to ask whether a 
sentence that will inevitably vary in length, possibly very substantially, can ever be 
proportionate.  The severity of the sentence will, in effect, vary according to arbitrary factors  
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associated with the timing of the person’s death.  This view, however, is in conflict with  
Lord Steyn’s declaration in Hindley:    
 
There are cases where the crimes are so wicked that even if the prisoner is 
detained until he or she dies, it will not exhaust the requirements of retribution 
and deterrence. 886 
 
If it is conceded, however, that concerns about the proportionality of one whole life order 
compared to another, have some justification, a remedy would be needed.  As Edward 
Fitzgerald pointed out in interview, Lord Hailsham advocated gradation with the seriousness of 
crimes being reflected in sentences expressed in terms of years.   This, as has been seen, is 
already the position in Scotland. 887  The adoption of such a sentencing regime would explicitly 
end the whole life order, while the adoption of any form of a review mechanism would implicitly 
end it.  Although, however, such a change would restore the concept of hope for prisoners it 
could conflict with concern expressed by politicians such as David Blunkett, fearful of judicial 
erosion of sentences.   
 
 
8.5 A sentence apart: a step beyond the continuum 
 
David Blunkett, in interview said he felt strongly that, for ‘a very few’ offenders, a life sentence 
should mean exactly that.  For those few there would be no minimum term set and no 
possibility of release or review.  A very long determinate sentence was not sufficient, he 
thought, as it would be undermined over time by the judiciary.   At first glance the whole life 
order might appear to be the extreme point on the sentencing continuum, but it can be argued 
that the sentence is much more than that.  It is different in its nature, not only because of its 
potential to contradict the principle of proportionality but also, unlike every other sentence, it 
removes from prisoners serving the sentence any form of hope of release. 
 
Historically, the sentence apart was the death penalty.  Bailey wrote that although capital 
punishment could be considered merely as one level of the country’s penal system, to do that 
would be to ignore the fact that the subject ‘touched the deepest fears and values’, with few 
people without an opinion and with governments having to remain vigilant regarding public 
opinion on such a sensitive issue. 888  Clearly, in Bailey’s view therefore, the death penalty was 
a sentence apart from all others.  This too was reflected in judicial practice, with the symbolic 
placing of the black cap on the trial judge’s head before he pronounced the sentence.  
Since 2003 the equivalent sentence has been the whole life order.  Neither the United Nations 
nor the Council of Europe concede the need for such a sentence.  Its use distinguishes 
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England and Wales from the rest of Europe, except for the Netherlands.  For whole life order 
prisoners, being in such an exceptional situation, combined with the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, makes an application to Strasbourg an attractive option.   
 
The judicial minority at Strasbourg’s Sectional Chamber ruling in Vinter, Bamber and Moore 
spoke of the requirement for hope: ‘however tenuous that hope might be’. 889  The government 
in its argument to the Grand Chamber, however, said that it did not appear that Article 3 
requires penal systems to be arranged so as ‘to give a tenuous (and the government would 
add, wholly unrealistic) hope’. 890   At the subsequent Grand Chamber hearing, the QC for 
Vinter understandably raised the question of loss of hope:   
 
The imposition of the whole life order crushes human dignity from the outset, 
as it removes any chance, and therefore any hope, of release in the future.  
The individual is left in a position of hopelessness whereby he cannot 
progress whatever occurs. 891 
 
The argument was countered on behalf of the government by the statement that some crimes 
are so serious that they require a proportionate response, namely life-long incarceration.  This 
was echoed by politicians in interview for the study when, although acknowledging the 
sentence as being unique in removing all prospect of release at time of sentencing, they 
accepted the uniqueness as a necessity to demonstrate to the public that serious crimes would 
attract serious punishment.   Other respondents supported the certainty of the whole life order.  
The police respondents, for example, drew attention to the uniqueness of the whole life order, 
in that it was absolutely transparent.  This was particularly appreciated by family support 
officers, who found it easy to explain the significance of the sentence to victims’ families and 
friends.   A life sentence with a whole life order, meant exactly that:  there was no need to try 
to explain minimum terms, the concept of risk and the role of the Parole Board.   
 
A sentence that is apart from others because of the withdrawal of hope would be expected to 
attract controversy and debate.  However, there has been little emotional reaction to the whole 
life order and little discussion, or public campaign, on the ethical or moral foundations on which 
it rests.  To the extent that emotion has been demonstrated publicly, it has been demands from 
the media and the public, to impose the sentence on those they consider to have committed 
particularly evil acts.  The emotional and moral questioning surrounding another ‘sentence 
apart,’ the death penalty, far outweighs any involving the whole life order.  Almost fifty years 
ago, the ethical issue was an important element in the public debate on the abolition of capital 
punishment.  In Ruth Ellis’s case, it was asked if it was morally right for a mother of two, with 
an abusive background to be hanged.  And in relation to Derek Bentley, if it was right for a  
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young man with learning difficulties to be hanged when he had not fired the fatal shot.   
Crucially, following the wrongful execution of Timothy Evans, it was questioned whether it 
could ever be morally, ethically or judicially right to risk a miscarriage of justice.   
 
Perhaps the lower level of attention paid to the whole life order is understandable:  the whole 
life order has no specific act of life-taking and any miscarriage of justice is reversible.  The fact 
that offenders serving the sentence, uniquely, are deprived of hope of any release and will be 
removed from society until they die – not because of any continuing dangerousness but as 
punishment for their crimes of exceptionally high seriousness – certainly does not appear to be 
an issue engaging the emotions of many.  
 
Murder is often described as a heinous offence and the crimes that attract the whole life order 
are at the apex of any hierarchy of heinousness.  It is accepted almost universally that the 
worst crimes should attract the most severe sentences.  However, this does not preclude 
discussion on what that penalty should be, and on whether it demands a sentence that is 
unique in its requirement to remove from the prisoner all hope of release or any opportunity for 
rehabilitation in society.   Hope has been seen as the essence of humanity whether it is 
Dostoevsky declaring ‘to live without hope is to cease to live’ or W.C. Fields stating that ‘when 
we have lost everything, including hope, life becomes a disgrace, and death a duty’.  By virtue 
of being the only sentence to close the prison doors permanently, the whole life order is indeed 




8.6 A sentence apart: serving the sentence  
 
With the acceptance that the whole life order is different from any other sentence, the issue 
arises of the extent to which serving the sentence also is different from others, and the 
attention that deserves.   Much has been written on subjects that are related to those serving a 
whole life.  There is a wealth of debate and writing on the death penalty and on the USA 
penalty of life without parole.  There is also much commentary on international approaches to 
considering which punishments are legitimate and acceptable, following the abolition of the 
death penalty, and on how different jurisdictions have tackled this challenge.  In this 
commentary, England often receives little attention and is dealt with as an exception, being 
one of the few jurisdictions in western democracies to adopt a whole of life penalty based on 
retribution and deterrence, with no review mechanism.  The numbers serving the sentence are 
extremely small; however the infrequency of the imposition of the sentence should not inhibit 




One particular aspect has lacked such attention: the appropriate prison regime for those 
serving a whole life sentence.  It can be argued that prison-based issues relevant to this cohort 
are no less relevant to many other prisoners:  the exhibition of dangerous behaviour in prison; 
facing old age and death while incarcerated; sufficient and appropriate out of cell activities, 
both social and educational; access to therapy and counselling; continuing contact with friends 
and family; and retaining a sense of purpose and progress.  Certainly these issues affect 
prisoners other than those serving a life-long sentence.   It can also be argued that whilst the 
prisoners this study is focused on constitute a discrete group, it is not homogeneous.  They 
have in common that they have been convicted of crimes of exceptionally high seriousness, 
but in prison they are reported to exhibit different behaviour patterns.  Some are amongst the 
most dangerous and violent prisoners, requiring up to seven prison officers to be present when 
out of cell.  Others are reputed to be model prisoners. 892  The age range is also wide, from 
early middle age to elderly and, reportedly, frail.  They may, therefore, both face and pose 
similar challenges to other prisoners.   
 
Crucially, however, they are a unique group in being aware that, on the grounds of retribution, 
a life-long sentence with no possibility of release for them has been judged proportionate and 
just.   In the submissions to the Grand Chamber in Vinter, Bamber and Moore, different 
consultants in clinical, forensic and neuro psychology have written of how the whole life order 
can affect prisoners in different ways.  One such prisoner is described as reacting with a 
mixture of fury and despair, causing a loss of moral compass, as he faces a sentence that is 
‘akin to a death sentence albeit a slow and intolerable one.’ 893   The fact that the sentence 
virtually precludes the possibility of movement out of Category A, puts another of the 
appellants increasingly in danger of depression. 894    
 
It is surprising that no study has been undertaken to explore, for example, to what extent the 
prison authorities take this unique sentence into consideration when deciding on individual 
regimes to accommodate the needs for those involved; to what extent the sentence affects 
prison behaviour; and whether allocating an enhanced regime, with elements of those 
employed many years ago in Barlinnie or currently in Grendon, could modify violent behaviour 
in this particular group where necessary or, if required, alleviate depression.  In the interview 
with the released lifer for this study he commented ‘When the whole life tariffs began to trickle 
through I was waiting for a strategy document to come down.  I was ‘Right how are you going 
to deal with these guys?’  It still hasn’t appeared to the best of my knowledge.  Slightly 
worrying’.  As seen earlier, when government ministers have been asked about prison regimes 
specifically focused on the needs of the whole life order group, the response has been that the 
emphasis is on assessing and meeting the individual needs of all prisoners and not on  
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any particular grouping of prisoners.  This is perhaps surprising given that much of the new 
penology is concerned with actuarial assessment to identify and regulate the risk posed by 
specific groups of offenders.  
 
The lack of attention paid by politicians to the subject is perhaps reflected in the apparent 
reluctance of NOMS to allow external inquiry, certainly in the case of the application for this 
study to interview relevant prison staff and prisoners.   NOMS also seems remarkably slow in 
implementing a national policy for older prisoners, a question, particularly relevant to those 
serving a whole life order.  The 2004 Prison Inspectorate Report and its follow up report in 
2008, discussed above, both strongly recommended such a policy.  Yet, nothing has been put 
in place.   However, in January 2013, a Select Committee895 launched a new inquiry into older 
prisoners and has sought views on whether a national strategy for the treatment of prisoners 
aged 60 and over, should be established.  Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, Nick 
Hardwick, submitted evidence to the Committee in March 2013, reiterating the case for a 
national NOMS strategy.   Although not specifically about those serving a whole life order, the 
inquiry and possible subsequent national strategy for the elderly in prison, would hopefully 
direct attention to this group. 
 
However, there is no sign of any scrutiny on the central issue of whether those serving a whole 
life have unique challenges worthy of attention.   The argument that prisoners with very long 
sentences share the same issues as those serving a whole life has not stopped significant 
attention and research on the sentence of life without parole in the USA.  Although the 
numbers, and the crimes and ages of those involved, are significantly different from those in 
England and Wales, the key issue of no review and no release is the same.  No academic 
study in the UK, however, has explored empirically whether the issues relating to long 
imprisonment and life-long imprisonment are indeed the same. 
 
 
8.7     The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill   
 
This study consistently has sought, mostly in vain, to find any extensive, informed public 
debate on the principles of the whole life order sentence.  However, under the 
unprepossessing title of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill 2012, an 
attempt was identified to raise issues very similar to those that had emerged from this study.896   
An amendment was proposed in the House of Lords to introduce a review for those who would 
have served 30 years of a whole life order. 897   The proposer was Lord Lloyd, a former Lord of 
Appeal, who speak out about the need to address the lack of hope experienced by those 
serving the sentence.   
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The consequence of this proposed amendment being successful would, of course, have been 
the removal of the whole life order from the CJA 2003, placing the prisoner in the same 
position as someone with a 30 year minimum term, and in fact, in a better position than 
anyone sentenced to a minimum term of longer than 30 years. 898  In proposing the 
amendment, Lord Lloyd asserted that it was an attempt to undo some of the harm that was 
done by the CJA 2003.  He argued for the amendment on two grounds:  first, that a review by 
the Home Secretary of a whole life tariff was ‘settled practice’ before 2003, but such a review 
had found no place in the Criminal Justice Act; second, that an adverse decision by 
Strasbourg in Vinter, Bamber and Moore would require primary legislation anyway.  In the 
debate, the contributions, except for that of the government minister, were unanimously in 
favour of the amendment.   The points raised directly relate to the themes considered in this 
study.     
Lord Lloyd believed the amendment would restore hope to whole life order prisoners.  Lord 
Clinton-Davis also spoke of the need for prisoners ‘to look forward with some hope’.   Five 
other Lords spoke of the importance of hope.  Amongst those was Lord Ramsbotham, who 
referred with approval to the view of a prison education officer, who had worked closely with 
Nilsen, a prisoner serving a whole life order, and who stressed the importance of providing 
such prisoners with hope.  Lord Ramsbotham continued that he had been ‘enormously 
disturbed when that hope was removed by the 2003 Act’.  Lord Judd and Baroness Stern 
argued for the importance of the goal of rehabilitation that would be an empty ambition if there 
was no prospect of release.  Lord Pannick regarded the sentence as very damaging to prison 
order, and was supported in this by Baroness Mallalieu. 
Lord Judd, Lord Pannick and Baroness Stern felt the whole life order was a betrayal of civilised 
values and humanitarian concerns.  Baroness Mallalieu urged the government to show 
courage and accept the amendment.   However, Lord McNally stubbornly defended the 
government’s position:  he referred to the ‘pact’ from the time of the abolition of the death 
penalty; he spoke of the Justice Secretary’s powers of compassionate release; and, in tones 
reminiscent of Tony Blair, declared: 
Penal reform is always a balance between humane treatment of those who are in 
prison, concern for the victims of crime and the retention of public confidence in our 
system of justice. 899 
 
But, for this last point, he was taken to task by Lord Pannick who asked why the public should 
not have confidence in the Parole Board and in its role in protecting the public. 
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In seeking to draw the debate to a conclusion, Lord McNally argued 
 
…the position as it is now is best in retaining public confidence.  It is a matter of 
political judgment, and the political judgment is that to move on this point, at this 
point, would not retain public confidence. 900  
 
However Lord Judd intervened, in what might be seen as an attempt to return to the situation 
in the 1960s, asserting: 
 
It is not a matter of accepting as inevitable the existing state of public opinion. 
We have to be very careful that we are not, in effect, running scared of the 
sensationalist media. We really should be not only respecting public opinion 
and public confidence but helping to shape public confidence by putting 
forward the positive argument for change. That is essential to successful 
democracy. If we have become convinced that this is the right thing to do, we 
have to speak up for it. 901 
 
The campaign to abolish the death penalty was led by the liberal elite of the day stimulating 
debate.   This amendment debate is the only one identified which equates the whole life order 
with a lack of civilised values and lack of humanitarian concerns.  The amendment was 
withdrawn in view of opposition from the government, but it did raise issues of principle relating 
to the sentence and in the event of it being under examination because of any ECtHR ruling, it 




8.8       Endnote 
 
This chapter began by noting that issues raised in the 1965 debates in parliament were still 
issues in 2002 at the time of the Criminal Justice Bill.  Furthermore, the 2012 Amendment 
debate drew attention to their continuing currency.   The need for hope was emphasised in the 
debate and also features strongly in the Vinter, Bamber and Moore application to the ECtHR.   
In this, implicitly the need and justification for a sentence apart was raised, and explicitly the 
implications for prisoners of such a sentence was stressed.  
 
In the submission to Strasbourg, Vinter’s counsel said: ‘We don’t say that these applicants 
should necessarily ever be released, just that they should not have all prospect of future 
release taken away at the outset of their sentence.’  The first half of his statement accords with 
views of the respondents of this study.  Everyone, without fail, agreed that there were certain 
offenders who would never be released.   What was at issue and what resulted in differing 
opinions from respondents, was whether the continued imprisonment, until end of life, should 
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be as a result of the crime, or crimes, committed being judged so heinous that the sentence of 
life-long imprisonment was justified at the time of trial; or whether it should be decided upon at 
reviews years, probably decades, into the sentence.  The latter would retain a sense of hope 
of release for the prisoners involved; the former would remove hope.   
 
It is this issue that divides opinion.   And the division is deep.  Most politicians stated in 
interview that for some offenders, a second chance should never be available.  Members of 
the judiciary in court have made clear that the question of hope or redemption is not a relevant 
one for them.  Earlier in the chapter Lord Steyn’s determination in Hindley that, for some 
crimes, even death does not exhaust the requirements of retribution, was quoted.   Lord 
Hoffman has rejected the idea that redemption has to be taken into consideration:      
 
If a whole life sentence of imprisonment without parole is a just punishment for 
the crime, the prisoner atones by serving his sentence.  Redemption, a matter 
between him and his Maker, may well be achieved during the currency of the 
sentence, but I do not follow why it is said to require a reduction of the length of 
the just punishment sentence.902 
 
Others hold different views.  David Rhodes has written of how, if the only hope available to a 
whole life order prisoner is release if terminally ill, then that is no hope at all. 903    Rod Morgan, 
also views redemption differently from the judiciary: 
 
In my view the essential core of humanity is that everyone is redeemable.  A 
life sentence without parole removes any prospect of reward for change and 
is therefore fundamentally inhumane.  If society is going to announce baldly 
that we don’t care what you do, we don’t care what programmes you 
engage in, you are never going to be released, it’s the equivalent of 
providing a death sentence. 904 
 
Lord Judd in the Amendment debate discussed above, said: 
 
If we do not always strive to try to enable someone who has done a dreadful 
thing to become a better person and to rejoin society as a better person, I 
think that we demonstrate a lack of self-confidence in our own civilised 
values.      
 
At the start of this study, the views of Downes and Morgan were referred to:  that in the twenty-
first century we are used to law and order arousing emotive issues and provoking passionate 
political debate. 905  The whole life order has defied this view.  What is lacking and is needed 
more than anything else is cool, critical scrutiny of the subject in order to stimulate passionate 
political debate.    
                                                     
902 para 46 
903 Barrister at Doughty Street Chambers.  ‘When all hope is gone’   9 September 2008      
Available www.solicitorsjournal.com 
904 In personal correspondence, cited in Appleton and Grover (2007):611   
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  APPENDIX A 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003: s269 & 270 and Schedule 21  
 
Section 269  is concerned with the determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory 
life sentence, with the relevant parts stating: 
 
(2)   The court must, unless it makes an order under subsection (4), order that the provisions 
of section 28(5) to (8) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (referred to in this Chapter as 
“the early release provisions”) are to apply to the offender as soon as he has served the 
part of his sentence which is specified in the order.   
(3a)  The part of his sentence is to be such as the court considers appropriate taking into 
account the seriousness of the offence, or of the combination of the offence and any one 
or more offences associated with it. 
(4)  If the offender was 21 or over when he committed the offence and the court is of the 
opinion that, because of the seriousness of the offence, or of the combination of the 
offence and one or more offences associated with it, no order should be made under 
subsection (2), the court must order that the early release provisions are not to apply to 
the offender. 
(5)  In considering under subsection (3) or (4) the seriousness of an offence (or of the 
combination of an offence and one or more offences associated with it), the court must 
have regard to 
  (a) the general principles set out in Schedule 21, and 
  (b) any guidelines relating to offences in general which are relevant to the  case and   
  are not incompatible with the provisions of Schedule 21. 
 
 
Section 270 concerns the duty to give reasons in sentencing:   
 
(1)   Any court making an order under subsection (2) or (4) of section 269 must state in  
   open court, in ordinary language, its reasons for deciding on the order made. 
(2)   In stating its reasons the court must, in particular 
 (a) state which of the starting points in Schedule 21 it has chosen and its  
  reasons for doing so, and 










4          (1)    If – 
  (a)  the court considers that the seriousness of the offence (or the combination 
   of the offence and one or more offences associated with it) is  
   exceptionally high, and 
  (b) the offender was aged 21 or over when he committed the offence, 
   the appropriate starting point is a whole life order. 
 
 (2)   Cases that would normally fall within sub-paragraph (1)(a) include  
  (a)  the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves any of the 
   following— 
 (i)  a substantial degree of premeditation or planning 
 (ii) the abduction of the victim, or 
 (iii) sexual or sadistic conduct, 
  (b) the murder of a child if involving the abduction of the child or sexual or 
   sadistic motivation, 
  (c)  a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, 906 
   or ideological cause, or 
  (d) a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder. 
5     (1)   If –  
     (a) the case does not fall within paragraph 4(1) but the court considers that the 
   seriousness of the offence (or the combination of the offence and one
   or more offences associated with it) is particularly high, and 
  (b) the offender was aged 18 or over when he committed the offence, the 
   appropriate starting point, in determining the minimum term is 30 years. 
 (2)  Cases that (if not falling within paragraph 4(1)) would normally fall within sub-
                 paragraph (1)(a) include 
  (a) the murder of a police officer or prison officer in the course of his duty, 
  (b) a murder involving the use of a firearm or explosive, 
  (c) a murder done for gain (such as a murder done in the course or furtherance 
   of robbery or burglary, done for payment or done in the expectation of 
   gain as a result of the death), 
  (d) a murder intended to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice, 
  (e) a murder involving sexual or sadistic conduct, 
                        (f)  the murder of two or more persons, 
  (g) a murder that is racially or religiously aggravated or aggravated by sexual 
   orientation, or 
  (h) a murder falling within paragraph 4(2) committed by an offender who was 
   aged under 21 when he committed the offence. 
 
                                                     
906 The word ‘racial’ inserted (16.2.2009) by Counter-Terrorism Act 2008  
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All other murders have a 15-year starting point  907 (changed by statutory instrument in 2010 
to 25 years for murder involving the use of a knife 908).   Those offenders aged 17 or under are 
subject only to a twelve year starting point 909 and those offenders aged 18 -20 are subject to 
the 15 or 30 year starting point, but not the whole life tariff.  
 
Once the trial judges have determined the starting point they must consider aggravating or 
mitigating factors set out in the Act in order to decide the appropriate minimum term.  This 
represents the number of years that must be served before the Parole Board can grant 
release.   
 
8 Having chosen a starting point, the court should take into account any aggravating or 
  mitigating factors, to the extent that it has not allowed for them in its choice of 
  starting point. 
9 Detailed consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors may result in a minimum 
  term of any length (whatever the starting point), or in the making of a whole 
  life order. 
10 Aggravating factors (additional to those mentioned in paragraph 4(2)) that may be 
  relevant to the offence of murder include— 
 (a)  a significant degree of planning or premeditation; 
 (b)  the victim being particularly vulnerable because of age or disability; 
 (c)  mental or physical suffering inflicted on the victim before death; 
 (d)  the abuse of a position of trust; 
 (e)  the use of duress or threats against another person to facilitate the  
       commission of the offence; 
 (f)  the fact that the victim was providing a public service or performing a  
       public duty; 
 (g)  concealment, destruction or dismemberment of the body. 
11       Mitigating factors that may be relevant to the offence of murder include— 
 (a)  an intention to cause bodily harm rather than kill; 
 (b)  a lack of premeditation; 
 (c)  the fact that the offender suffered from any mental disorder or  
       mental disability which would lower his degree of culpability     
      (although not falling within section 2(1) of the Homicide Act    
      1957); 
 (d)  the fact that the offender was provoked – for example by prolonged  
       stress – in a way not amounting to a defence of provocation; 
 (e)  acting to any extent in self-defence; 
 (f)   the belief that the murder was an act of mercy and  
 (g)  the age of the offender. 
 
The list of aggravating and mitigating factors in the statute is not exhaustive. 
 
 
Schedule 22, is concerned with transitional arrangements.   The Lord Chief Justice delivering 
the deliberation in Sullivan in the Court of Appeal rehearsed the content of the Schedule and 
gave guidelines on how it should be applied.  
 
 
                                                     
907 Schedule 21  6 
908 si2010/197 




APPENDIX   B  
 
European Convention on Human Rights: Relevant Articles  
 
ARTICLE 3    Prohibition of torture 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
ARTICLE 5       Right to liberty and security 
 
1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one shall be deprived of his 
 liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
 law: 
 
(a)  the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a 
 court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before 
 the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence 
 or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or 
 fleeing after having done so; 
(d)  the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his 
 lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e)  the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
 diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
(f)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
 into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
 deportation or extradition. 
 
2.  Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
 understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
  
3.  Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of
 this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law 
 to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 




4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
 proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a 
 court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5.  Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 




ARTICLE 6    Right to a fair trial 
 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to 
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
 according to law. 
 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 (a)  to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
       nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
 (b)  to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
 (c)  to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he 
      has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
      interests of justice so require; 
 (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
      and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
      against him; 
 (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 








ARTICLE 7      No punishment without law 
 
1.  No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
 which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time 
 when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
 applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
 
2.       This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act  
          or  omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 











The Halliday Report   July  2001 
 
1.3 At its roots, sentencing contributes to good order in society.  It does so by visibly 
upholding society’s norms and standards; dealing appropriately with those who breach 
them; and enabling the public to have confidence in its outcomes.  The public, as a 
result, can legitimately be expected to uphold and observe the law, and not to take it into 
their own hands. To achieve this, there must be confidence in the justice of the 
outcomes, as well as in their effectiveness.  Achieving a satisfactory level of public 
confidence is therefore an important goal of sentencing, and the framework for 
sentencing needs to support that goal. 
 
1.4 The review has found widespread agreement that sentencing serves three other more 
 specific purposes, those of: 
• punishment  
• crime reduction and  
• reparation. 
 
1.5 Opinions differ as to whether punishment is a goal in its own right or is, rather, a means 
 of achieving the other two goals.  Crime reduction includes: 
• deterrence (specific deterrence of those actually sentenced, and general deterrence of 
others put off from offending for fear of the sentencing consequences); 
• incapacitation (being excluded from society through imprisonment for a period during 
which offending in the community is therefore not possible); 
• reform and rehabilitation (measures to change the way offenders think and behave, and 
to enable them to develop in ways that reduce risks of re-offending). 
 
Punishment - meaning the loss of liberty, property or other rights and freedoms – is 
necessary in order to achieve any of the three aspects of crime reduction, as well as 
reparation.  Perhaps above all, the goal is to achieve punishments that work as well as 
they can, in terms of crime reduction and the satisfaction of victims and communities.  






White Paper Justice For All  July 2002   
 
Purposes and principles of sentencing 
 
5.8  For the first time, we will set out in legislation the purposes of sentencing.  Sentences    
should: 
 
• first and foremost protect the public.  This is paramount; 
• act as a punishment and ensure the punishment fits the crime; 
• reduce crime.  Sentencing must be an effective tool which leads to fewer crimes; 
• deter (this includes both the general effect on the population at large and the specific 
effect on the offender); 
• incapacitate, where offenders are physically prevented from committing crimes by 
removing them partly or entirely from society; 
• reform and rehabilitate, so that the offender can learn new skills and attitudes which 
make him or her less likely to re-offend; and 
• promote reparation.  We must actively encourage offenders to make amends for the 
crimes they have committed. 
 
5.9    Sentencers will be required to consider these purposes when sentencing and how the 
sentence they impose will provide the right balance between the purposes set out 
above, given the circumstance of the offence and the offender.  Legislation will make it 
clear that custody should be used only when no other sentence would be adequate to 
protect the public or in relation to the seriousness or persistence of the offence or 
offences. 
 
 5.10    The severity of the sentence should be governed by the following principles:  
•   it should reflect the seriousness of the offence; 
•   the seriousness of the offence should reflect its degree of harmfulness or risked 
harmfulness, and the offender’s culpability in committing the offence;  and 
• persistent offending should also justify a more severe view and more intensive efforts at 
preventing reoffending.  Increased punishment will be the outcome for those offenders 
who have consistently failed to respond to previous sentences.  We will ensure that 








Criminal Justice Act November 2003     
 
Section 142 
Purposes of sentencing 
 
(1) 
Any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must have regard to the following 
purposes of sentencing— 
 
(a) the punishment of offenders, 
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), 
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, 
(d) the protection of the public, and 




Subsection (1) does not apply— 
(a) in relation to an offender who is aged under 18 at the time of conviction, 







Determining the seriousness of an offence 
 
(1) 
In considering the seriousness of an offence, the court must consider the offender’s culpability 
in committing the offence and the harm, or risk of harm, which the offence caused, or was 
intended to cause. 
 
(2)  (6) 











The Lord Chief Justice referred to four documents, variously called Practice Directions and  
Practice Statements.   
 
• A letter of 10 February 1997 sent by Lord Chief Justice Bingham to trial judges, where 
he stated his current practice was to take 14 years as the period actually to be served 
for an ‘average’ murder.  He noted that this was longer than the 12 years that Lord 
Lane took as his norm a decade earlier.  He then listed mitigating and aggravating 
factors.  He continued: 
 
 while a recommendation of a term longer than say 30 years will be 
very rare indeed, I do not think one should set any upper limit.  Some 
crimes will certainly call for terms very well in excess of the norm.910 
 
• Lord Chief Justice Woolf’s Practice Statement of 27 July 2000, while concerned 
principally with juvenile offenders, reiterated Lord Bingham’s view of 14 years for the 
‘average’ murder committed by an adult. 
 
• Advice of the Sentencing Advisory Panel of 15 March 2002 implemented in the 
Practice Statement (Crime, Life Sentences).  This set three starting points, the highest 
of which was 15/16 years.  It continued: 
 
a substantial upward adjustment may be appropriate in the most 
serious cases, for example, those involving a substantial number of 
murders, or if there are several factors identified as attracting the 
higher starting point present.  In suitable cases, the result might 
even be a minimum term of 30 years (equivalent to 60 years)  which 
offers little or no hope of the offender’s eventual release.  In cases of 
exceptional gravity, the judge, rather than setting a whole life 
minimum term, can state that there is no minimum period which 




                                                     
910 quoted in Sullivan para. 28 
911 quoted in Sullivan para 32 
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• Practice Direction of 18 May 2004 included the statement: 
 
The only area where the Secretary of State tended to differ from 
the guidance in Lord Bingham’s letter and the Practice Statement 
of 27 July 2000 was in relation to the gravest murders.  In cases 
involving multiple or serial murders, where there are aggravating 
circumstances and no compelling mitigating factors, the Secretary 
of State has set minimum terms considerably higher than judicial 
recommendations.  In such cases, the minimum terms have 
generally fallen between 30 years and whole life.912 
 
 
This account suggests that the term to be served for murder had increased - from the 12 year 
norm of Lord Lane, through the 14 year figure of Lord Bingham to the 15 year lowest starting 
point of the 2003 Act.  What is also striking is the relative lack of advice in the Practice 
Directions to sentencing in respect of the most heinous murders (and what counts as the most 
heinous murders).  Lord Bingham wrote of the 30 year tariff as being ‘very rare indeed’ and 
said that he did not think there should be an upper limit (but no reference to a whole life tariff); 
the Sentencing Advisory Panel wrote that in especially grave cases the judge can state that no 
minimum time should be set.  In contrast, of course, the 2003 Act spelt out in detail guidance 
regarding the 30 year minimum term and the whole life term. 
 
 
                                                     
912 ibid para 38 
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APPENDIX  E 
 
Reduction in sentence for exceptional progress in prison:  
Caines  [2006] EWCA Crim 2915 
 
51.   Finally we must consider the ambit of exceptional progress in prison. The policy 
adopted by the Secretary of State was described in Cole. 
  
• Para 5….. The Secretary of State remains open to the possibility that he would review 
an existing tariff where wholly exceptional circumstances are shown. Such exceptional 
circumstances might include, for example, a prisoner whose tariff has not long to run 
who displays exceptional bravery in preventing the death or serious injury of a 
member of staff or fellow prisoner, or in preventing the spread of fire which would have 
otherwise caused extensive damage or loss of life…. 
 
•  Para10…  The Secretary of State has never issued a definition of what constitutes 
progress in prison. Cases are considered on an individual basis and exceptional 
progress has to stand out clearly from the good progress in prison that is expected in 
prison of all mandatory life sentence prisoners. In broad terms the Secretary of State 
would look for an exemplary work and disciplinary record in prison, genuine remorse, 
and successful engagement in work (including offence - related courses) that has 
resulted in substantial reduction in areas of risk. All these have to be sustained over a 
lengthy period and in at least two prisons. To reach the threshold of exceptional 
progress there would also need to be some extra element to show that the lifer had 
done good works for the benefit of others. Examples would be acting as a Listener, 
helping disabled people to use prison facilities, raising money for charity, and helping 
to deter young people from crime. Again there would need to be evidence of sustained 
involvement in at least two prisons over a lengthy period. 
 
52.   From this statement, it is possible to discern some clear features. Good behaviour is 
not enough to constitute exceptional progress. We agree that the standard should be very 
high: the progress must be exceptional, outstanding, and bearing in mind that it provides the 
basis for a reduction in a period fixed for the purposes of punishment and deterrence, so it 
should be. Even where the necessary high standard is reached, the impact on the total tariff 
period is likely to be very modest. The longest reduction so far has not exceeded two years, 
and in the significant majority of cases where exceptional progress has been established, the 
reduction has been for one year. It also appears, and logically it is plain, that such progress 
falls to be considered when the minimum period is coming towards its end. Finally, it is a 
prerequisite to any reduction that the risk assessment should be favourable. 
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APPENDIX  F 
 
 
Cases referred to by the ECtHR in Vinter, Bamber and Moore 
 
There are two cases not reported in England: 
 
2008 R v Wilson (para 43) 
An application by the Attorney General.  Despite this citing it is not clear how this clarifies 
Schedules 21 and 22. 
 
2005 R v Leigers (para 44) 
The Court of Appeal held that Schedule 22-10 meant that the punishment was compatible with 
Articles 5 and 7 of ECHR. 
 
 
Two cases came before the Privy Council in London.  Both, Reyes 913 and de Boucherville 914 
(paras 68 and 69), addressed the issue of disproportionality.  In the latter case mandatory life 
imprisonment did not allow for the facts to be taken into account, and the sentence was 
manifestly disproportionate and arbitrary.  In the former the mandatory death penalty was 
similarly disproportionate.   
 
The final case referred to was Lau Cheong v Hong Kong Special Administrative Region  915 
(para 72) where the HK Court of Final Appeal rejected a challenge to the mandatory life 
sentence for murder.  It found that the possibility of regular review by an independent board 
meant that the sentence was neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate. 
                                                     
913 [2002] UKPC 11 
914 [2008] UKPC 37 
915 [2002] 2 HKLRD 612; reported in doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pub20030002_i4.htm 
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APPENDIX  G 
 
 
ECtHR rejection of alleged breaches of Articles 5.4, 6 and 7, in  
Vinter, Bamber and Moore  
 
The application central to this thesis was that Article 3 had been breached by the whole life 
order.  In addition, there were complaints of breaches of other Articles.    
 
Articles 5.4 and 6 
 
The Applicants complained that the imposition of a whole life order without the possibility of 
regular review violated Article 5.4 or alternatively Article 6.  The Chamber took the view that 
the complaint fell to be considered under Article 5.4.  The Chamber further considered that the 
issue had been dealt with in Kafkaris (2). 916  That application in respect of Article 5.4 was 
declared inadmissible.  The Court had declared that when someone is deprived of his liberty 
by a judicial decision, the ‘supervision required by Article 5.4 is incorporated by the decision of 
the Court’. 917  No further review was required.  This applied to mandatory life sentences which 
were purely punishment in nature because of the gravity of the offence.   
 
This declaration of inadmissibility was due to Iorgov (2.) 918   Iorgov had been convicted in 
Bulgarian courts of the murder of three children and the rape of one of them and he was 
sentenced to death.  Before this could take place, a moratorium on capital punishment took 
effect and his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without parole.  He challenged the 
lawfulness of his detention under Article 5.4.  The domestic courts had found the seriousness 
of the crimes warranted the harshest penalty.  ECtHR accepted that the determination of the 
need for the sentence imposed on the applicant did not depend on any circumstance that was 
likely to change in time (unlike in the Stafford judgment). 919  In conclusion, ECtHR found that 
the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention was incorporated in the court’s 
conviction.  His application was therefore declared inadmissible.   
 
Similarly, therefore, the application of Vinter, Bamber and Moore was declared inadmissible 
unanimously.   
 
 
                                                     
916 [2011] ECHR 1089  
917 ibid para 58 
918 [2010] ECHR 1269 
919 [2012] ECHR 61  Para 75 
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Article 7  
 
For Bamber it was argued that as the trial judge had recommended a minimum term of 25 
years, the High Court review should not have resulted in a sentence greater than this, in order 
to be compatible with Article 7.  For Moore it was argued that in 1996 it was very exceptional 
indeed for a whole life order to be imposed: the whole life order for his type of crime had not 
been introduced until Schedule 21 in 2003.  
 
The Chamber accepted that setting a minimum term of imprisonment was a sentencing 
exercise and attracted the protection of Article 7.   However, it was unable to accept that the 
process by which these whole life orders were imposed had infringed Article 7.  Schedule 22 
expressly protects against the imposition of a longer minimum term than was originally 
imposed.  Accordingly the applicants’ complaints were found to be manifestly ill founded.  This 









APPENDIX  H 
 
 
The Prerogative of Mercy  
 
Shields  [2008] EWHC 302 (Admin)  
 
Shields was a football supporter who travelled to Bulgaria and who was arrested, tried and 
sentenced to imprisonment for a serious assault.  After failing to get his conviction quashed in 
Bulgaria’s appeal courts he was returned to England to serve his sentence.  The Secretary of 
State maintained that he had no powers to quash the conviction because of the terms of the 
Convention On The Transfer Of Sentenced Persons 1983.   Much of the case before the High 
Court was concerned with the nature of the Secretary of State’s powers.  What is of relevance 
to this study are the comments made by the Court on pardons:   a pardon is a common law 
extra-judicial power exercised by the Crown under the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, and is 
exercised by the Secretary of State for Justice as the minister responsible for those in 
detention.  In ‘modern times’ it has been exercised in three situations:  special remission where 
the prison authorities miscalculate a release date; conditional pardon e.g. Bentley where the 
penalty was recognised not to be commensurate with the offending;  and a free pardon which 
may relate to a miscarriage of justice.   This last possibility has rarely been exercised since the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1907 and more particularly with the establishment of CCRC in 1995.   The 
court concluded however: 
 
The prerogative to grant a free pardon undoubtedly remains, as was made plain in 
Bentley  - and see also section 16 of the 1995 Act, which provides for the 
Commission to give assistance to the Secretary of State in connection with the 




Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers:  Final Report  (Ministry of Justice 
2009)  
 
In the section dealing with the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, the Report notes that the power is 
exercised by the Sovereign on ministerial advice.  The power of pardon falls into two parts. 
 
In the first, free and conditional pardons were used to address miscarriages of justice.  The 
High Court’s ruling in Shields emphasised ‘the breadth and flexibility of the Royal Prerogative 
of Mercy, together with the Secretary of State’s right to formulate appropriate policies and 
                                                     
920 para 19 
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criteria for its application’.921  The Report asserted it would be inappropriate to grant a free 
pardon where a statutory remedy was available.  The Criminal Appeals Act 1995 Section 16 
(1) provides that CCRC must consider any matter referred to it by the Secretary of State in his 
consideration of whether to recommend the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy;  
CCRC must provide a statement of its conclusions and the Secretary of State must treat 
CCRC’s statement as conclusive.    At the date of the Report this provision had never been 
used.   
 
The second part of the power of pardon is remission pardons that fall into four groups:   
 
• Compassionate grounds:  this has been constrained by the statutory provision in the 
Crime Sentences Act 1997 Section 30.     
• Information helping to bring others to justice: the scope of this has been narrowed 
statutorily by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.   
• The prevention of escape, injury or death by a serving prisoner: this power has not 
been affected by statute.   
• Mistakes surrounding a prisoner’s release date: there is no remedy except the use of 
the Royal Prerogative.   
 
 
The section of the Report dealing with the Prerogative of Mercy concludes: 
 
Use of the prerogative powers to grant free, conditional and remission pardons 
has been largely, but not entirely, superseded by statutory provisions.  Residual 















                                                     
921 para 61 






Compassionate Release  
 
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
 
s30 Power to release life prisoners on compassionate grounds. 
 
(1) The Secretary of State may at any time release a life prisoner on licence if he is 
satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the prisoner’s release on 
compassionate grounds. 
(2) Before releasing a life prisoner under subsection (1) above, the Secretary of State 




Prison Service Order 4700 
 
Chapter 12. Indeterminate sentence prisoners compassionate release on medical grounds  
12.1 General 
 
12.1.1 Under section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, the Secretary of State may 
at any time release a prisoner on licence if he or she is satisfied that exceptional 
circumstances exist which justify early release on compassionate grounds.  Before exercising 
this power, the Secretary of State is required to consult the Parole Board, unless the 
circumstances make such consultation impracticable. Each case is considered on its own 
individual merits.  Compassionate release must be approved personally by a Minister; it is not 
a decision which is delegated to officials. 
 
12.2 Criteria for release on compassionate grounds 
 
12.2.1 The criteria for compassionate release on medical grounds for all indeterminate 
sentence prisoners (ISP) are as follows: - 
 
The prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness and death is likely to occur very shortly 
(although there are no set time limits, 3 months may be considered to be an appropriate period 
for an application to be made to Public Protection Casework Section [PPCS]), or the ISP is 
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bedridden or similarly incapacitated, for example, those paralysed or suffering from a severe 
stoke; 
and 
The risk of re-offending (particularly of a sexual or violent nature) is minimal; further 
imprisonment would reduce the prisoner’s life expectancy; 
and 
there are adequate arrangements for the prisoner’s care and treatment outside prison; 
and 
early release will bring some significant benefit to the prisoner or his/her family. 
 
 
12.2.2 However, the resource and cost implications of maintaining staff on bed-watch 
duties at an outside hospital/hospice are not grounds to justify release on compassionate 
grounds if the criteria set out above are not met.  Other examples of cases not meeting the 
criteria are where conditions are self-induced, for example: following a hunger strike or where 









The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill  2012: 
Amendment 178A   
 
(1) In the case of a life prisoner who has been made subject to a whole life order, 
and has served 30 years of his sentence, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of 
State, with the consent of the Lord Chief Justice and the trial judge if available, to 
refer the case to the Parole Board. 
(2) If the Parole Board is satisfied- 
(a) that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner 
should be confined, and 
(b) that in all the circumstances the release of the prisoner on licence would be in 
the interests of justice, 
the Parole Board may direct his release under this section. 
(3) Where the Parole Board has directed a prisoner's release under this section, it 
shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence. 
 
